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The definition of a tax base developed by Haig and refined by 
Simons has become the normative standard for evaluating income tax 
rules. 1 Haig-Simons income is defined as the sum of "(1) the market 
value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the 
value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end of 
the period in question."2 Although the accretion tax model Haig-
1. H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION (1938). Simons had a limited, but important, 
purpose in setting out a definition of "ideal income": 
Since the devices of accounting and tax legislation contemplate only very rough 'approxi-
mation to income, it is decisively important to see behind these methods of calculation an 
"ideal income," calculable by different and less practicable methods. Only on the basis of 
some broader conception is it possible to criticize and evaluate merely practicable proce-
dures and to consider fruitfully the problem of bettering the system of presumptions. In-
deed, if there be any excuse for a treatise like this, it must lie in the importance of 
maintaining some broad - and perhaps quite "impractical" - conception in terms of 
which existing and proposed practices in income taxation may be examined, tested, and 
criticized. 
Id at 105-06 (footnote omitted). It served this function well, as demonstrated by even a brief 
review of recent legal literature. See, e.g., Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal 
Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1113, 1113-19 (1974); Epstein, The Consumption and Loss of 
Personal Property Under the Internal Revenue Code, 23 STAN. L. REV. 454, 455 (1971); Halperin, 
Interest in Disguise: Taxing the "Time Value of Money," 95 YALE L.J. 506, 508-09 (1986); 
Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an "Ideal" Income Tax and 
Why They Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831, 833 (1979); Klein, 
Timing in Personal Taxation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 463, 464 n.17 (1977); Stephan, Federal 
Income Taxation and Human Capital, 70 VA. L. REV. 1357, 1359 n.2 (1984); Strnad, Taxation of 
Income from Capital: A Theoretical Reappraisal, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1023, 1024-25 (1985). 
2. H. SIMONS, supra note 1, at 50. Simons discussed Professor Haig's earlier accretion con-
cept. Id. at 61-62. That concept was introduced in Haig, The Concept of Income - Economic 
and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7 (R. Haig ed. 1921). Simons also gave 
credit for this definition of "income ideal" to Georg Schanz. Id.; see Schanz, Der Einkommen-
sbegrijf und die Einkommensteurgesetze, 13 FINANZ ARCHIV 1 (1896); see also Musgrave, In 
Defense of an Income Concept, 81 HARV. L. REV. 44, 47 n.7 (1967) (observing that Schanz was 
the first to propose the accretion concept). 
This definition includes (although not explicitly) the income tax itself in the tax base. See 
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Simons describes is the keystone of many tax policy arguments, tax 
commentators readily admit that administrative constraints tum the 
definition into an unachievable ideal. 3 
One significant departure from the ideal is the Internal Revenue 
Code's failure to tax unrealized gains.4 The Code's treatment of un-
realized gains has nothing to do with its definition of income, and 
everything to do with the timing of the tax assessment. Requiring a 
realization event before assessing a tax, as the Code does, avoids the 
difficult administrative problems of determining the value of property 
by hypothesizing a market event.5 Additionally, such a requirement 
prevents the possibility that the taxpayer will be forced to liquidate an 
investment or borrow to pay any tax due. 6 
Ironically, Simons was generally indifferent to the timing implica-
tions of his definition,7 and instead concentrated his critique of the 
Andrews, supra note 1, at 1114 n.2 (demonstrating that including the income tax in the tax base 
is .really only an issue of tax rates). 
3. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 1, at 1142-43, 1148; Epstein, supra note 1, at 457; Klein, 
supra note 1, at 465. 
4. An unrealized gain occurs when a taxpayer retains property that has appreciated in value. 
The Code taxes this appreciation only when the taxpayer enters into a realization event by dis-
posing of the property. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920); Andrews, supra note 1, at 
1115-16, 1123-48. The Code's failure to tax imputed income is the other reason it falls short of 
the Haig-Simons ideal. See id. at 1115, 1122; Klein, supra note 1, at 463-67, 475; Stephan, supra 
note l, at 1363. Although the exclusion of imputed income from the Code's tax base is largely 
attributable to the definition of income, tax timing also plays a significant role. See infra notes 
127-33 and accompanying text. 
5. See H. SIMONS, supra note l, at 56, 100, 103-04, 153; Andrews, supra note 1, at 1141-42; 
see also H. SIMONS, supra note 1, at 82-89 (critiquing attempts to define income in terms of 
transaction profit, instead of acknowledging that this approach provided merely an administra-
tively workable solution for identifying income). 
6. See Andrews, supra note l, at 1143. But see Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A 
Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1167-76 (1986) (providing data showing 
that liquidity is not as serious a problem as it seems). Ifliquidity is not significant, then failure to 
tax periodic increases in the cash surrender value of life insurance policies or deferred annuity 
contracts is indefensible. Valuation is easy, and to delay tax payment, even a time-value-adjusted 
tax payment, is unwarranted. See id. at 1137-38. The same argument applies to installment 
sales. See generally Note, Fairness and Tax Avoidance in the Taxation of Installment Sales, 100 
HARV. L. REv. 403 (1986) (discussing tax deferral and tax avoidance opportunities of install-
ment sales). 
Two major exceptions to the Code's realization principle are its provision for amortization 
deductions for wasting assets and other property subject to wear and tear or obsolescence, see 
l.R.C. §§ 167-69, 179, 184, 188, 280F, 611 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), and its inventory rule of 
lower than cost or market, see Treas. Reg. § I.471-2(c) (1958); 4 B. BITIKER, FEDERAL TAXA-
TION OF INCOME, EsTATES AND GIFTS ~ 105.4.4 (1981 & Supp. 3 1989). See generally H. 
SIMONS, supra note l, at 88 (criticizing asymmetric treatment of value changes). 
7. There remains the possibility, under the arrangements here proposed, of postponing 
tax payments and thus of retaining the use of funds which, under an income-tax procedure 
involving annual reappraisal of investment assets, would be payable to the government at 
earlier dates. Enjoying large gains, realizable but unrealized, one could in effect borrow 
from the treasury without interest, sometimes for many years. While this possibility indi-
cates a significant difference between the "ideal" methods of calculating taxable income and 
the modified realization procedure, there would seem to be no serious inequities involved in 
adherence to the methods which practical considerations so strongly dictate .•.• Moreover, 
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federal tax system on its exclusion of certain income items. 8 However, 
those criticisms pale in comparison to the Code's failure to adhere to 
what the Haig-Simons ideal establishes as the proper time for tax as-
sessment.9 That ideal implies that any consumption or changes in the 
market price of asset holdings that occur during the designated taxing 
period should be assessed and taxed at that time.10 
Although the timing differences between Haig-Simons and the 
Code might appear largely inconsequential because both models use 
equivalent income measures, time-value-of-money analysis demon-
strates that timing differences seriously affect the fairness and alloca-
tive efficiency of the taxing system.11 "Time value of money" is a 
the treasury is protected in most cases against abuse of the postponement opportunities, for 
wholesale postponement would ordinarily subject the income, when realized, to much 
higher surtax rates. 
H. SIMONS, supra note 1, at 168-69; see also id. at 208; id. at 44 (acknowledging that the term 
"income" is frequently used to mean gain from transactions and noting that the "distinguishing 
feature of this conception is that it presupposes no allocation of income to assigued periods of 
time - that it does not raise the often crucial question as to when 'income' accrues"); id. at 50 
("The relation of the income concept to the specified time interval is fundamental - and neglect 
of this crucial relation has been responsible for much confusion in the relevant literature."); id. at 
89-100 (critiquing Irving Fisher's work on capital, interest, and consumption). 
8. Simons argued that gifts, inheritances, and bequests should be included in the tax base, see 
id. at 56-58, 125-47, as well as interest from state and local securities, id. at 170-84, and imputed 
income from property, see id. at 112-19. 
9. Professor Warren might criticize the text's claim that the Haig-Simons definition tells us 
something about timing: 
Simons's idea ... is strictly personal in its application. As Simons himself put it, the con-
cept is simply an arithmetical operation, designed to identify the change in a person's posi-
tion over the course of an accounting period. It does not provide a standard for deciding 
whether a given receipt, transaction, event, or whatever is income in some abstract sense. 
Nor does the idea usefully illuminate the nature of the aggregate tax base, let alone the 
appropriate taxable unit or period, a limitation not always appreciated by either Simons's 
disciples or the denigrators of his formulation. 
Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081, 1084-
85 (1980) (footnotes omitted). However, although Simons tells us nothing about the appropriate 
length of a taxing period, his interest in formulating a definition that properly identifies income 
with persons "for comparative purposes (for measurement of relative incomes)," H. SIMONS, 
supra note 1, at 52, suggests that, whatever taxing period the government adopts, a person's tax 
base must include consumption and changes in asset values that occurred during that taxing 
period. See also supra note 7 (identifying Simons' acknowledgment of timing issues) .. 
10. The verb occur is hopelessly imprecise and ambiguous in a discussion focused on the 
proper timing of a tax assessment. Nevertheless, I use it instead of the more traditional term 
accrue to avoid confusion with the tax accounting method that presupposes the realization-event 
model. Moreover, occur seems to capture more accurately the central notion of value in the 
Haig-Simons definition of income. See H. SIMONS, supra note l, at 99-100 (resisting the term 
accrual because it inadequately describes the notion of periodic reevaluation of the taxpayer's 
assets and obligations). 
11. Time-value-of-money analysis has become conventional fare in the tax legal literature 
during the past 15 years. See, e.g., M. GRAETZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 384-90 (2d ed. 
1988); s. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 108-11, 117-25, 317-19 nn. 29-31, 323-24 nn. 1-
3 & 6-7 (1973); Andrews, supra note 1, at 1123-28; Blum, New Role/or the Treasury: Charging 
Interest on Tax Deferral Loans, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1988); Canellos & Kleinbard, The 
Miracle of Compound Interest: Interest Deferral and Discount After 1982, 38 TAX L. REv. 565 
(1983); Halperin, The Time Value of Money-1984, 23 TAX NOTES 751 (1984); Halperin, supra 
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shorthand reference to the simple principle that a person prefers a dol-
lar today over one tomorrow, because, by investing today's dollar, that 
person tomorrow will have not only the dollar but also an investment 
return on it. This simple principle was frequently forgotten or under-
estimated in the income tax arena, because policymakers saw that a 
failure to tax in one period led to an increased tax base in a later pe-
riod, and they believed that the progressive tax rates would eliminate 
any advantage to the taxpayer. 12 This thinking was misguided for two 
reasons. It failed to appreciate, first, that the amount of untaxed in-
come did not increase, but the nonassessment of tax allowed the tax-
payer a larger amount to invest in the later period, and, second, that 
the taxpayers who benefitted most from the delay were those otherwise 
already subject to the highest progressive tax rates. 
The importance of the time-value-of-money principle is demon-
strated easily by the following two-period example. Assume a 30% 
tax rate, a 20% pretax rate of return, and an investment at Time 0 of 
$10,000. At Time 1, the taxpayer's investment has grown to $12,000 
(10,000 X (1 + .2)). If the government taxes the $2000 gain at that 
time, the taxpayer then has only $11,400 ($12,000 - ($2000 X .3)) to 
reinvest during the next period.13 At Time 2, that $11,400 has grown 
to $13,680 ($11,400 X (1 + .2)), and the tax on the $2280 gain leaves 
an after-tax return of $12,996 ($13,680 - ($2,280 X .3)). On the 
other hand, if the government assesses no tax at Time 1 (when the 
taxpayer's investment has grown to $12,000), the taxpayer can rein-
vest $12,000 and by Time 2 the pretax return will have grown to 
note l; Johnson, Silk Purses from a Sow'.s' Ear: Cost Free Liabilities Under the Income Tax, 3 
AM. J. TAX POLY. 231 (1984); Kelman, Time Preference and Tax Equity, 35 STAN. L. RBV. 649 
(1983); Kiefer, The Tax Treatment of "Reverse Investment": An Analysis of the Time Value of 
Money and the Appropriate Tax Treatment of Future Costs, 26 TAX NOTES 925 (1985); Associa· 
tion of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on Taxation, Transactions Involving De· 
/erred Payment of Accrued Liabilities: Federal Income Tax and the Time Value of Money, 20 
TAX NOTES 699 (1983); Sunley, Observations on the Appropriate Tax Treatment of Future Costs, 
22 TAX NOTES 719 (1984). 
12. See supra note 7. 
13. This article adopts a comparison analysis that assumes that the taxpayer's investments 
will change in response to different tax rules. Some might refer to this approach as a partial· 
equilibrium analysis. See Kaplow & Warren, An Income Tax by Any Other Name -A Reply to 
Professor Strnad, 38 STAN. L. REV. 399, 414-15 (1986). In an effort to isolate and explain differ-
ences among tax rules, this approach fails to account for market changes that may result from 
those different rules. The analysis should not be misconstrued as reflecting real-world market 
effects, but instead should be seen as a methodological tool for understanding the different tax 
models. 
The example in the text and others that follow treat accretions and decretions as occurring at 
a particular point in time to avoid an analysis that depends on calculus. Although most market· 
place changes in value occur gradually over time, the basic methodology and conclusions of this 
article would not change if that complexity were taken into account. 
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$14,400 ($12,000 X (1 + .2)). A30% tax on the resulting $4400 ga~ 
would yield an after-tax return of $13,080 ($14,400 - ($4400 X .3)). 
The higher tax base, in absolute dollar terms, resulting from the 
tax delay is attributable to the taxpayer's investment of the $600 of 
unpaid taxes at a 20% pretax rate; the $120 return on that investment 
($600 X .2) accounts for the $84 difference in after-tax wealth 
($13,080 - $12,996). The $2000 gain at Time 1, which the govern-
ment fails to tax until Time 2, still results in only a $600 tax at Time 2. 
This observation is the key to understanding the operation of the time-
value-of-money principle in the tax context: Not having to pay the 
$600 tax liability until later allows the taxpayer to invest it and retain 
the after-tax return on the unpaid tax liability, or $84 ($600 X .2 X (1 
- .3)), even after the $600 is ultimately paid at Time 2. 
The tax deferral advantage has both economic and social implica-
tions. Economic resources potentially are misallocated as investors 
search for investments that will produce unrealized gains and retain 
those investments to avoid taxation. Further, wealth redistribution ef-
forts are undermined because the opportunities for tax deferral are 
greater for persons with capital wealth. 14 
The time-value-of-money principle, while exposing the serious 
problems created by the Code's realization-event rule, provides the an-
alytical tool for designing a tax system that solves them. This article 
presents a proposal which demonstrates that, with a few assumptions, 
time-value adjustments virtually convert the Code's realization-event 
taxing model into the Haig-Simons ideal. 15 To avoid liquidity and 
most valuation problems, the proposal operates in the Code's familiar 
fashion of assessing a tax only when a market transaction occurs. 
However, the difference between the proposed taxing model and the 
Code is in the manner of computing the tax liability. The method 
proposed here uses the initial investment and selling price to estimate 
14. "Economic resources" refers to goods and services that are exchanged in the market-
place. See Warren, supra note 9, at 1084. 
15. The proposed conversion to the Haig-Simons ideal is incomplete in two respects. One 
variance from the ideal concerns the timing of the tax on the accretion of human capital. For a 
further discussion of the concept of human capital, see Klein, supra note l, at 465-69; Stephan, 
supra note 1; Warren, supra note 9, at 1113-17; and infra notes 120-26 and accompanying text. 
Difficulties of measurement, and of accurately allocating human capital accretion to particular 
periods in the taxpayer's life, place it beyond the proposal's taxing technique. The second vari-
ance from the ideal involves imputed income from services and property produced and consumed 
outside the marketplace. For a further discussion of the concept of imputed income, see 1 B. 
BITIKER, supra note 6, at 11 5.3; H. SIMONS, supra note 1, at 51-52, 112-22; and infra notes 127-
33 and accompanying text. Policy and practical considerations allow for only partial taxation of 
the value of imputed income under present law and under the proposal advanced here. This 
article argues that these two exceptions are insufficient reasons for rejecting further consideration 
of the proposal. 
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the gains and losses for each period the taxpayer holds or produces an 
asset, computes a tax for each period based on the estimated market 
price changes, and adjusts the period's tax for any payment delay. 
The tax assessed at the time of the realization event is the sum of the 
time-adjusted tax for each period that the taxpayer holds or produces 
the asset. 
An income tax system designed around this approach would look 
very different from the Code. Provisions for capital gains and losses, 
depreciation and amortization, capitalization of incurred expenses, 
nonrecognition of gains and losses on property, net operating losses, 
and passive activities would no longer be necessary. Moreover, the 
system proposed here would permit serious consideration of the repeal 
of the federal corporate and wealth transfer taxes, because those taxes 
serve primarily to reach some of the income that escapes taxation 
when individual taxpayers exploit the existing realization-event princi-
ple. Without the incursions on the tax base resulting from tax defer-
ral, administration of either a corporate or wealth transfer tax may 
prove unnecessary. 
Others have previously proposed a time-adjusted-realization-event 
tax ("TARET") or a variation of it. 16 The main objections to these 
16. See, e.g., CoNGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REVISING THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 
70-81 (1983); INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES, THE STRUCTURE AND REFORM OF DIRECT 
TAXATION 127-49 (1978) (Report of Committee chaired by J.E. Meade) [hereinafter MEADE 
REPORT]; Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation (Draft Nov. 1988); Blum, supra note 
11, at 27-93; Brinner, Inflation, Defe"a/, and the Neutral Taxation of Capital Gains, 26 NATL. 
TAX J. 565, 570-71 (1973); Diamond, Inflation and the Comprehensive Tax Base, 4 J. Pun. 
EcoN. 227 (1975); Gann, Neutral Taxation of Capital Income: An Achievable Goal?, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PRODS., Autumn 1985, at 77, 145-47; Helliwell, The Taxation of Capital Gains, 2 
CAN. J. EcoN. 314 (1969); Vickrey, Averaging of Income for Income Tax Purposes, 47 J. POL. 
EcoN. 379 (1939); see also Galvin, Tax Legislation in the Reagan Era - Movement to or from a 
Consumption Base?, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS. 31, 35-39 (1985) (proposing annual valuations 
and taxation for taxpayers owning assets exceeding a certain value); Shakow, supra note 6 (pro-
posing annual taxation on market value changes of some assets and time-value-of-money adjust-
ments of the tax upon the sale of others). 
Congress already has introduced taxpayers, in a limited way, to time-adjusted tax computa-
tions. See I.R.C. § 453(1)(3) (1982) (The installment method is available for a dealer's disposition 
of residential lots or time-shares if the dealer elects to pay interest on the amount of deferred tax 
attributable to the use of the installment method.); I.R.C. § 453A (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (This 
provision charges interest, with some exceptions, on the tax deferred by the use of the installment 
method for nondealer dispositions for more than $150,000 of business or rental property. The 
interest is charged only to the extent that the deferred payments for these types of dispositions for 
the tax year exceed $5 million.); I.R.C. §§ 460(a)(2), (b)(2)-(3) (Supp. IV 1986) (For some long-
term contracts, the taxpayer must use the percentage-of-completion method for calculating taxes 
owed on a portion of the contract during the contract's duration. When the taxpayer completes 
the contract, however, the taxpayer must "look back" and calculate the taxes that would have 
been payable each year if actual total costs had been known. If the taxpayer underpaid taxes in 
any period under the percentage-of-completion method, interest will be assessed for the payment 
delay; conversely, if the taxpayer overpaid in any period, the government must pay interest on 
the prepayment.); I.R.C. § 995(f) (Supp. IV 1986) (This provision imposes an interest charge on 
shareholders of a Domestic International Sales Corporation, or "DISC," to compensate for tax 
deferral enjoyed with regard to accumulated DISC income.); I.R.C. §§ 1291-97 (Supp. IV 1986) 
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proposals have been that the system for allocating gains and losses to 
prior periods is inaccurate and that the time-value adjustments are 
complicated and administratively burdensome.17 This article explores 
the operation of T ARET and demonstrates that it produces economic 
neutrality and fairness among taxpayers, while simplifying the tax sys-
tem by eliminating the need for provisions designed to reduce deferral 
advantages or ameliorate the inequities created by the realization-
event rule. Finally, even if one decides that TARET should not be 
implemented, considering its operation provides a useful and quite dif-
ferent perspective on tax policy and taxing issues. In Simons' words, 
exploring the T ARET model allows us "to consider fruitfully the 
problem of bettering the system of presumptions."18 
Part I establishes the foundation for the time-adjustment compo-
nent in TARET by explaining tax deferral through examples and anal-
ogies. Part II sets forth TARET and shows how it achieves the goals 
of economic neutrality, fairness, and administrability. Section 
Il.A.l.a, dealing with nonexhaustible assets used in business or invest-
ment ventures, presents the core concepts of the model; further refine-
ments are provided in discussions of assets that the taxpayer exhausts, 
produces, or devotes to consumption. Section II.D extends the 
TARET approach to debt, and includes an: extended discussion of the 
controversy concerning the proper treatment of future costs. The final 
section of Part II summarizes the model and its operational implica-
tions. Part III continues the evaluation of the TARET model by com-
paring it to the "consumption tax" approach, 19 which has gained 
political attention in recent years as a viable and desirable alternative 
to the present unwieldy tax regime.20 The purpose of this Part is to 
(These provisions apply to shareholders who are United States persons investing in a foreign 
corporation that earns a substantial amount of passive income, or a "PFIC." If U.S. sharehold-
ers realize a gain from the disposition of PFIC stock or receive corporate distributions in excess 
of 125% of the average amount of distributions received during the three preceding taxable 
years, they must compute their tax in a manner similar to the time-adjusted approach described 
in the text.). 
The term "TARET" will be used throughout the article to refer to the particular time-ad-
justed model that I am putting forth. Although some aspects ofTARET have been suggested by 
others, its particular solutions to the variety of tax-deferral opportunities produced by the reali-
zation-event principle are unique to TARET. 
17. Andrews, supra note 1, at 1148; Vickrey, Tax Simplification Through Cumulative Averag-
ing, 34 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 736, 740 (1969). 
18. H. SIMONS, supra note l, at 106; see supra note 1 (quoting the complete passage). 
19. The consumption tax refers to a tax "in which accumulation is comprehensively ex-
cluded." Andrews, supra note 1, at 1120; see also id. at 1117 n.7 (providing an historical sketch 
of the development of the consumption tax idea); id. at 1120 n.11 (discussing the relationship of 
value-added taxes to the consumption and accretion models). · 
20. See, e.g., Babbit, Letter to the Editor, Wash. Post, Jan. 31, 1988, at D6, col. 4; Kilborn, 
Tax System: Efficiency vs. Fairness, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1988, at 35, col. 3 (national ed.); Price, 
Time is Right for the Right Type of Tax, L.A. Times, Oct. 31, 1987, § 2, at 8, col. 4. 
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begin the debate about whether TARET or the consumption tax best 
achieves the tax goals of economic neutrality, fairness, and adminis-
trability. The conclusion emphasizes certain issues, regarding adjust-
ments to exclude general price-level changes from the tax base and the 
transition rules necessary to move from the realization-event model to 
TARET, that must still be explored before TARET can become a seri-
ous alternative to the present tax structure. 
I. UNDERSTANDING TAX DEFERRAL 
Consider again the simple example of the taxpayer who acquires 
an asset for $10,000, enjoys a 20% pretax rate of market price increase 
for each period, sells the asset at the end of the second period, and is 
taxed at a 30% rate for gains earned in each period. A comparison of 
Table I, illustrating the tax consequences under the Haig-Simons ideal, 
with Table II, illustrating the tax consequences under the Code's reali-
zation-event model, shows the significance of taxing an accretion 
when it occurs, rather than when it is realized. 
TABLE I: HAIG-SIMONS MODEL 
Investment 
Profit 
Tax 
After-tax return 
Time 0 
---
$10,000 
0 
0 
$10,000 
Time 1 
---$10,000 
$ 2,0001 
$ 6002 
$11,400 
1. $10,000 investment multiplied by 20% rate of market price change. 
2. $2000 profit for period multiplied by 30% tax rate. 
3. $10,000 base investment plus $1400 after-tax profit from Time 1. 
4. $11,400 investment multiplied by 20% rate of market price change. 
5. $2280 profit for period multiplied by 30% tax rate. 
TABLE II: REALIZATION-EVENT MODEL 
TimeO Time 1 
--- ---
Investment $10,000 $10,000 
Profit 0 $ 2,0001 
Tax 0 02 
After-tax return $10,000 $12,000 
I. $10,000 investment multiplied by 20% rate of market price change. 
2. No tax is assessed because no realization event has occurred at Time 1. 
3. $10,000 base investment plus $2000 untaxed profit from Time I. 
4. $12,000 investment multiplied by 20% rate of market price change. 
Time2 
$11,4003 
$ 2,2804 
$ 6845 
$12,996 
Time2 
$12,0003 
$ 2,4004 
$ 1,3205 
$13,080 
5. Sum of $2000 profit at Time I and $2400 profit at Time 2, or $4400, multiplied by 30% tax 
rate. 
The $84 difference ($13,080 - $12,996) in the after-tax returns 
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reflected in Tables I and II is attributable to the realization-event 
model's deferral of tax on the $2000 appreciation occurring at Time 
1.21 By being able to delay paying $600 in tax, the taxpayer, under the 
realization-event regime, could invest that money and obtain $120 of 
additional appreciation between Time 1 and Time 2 ($600 X .2). That 
$120 was, of course, itself subject to the 30% tax at Time. 2, but the 
taxpayer was still left $84 better off.22 The tax base is preserved to the 
extent that the tax base at Time 2 includes the $2000 increase at Time 
1, but the comparison with the Haig-Simons ideal demonstrates that 
more is needed to equate these two models. , 
. Analogies to interest-free loans, tax forgiveness, and a tax-free re-
turn on investment income further demonstrate the value of tax post-
ponement and are useful in understanding TARET's solutions to tax 
deferral.23 Table I shows that the $2000 accretion occurring at Time 1 
leads to a $600 tax liability at Time 1, and Table II shows that the 
realization-event model allows the taxpayer to postpone payment of 
that $600 tax liability until Time 2. Comparing the two models sug-
gests that one way to describe the value of tax deferral is as the 
equivalent of an interest-free loan from the government .. Had the gov-
ernment charged the taxpayer the same rate of interest that the invest-
ment earned, the Table II taxpayer would have owed $720 (the $600 
of tax plus $120 of interest), rather than $600, at Time 2, The cost of 
borrowing, or the $120, however, would have led to a deduction and a 
lower tax base at Time 2 under the realization-event model. This 
lower tax base in tum would have reduced the tax liability iJy $36 
($120 X .3), leaving the taxpayer with an after-tax savings from the 
government's interest-free loan of $84 ($120 - $36). The interest-free 
loan analogy is the mirror image of the earlier explanation for the dif-
ference between the after-tax returns under Tables I and II. This arti-
cle relies heavily on this analogy to explain the Code's failings and 
TARET's approach, because TARET's response to tax deferral 
problems is simply to impose interest on unpaid tax liabilities. 
A second way to describe the benefit that tax deferral confers on 
the taxpayer is to consider how much the taxpayer would have to set 
21. The amount of the tax on the increase in the asset's value at Time 1 might be greater at 
Time 2 if the progressive rate schedule operated to place the taxpayer at a higher marginal rate at 
that time. It might also change if Congress imposed different tax rates for the different tax 
periods. The discussion in the text isolates the time-value-of-money issue by assuming that the 
same tax rate applies in both time periods. 
22. That figure is derived as follows: $120 multiplied by the 30% tax rate equals $36, and 
$120 minus $36 equals $84. These computations can be more simply described as $120 X (1 -
.3) = $84. 
23. For a similar analysis of tax deferral, see M. GRAETZ, supra note 11, at 385-90; Andrews, 
supra note 1, at 1124-28. 
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aside at Time 1 in order to have $600 available at Time 2 to pay the 
tax. If the taxpayer's rate of return remains 20% and she pays a tax 
on that return at Time 2, she would have to set aside only $526.32 at 
Time 1.24 That is the same as saying that $73.68 of tax ($600 -
$526.32) is forgiven at Time 1, which is the equivalent of $84 ($73.68 
X [1 + .2(1 - .3)]) at Time 2.2s This tax-forgiveness analogy, as is 
true for all discussions of tax deferral, relies on determining the 
amount of taxes not paid at Time 1 ($600), when the increase in the 
market value of the taxpayer's asset ($2000) occurred. It is especially 
useful because it highlights the fact that, in the realization-event 
model, the amount of the tax calculated on the income that occurred 
at Time 1 remains unchanged at Time 2, i.e., that time-value-of-money 
is ignored. 
A third way to describe the advantage of tax deferral is to observe 
that the after-tax return of $13,080 achieved under the realization-
event model is equivalent to the after-tax return if the taxpayer were 
taxed on the $2000 of income at Time 1 and then not taxed on any 
further income yielded from the after-tax investment of $1400 ($2000 
X (1 - .3)). Under this yield-exemption analogy, the only tax owed 
at Time 2 would be $600, which is the tax on the profit earned on the 
original $10,000 investment between Time 1 and Time 2, leaving a 
$13,080 after-tax return. Table III illustrates this analogy. 
TABLE III: YIELD-EXEMPTION MODEL 
Time 0 Time 1 Time2 
--- --- ---
Investment $10,000 $10,000 $11,400 
Profit 0 $ 2,0001 $ 2,2803 
Tax 0 $ 6002 $ 6004 
After-tax return $10,000 $11,400 $13,080 
1. $10,000 investment multiplied by 20% rate of market price change. 
2. $2000 profit for period multiplied by 30% tax rate. 
3. $11,400 investment ($10,000 base investment plus $1400 after-tax profit from Time 1) multi-
plied by 20% rate of market price change. 
4. $2000 of the $2280 profit multiplied by the 30% tax rate. The remaining $280 ($1400 X .2) 
profit represents the profit on the after-tax profit from Time 1 of $1400 ($2000 (1 - .3)) and, 
according to this model, is excluded from taxation. 
24. This amount is derived by solving for X in the following formula: [1 + .2(1 - .3)]X = 
$600. 
25. Equivalence in this context means that the taxpayer is indifferent about receiving a cer-
tain amount of money at Time 1 or a larger amount at a later time. The amount received at the 
later time is equivalent only if it is equal to the after-tax return that the taxpayer would have if 
she had received the money earlier and invested it herself. Two important aspects of the equiva-
lence computation are compound interest and that each period's profit is taxed at each period in 
accordance with the Haig-Simons ideal. 
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The equivalence of the yield-exemption analogy to the realization-
event model is easily identified if the computation of the after-tax re-
turn for the Time 1 profit under the realization-event model is stated 
in its simplest arithmetic form:26 
(l)(R)(l + Rt-1(1 :- T) 
I - market value of asset at time of acquisition 
R - rate of market price change 
n the number of periods since asset was acquired 
T - rate of tax 
This depiction of the realization-event model's treatment of the 
Time 1 profit demonstrates that the yield-exemption analogy merely 
describes this formula's components in a different order. It focuses 
first on the after-tax function (1 - T) and then the reinvestment 
function (1 + R)n-1, reminding us that the transitivity property of 
arithmetic makes this difference irrelevant. The yield-exemption 
analogy, as is true for all discussions of tax deferral, depends on 
determining the amount of taxes not paid at Time 1 ($600) when the 
increase in the value of the taxpayer's asset ($2000) occurred. This 
analysis is particularly useful because it illustrates dramatically that 
timing differences carry implications for the tax base, and that any 
effort to make the accretion tax base comprehensive requires 
consideration of when the government intends to assess the tax on 
accretions and decretions. 27 
26. The formula does not show the total tax liability owed under the realization-event model, 
because it does not take into account the profit earned on the original investment during each 
period. The explanation in the text isolates the question of taxation of the profit in the first 
period and its treatment under the realization-event model. 
27. One danger of considering the yield-exemption analogy is that it is easy to overlook the 
conditions necessary for the equivalence to hold. Professor Graetz identifies some of those 
conditions in the following manner: 
(i) The applicable tax rates must remain constant - rates can neither be progressive nor 
change over time. 
(ii) Interest rates must be constant. The yield from the investment must be the same 
without regard to when the investment is made. 
(iii) The deduction must produce an immediate tax savings equal to the taxpayer's 
marginal rate multiplied by the deduction. This means that the deduction must offset 
income from other sources and cannot be either lost or delayed by carryover requirements. 
(iv) Taxpayers are assumed to be concerned only with their after-tax position. 
Typically, the tax savings is assumed to be invested so as to yield a return identical to that of 
the original investment. It is assumed that the opportunities for investment at the assumed 
rate of return are unlimited. 
(v) Where borrowing is involved (again with constant tax and interest rates), the 
equivalence would hold only if the ratio of borrowing to after-tax investment were the same 
under a yield exemption and an immediate deduction. If speculative investment 
opportunities (or borrowing opportunities) were limited, after-tax differences between 
winning and losing taxpayers would be lessened under the immediate deduction method 
[referring to nontaxation of Time 1 profit under the realization-event method]. 
(vi) The system must be closed. Tax is collected at an identical rate on the earnings 
from an asset immediately deducted and on amounts received at the close of the transaction 
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For simplicity, the discussion of tax-deferral opportunities has 
focused exclusively on the postponement of tax on increases in the 
market price of the taxpayer's asset holdings. However, tax-deferral 
opportunities also arise under the realization-event model when 
taxpayers are permitted to take premature deductions by anticipating 
decretions before they have occurred.28 For example, the Code's 
generous amortization rules overestimate decretions during the early 
years of a taxpayer's ownership of what I will refer to as "exhaustible 
assets," or assets that depreciate in value from wear and tear or 
obsolescence, producing the same tax-deferral advantages as 
postponing taxation of market price increases. 29 The Code refuses to 
follow the realization-event principle for market price decreases and to 
allow a deduction only on disposition of an exhaustible asset because 
taxpayers typically realize profits (in the form of rents or othenvise) 
before they realize those decreases. 3° Fairness requires that a taxpayer 
who invests in an asset that does not produce unrealized gains should 
be allowed to deduct the costs that produce the realized profits. 
Otherwise that taxpayer will suffer tax acceleration, which translates 
into analogies that are the mirror images of those used to explain tax 
deferral - an interest-free borrowing by the government, a tax 
surcharge, or a tax on a phantom yield.3 1 
· The appropriateness of allowing some fair estimate of decretions, 
however, does not explain the Code's historically generous allowances. 
The usual explanation is Congress' interest in encouraging capital 
(whether by the disposition of the asset or by some other event, such as the taxpayer's 
death). 
M. GRAETZ, supra note 11, at 388-89; see also Graetz, Implementing A Progressive Consumption 
Tax, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1575, 1602 (1979). 
28. See Andrews, supra note 1, at 1126-28. 
29. See, e.g., l.R.C. §§ 167-69, 179, 184, 188, 280F, 611-14, 616-17 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
30. For discussion of TARET treatment of exhaustible assets, see infra notes 72-79 and 
accompanying text. 
31. To demonstrate the impact of postponing a deduction for an incurred loss, consider the 
following example: a taxpayer, taxed at a 30% rate, acquires an asset for $10,000, enjoys rents 
for each of two periods equal to 20% of the asset's market price, suffers a decrease in the asset's 
market price for each of the two periods of 10%, and sells the asset at Time 2 for $8100. Assume 
that all net profits can be reinvested at a pretax rate of return of 10%. Table A shows the tax 
consequences of these transactions under the Haig-Simons ideal. 
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investment through tax subsidies. 32 A related, but less traditional, 
TABLE A: HAIG·SIMONS IDEAL 
Investment 
Rents 
Interest 
Loss 
Tax 
After-tax return 
TimeO 
$10,000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
$10,000 
1. $10,000 investment multiplied by 20% rental rate. 
Time 1 
$10,000 
$ 2,0001 
0 
$ 1,0002 
$ 3003 
$10,700 
2. $10,000 investment multiplied by 10% depreciation rate. 
3. $1000 net profit ($2000 - $1000) for period multiplied by 30% tax rate. 
Time2 
$10,7004 
$ 1,8005 
$ 1706 
$ 9007 
$ 3218 
---$11,449 
4. $10,000 base investment reduced by $1000 of depreciation between Time 0 and Time 1 
($9,000), increased by $2000 cash rent received, and reduced by $300 of taxes paid. 
S. $9000 investment in asset at Time 1 multiplied by 20% rental rate. 
6. $1700 of cash ($10,700 after-tax return - $9000 investment in asset) multiplied by 10% rate 
of return. 
7. $9000 investment in asset at Time 1 multiplied by 10% depreciation rate. 
8. $1070 net profit ($1800 + $170 - $900) multiplied by 30% tax rate. 
Table B shows the tax consequences of these transactions if a strict realization-event rule were 
applied, denying the taxpayer any deduction for the loss in the value of the asset until it is sold. 
TABLE B: REALIZATION-EVENT MODEL 
TimeO Time 1 Time 2 
Investment $10,000 $10,000 $10,4004 
Rents 0 $ 2,0001 $ 1,8005 
Interest 0 0 $ 1406 
Loss 0 $ 1,0002 $ 9007 
Tax 0 $ 6003 $ 128 
---
After-tax return $10,000 $10,400 $11,428 
1. $10,000 investment multiplied by 20% rental rate. 
2. $10,000 investment multiplied by 10% depreciation rate. 
3. $2000 taxable income for period multiplied by 30% tax rate. (The $1000 depreciation in 
asset value is ignored in the absence of a realization event.) 
4. $10,000 base investment reduced by $1000 of depreciation between Time 0 and Time 1 
($9000), increased by $2000 cash rent received, and reduced by $600 of taxes paid. 
5. $9000 investment in asset at Time 1 multiplied by 20% rental rate. 
6. $1400 of cash ($10,400 after-tax return - $9000 investment in asset) multiplied by 10% rate 
of return. 
7. $9CJPO investment in asset at Time 1 multiplied by 10% depreciation rate. 
8. $40 taxable income-consisting of $1800 of rent, $140 of interest, and a $1900 realized loss 
upon the sale of the rental property ($10,000 - $8,100) - multiplied by 30% tax rate. 
The $21 smaller after-tax return as of Time 2 under the strict realization-event model is attribu-
table to the one-period postponement of the $1000 deduction for the decretion of the asset's 
market price. That postponement led to a Time 1 tax liability that was $300 greater than it 
should have been, which meant that the taxpayer lost $30 pretax profit by not having that $300 
to invest at 10%, or $21 of after-tax profit ($300 X .1(1 - .3)). The $21 loss of after-tax profit 
can be analogized to the taxpayer making an interest-free loan to the government of $300 that 
could have earned a 7% return after taxes (.1(1 - .3)). It can also be analogized to a tax 
surcharge because the taxpayer overpays $300 at Time 1 and receives only a $300 tax reduction 
at Time 2, rather than its time-value equivalent of $321 ($300 X [1 + .1(1 - .3)]). Finally, it 
can also be analogized to a tax on a phantom yield on the amount of after-tax loss. Had the 
after-tax loss at Time 1 of $700 ($1000 depreciation less the $300 tax savings) not occurred, $70 
of investment return would have been earned at Time 2 ($700 X .1), and that $70 would have 
resulted in $21 of tax. 
32. See M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 135-45 (5th ed. 1988). But see 
Durst, Inflation and the Tax Code: Guidelines for Policymaking, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1217, 1239-
42, 1246-51 (1989) (explaining how recently enacted depreciation schedules reflect economic 
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justification is that premature deductions for exhaustible assets are an 
antidote to the tax advantages enjoyed by taxpayers who invest in 
property that predictably will produce deferrable gains. Premature 
deductions thus equate the tax treatment of exhaustible assets that 
produce accretions that are taxed when they occur, and other 
investments that produce accretions that are taxed after they occur. 
The generous amortization allowances also reduce the disadvantages 
of realizing gains, by offering taxpayers the opportunity for tax relief if 
they reinvest. By lessening the differences between taxpayers who 
retain investments that produce unrealized gains and those who 
change their investments, the Code lessens the realization-event 
model's detrimental effects on resource allocations. 33 
Concern for economic distortions produced by a tax system that 
encourages investment in assets that produce deferrable income and 
discourages disinvestment also explains other tax relief provisions such 
as the repealed, but not forgotten, capital gains deduction34 or the 
numerous nonrecognition provisions. 35 The practical barriers to 
taxing unrealized gains leave Congress, if it wants to further its goals 
of economic neutrality and tax equity, with only the alternative of 
providing tax deferral for various types of investments and investment 
transactions. The consumption tax responds to the problem of tax 
deferral similarly, but more comprehensively and simply, by deferring 
taxation of all income until the taxpayer spends it for consumption 
purposes. However, this article demonstrates that an alternative 
solution is possible. Part II challenges the practical-barriers 
depreciation which takes inflation into account); Gann, supra note 16, at 138-40 (offering a 
similar analysis). 
33. This explanation of accelerated depreciation deductions is an extension of Professor 
Andrews' explanation of special rates for realized capital gains. See Andrews, supra note 1, at 
1133-35. . 
34. See id. The 1986 Tax Reform Act eliminated the capital gain preferential tax rate by 
amending I.R.C. § 1201 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) and repealing I.R.C. § 1202. See Tax Reform 
Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 2085, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 301, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). The capital 
gain preferential tax is gone, but capital gains remain favored sources of income because they 
allow the deduction of capital losses. See I.R.C. § 1211 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Further, the 
Code continues to distinguish capital gains and losses from ordinary income and losses, see 
I.R.C. §§ l(J), 1201, 1211 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), and policymakers favor restoration of the 
preference. See, e.g., Uchitelle, Bush, Like Reagan in 1980, Seeks Tax Cuts to Stimulate the 
Economy, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1988, at Al, col. 1 (national ed.); see also Dept. of Treasury, The 
Direct Revenue Effects of Capital Gains Taxation: A Reconsideration of the Time-Series 
Evidence, Research Paper No. 8801, reprinted in 134 CONG. REC. S7208-11 (daily ed. June 6, 
1988) (demonstrating revenue-raising potential of lower capital gains tax); Jones, The Capital 
Gains Debate: Partisan Politics or Economic Discourse?, 41 TAX NOTES 1373 (1988) (describing 
the shortcomings of economic methods of predicting the revenue impact of lower capital gains 
rates). 
35. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1031, 1033, 1034, 1039, 1041 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
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assumption by using time-value-of-money analysis to provide a 
solution to the problem it uncovers. 
II. THE TARET MODEL 
The differences in a taxpayer's after-tax returns under the Haig-
Simons and realization-event models stem from differences in the tim-
ing of the tax assessment. This suggests that the Haig-Simons ideal 
can be achieved by assessing a tax at the time of a realization event 
that takes into account any delay in taxing market price changes oc-
curring in earlier periods. Although TARET departs from Haig-
Simons by merely estimating the amount of market price changes in a 
period, it relies on the ideal to establish when those changes occur.36 
The following four steps describe how TARET is computed: (1) Esti-
mate the accretion or decretion in an asset's market price for each 
period the taxpayer held (or produced) the asset, based on its value at 
the time of the realization event; (2) Compute a tax liability (or re-
fund)37 for each period based on the amount of accretion or decretion 
allocated to that period; (3) Adjust the tax liability (or refund) com-
puted for each period for the time delay in making the payment; and 
(4) Sum each period's time-adjusted tax to determine the total tax 
owed to or by the government at the time of the realization event. 38 
The following discussion describes TARET's operation by looking 
36. An important assumption in the description of the Haig-Simons and TARET models is 
that the term "assets" encompasses a broad range of types of wealth. It includes, of course, cash, 
land, buildings, machines, goodwill, inventory, stocks, bonds, jewelry, paintings, and homes. As 
used in this article, however, it also includes items that are typically excluded as too undifferenti-
ated from other previously acquired assets or too remote from realization because they are non-
transferable, such as know-how, organization of a skilled labor force, legal advice, an unfinished 
manuscript by an unpublished author, or an artist's idea for a painting. Including these items 
has the analytical advantage of recognizing, first, that the taxpayer's market wealth extends be-
yond those items traditionally associated with marketplace transactions and, second, that failure 
to adjust the tax base for acquisition or loss of assets of this type is due to administrative, rather 
than conceptual, constraints. Moreover, using an expansive definition of assets when making the 
Haig-Simons ideal operational leads to more discrete observations about the acquisition and loss 
of market values in the taxing period, which in tum leads to more accurate timing determina-
tions of income-producing costs and produced income. 
37. The model assumes that taxpayers who suffer losses will either reduce that year's taxes by 
offsetting tax liabilities due on accretions or will receive a tax refund from the government. See 
infra notes 173-80 and accompanying text. 
38. The analysis assumes that, at the time of a realization event, the taxpayer will pay a tax 
liability and the government will refund an overpayment instantaneously. Without changing the 
article's conclusions, this assumption avoids the complication of considering time-value-of-
money issues resulting from delays beyond the realization-event. 
Delaying tax payments until a realization event leaves the government vulnerable to taxpay-
ers who are uncreditworthy. See Shakow, supra note 6, at 1170. The problem may be less severe 
than it first seems, however, because the appreciating asset itself provides some security, see id. at 
1170 n.228, and because the imposition of interest will remove the incentive for taxpayers to 
retain investments for an extended time. For further discussion of this issue, see infra notes 181-
86 and accompanying text, which proposes elimination of nonrecognition rules. 
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at different types of asset transactions. This analysis emphasizes the 
role the realization-event principle plays under the Code to demon-
strate that it is the source of the tax law's most serious abuses, inequi-
ties, and complications. The realization-event principle disconnects 
the costs of producing income from the income produced and that 
disconnection necessitates specially designed - and frequently admin-
istratively complex - rules to reduce the opportunities for tax deferral 
or increase the system's fairness. Although TARET determines the 
taxpayer's liability or refund when a realization event occurs, time-
value-of-money adjustments eliminate the need for these special 
provisions. 
A. Purchased Assets Devoted to Business or Investment Ventures 
One way the realization-event principle permits taxpayers to trig-
ger interest-free loans from the government is by allowing taxpayers to 
hold appreciating property. TARET measures an asset's market price 
change between acquisition and disposition and then allocates part of 
that change to each of the taxing periods during which the taxpayer 
held the asset. A prerequisite to measuring and allocating market 
price changes accurately is to consider the wealth changes the tax-
payer experiences at the time of purchase. A useful way to analyze the 
economic consequences of asset acquisition is by using the Haig-
Simons approach of comparing market value changes between two 
points in time. For this purpose, the two points in time are immedi-
ately before and after the taxpayer purchases an asset. 
Haig-Simons would deduct from the tax base the amount of cash 
the taxpayer expended for the asset and add to the base an amount 
equal to the market price of the asset purchased. 39 Isolating the dispo-
sition and acquisition components of a purchase may seem unneces-
sary because, for an arm's-length transaction, the amount of cash 
expended should equal the market price of the asset acquired, and thus 
the net change in the value of the taxpayer's asset holdings after the 
purchase should be zero. However, this conclusion assumes that the 
market price of the purchased asset is the same for the seller and the 
buyer. This does not correspond to marketplace experiences, except 
for some assets sold in highly organized markets, such as publicly 
39. Limiting the discussion to transactions involving taxpayers transferring cash in return for 
assets isolates the tax consequences of the purchase from the tax consequences of transferring 
appreciated or depreciated property other than cash. If taxpayers purchase assets with property 
other than cash, then the tax rules pertaining to property dispositions, see infra notes 47-79, 101-
16, and accompanying text, apply before considering any further tax consequences resulting from 
the purchase. 
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, traded securities.40 A buyer who purchases a truck from a dealer, for 
example, cannot typically sell the truck immediately afterwards for the 
same price. The resale market is thin, and the marketplace will treat 
the truck as used, leading to a price discount reflecting potential buy-
ers' skepticism about the circumstances of the resale. Furthermore, in 
many contexts, the amount expended for an asset may be more than 
its market price because the taxpayer frequently pays for services 
along with the asset, and those services are exhausted immediately. 
For example, a person who invests in publicly traded stock transfers 
cash equal to the sum of the stock's market price and the brokerage 
services, but those services are exhausted upon acquisition.41 Simi-
larly, the truck purchaser pays for a truck as well as dealer services, 
such as the opportunity to choose among a variety of trucks and op-
tions, or product information from sales representatives. Like the bro-
kerage fees, those services are exhausted upon acquisition of the truck. 
Even though some purchasers cannot immediately resell at the 
same price, they are not necessarily less wealthy immediately after a 
purchase because acquiring one asset may produce another. The asset 
produced and its market value depends on the taxpayer's intended use 
and what other assets the taxpayer owns. For example, if the taxpayer 
owns a pizzeria and intends to use the truck to offer pizza delivery, 
acquiring the truck produced a pizza-delivery capability whose market 
value depends on the proven success and value of the taxpayer's pizza 
business. 42 
Some taxpayers, however, like the stock investor, may be less 
wealthy after a purchase. The investor makes the wealth-decreasing 
investment because she expects the return on the stock and brokerage 
services to exceed the return from other investment opportunities. Ex-
pecting a high rate of return relative to other available investments 
does not mean that the investor is as wealthy or wealthier after the 
purchase as she was before. Subjective expectations are not the 
equivalent of a produced asset like the pizza-delivery capability. 
40. Even for frequently traded stock sold through a stock exchange, differences in ask-and-
bid prices exist, and the purchaser cannot necessarily resell the stock instantaneously for the 
price paid at purchase. 
41. The highly organized nature of the market makes it easy to segregate the stock's market 
value from the cost of other services purchased as part of the transaction, such as brokerage fees. 
The investor might be considered even less wealthy because any resale requires the purchase and 
exhaustion of further brokerage services. 
Although the brokerage or other selling services are exhausted at the time of an asset 
purchase, the services may provide the taxpayer know-how and expertise that will prove useful 
when she engages in future purchases. The acquisition of know-how, like pizza-delivery capabil-
ity discussed below, is a produced asset that requires separate tax consideration. See infra sec-
tions 11.B.1 & 11.B.2. 
42. For a discussion of T ARET's treatment of produced assets, see infra sections 11.B.1-2. 
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Although both involve expected profits, the delivery capability attains 
marketplace recognition because the truck in conjunction with the res-
taurant provides objective evidence of the likelihood of increased prof-
itability. Haig-Simons directs us to look to market values, and market 
values indicate that the stock investor is less wealthy. 
Isolating the disposition and acquisition components of a purchase 
transaction may identify some services that the taxpayer acquires, but 
immediately exhausts, such as the truck dealer's product expertise or 
the stock broker's services. Although exhaustion is a sufficient realiza-
tion event under the Code, 43 the Code denies the purchaser an imme-
diate deduction. 44 The services' costs are added to the costs of the 
purchased asset, and eventually are deducted upon sale or amortiza-
tion of the asset. Whether the purchaser enjoys a market price in-
crease immediately upon purchasing an asset, such as pizza-delivery 
capacity, or whether the acquired asset allows the purchaser to post-
pone recognition of future market value increases, as with stocks and 
securities, postponing the deduction for exhausted services reduces the 
benefits derived from the tax deferral of these gains. 4s 
Notwithstanding its justification, denying an immediate deduction 
for exhausted services creates inequities and potentially distorts tax-
payers' economic choices. Taxpayers who invest their own effort and 
talent (referred to classically as imputed income from services), rather 
than paying others to perform services for them, obtain a tax advan-
tage. The taxpayer's own services are performed and exhausted 
outside the marketplace, and are therefore beyond the Code's reach. 
Ignoring taxpayer-produced services, however, is the equivalent under 
the Code of taxing the value of the services as income and allowing 
their imlnediate deduction. Understood in this way, the Code pro-
vides an advantage to taxpayers who perform and exhaust their own 
acquisition services that is not available to those who buy those serv-
ices, exhaust them immediately, and deduct their costs later. 
TARET significantly reduces these inequities and economic distor-
tions because, by curing tax deferral through time adjustments, it elim-
inates the need to delay deductions for realized market value 
decretions. Exhausted acquisition services remain nondeductible, 
however, when the services are provided by the seller of the purchased 
43. See I.R.C. § 165 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
44. I.R.C. § 263 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
45. If the services are provided by the seller, the difficulty of separating the value of the asset 
from the value of the services provides another reason why the Code should deny the purchaser 
an immediate deduction. The parties' allocation of value among the assets and services has no 
economic consequence to the parties beyond its tax consequences and, therefore, provides no 
reliable evidence. 
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asset. The parties' allocation of value between the purchased asset and 
seller services is unreliable because it has no economic effect other 
than its tax consequences. Without a reliable transaction to determine 
the services' value, TARET must deviate from the Haig-Simons ideal 
by treating the services' value as unexhausted and allocating it to the 
purchased asset. This treatment risks encouraging taxpayers to seek 
more nonseller services, including providing those services themselves, 
but this potential economic distortion is administratively required.46 
1. ·Disposition of a Purchased Asset 
TARET's promise of increased fairness and economic neutrality 
depends on its ability to estimate accurately the accretions and decre-
tions in an asset's market value for each period the taxpayer held it 
and to identify the appropriate tax rate and interest rate factors to 
determine the tax liability (or refund) due when a realization event 
occurs. This subsection develops and evaluates the estimating tech-
niques and other components needed to make time-value-of-money ad-
justments when a taxpayer disposes of purchased assets devoted to 
business or investment activity. 
Tracking an asset's market value changes while the taxpayer holds 
the asset is administratively unfeasible. Consequently, any tax based 
on periodic market price changes in the taxpayer's' asset must rely on 
an accurate estimating technique using easily accessible information. 
TARET's estimating technique differs depending on whether the tax-
payer purchases a nonexhaustible or an exhaustible asset. The price of 
a nonexhaustible asset changes each period according to marketplace 
phenomena such as fluctuating interest rates, tastes, and technological 
innovations. Marketplace phenomena affect the price of an exhaus-
tible asset, but price changes also depend on the number of periods the 
asset is expected to produce profits and on the expected level of profits 
in those periods. The distinct profit-flow patterns that influence mar-
ket price changes of these two types of investments require estimating 
techniques that take the differences into account. 
a. Sale or exchange of a nonexhaustible asset. 
(1) Estimating market price changes. At the time of a realization 
event, TARET uses the following three values to estimate the periodic 
46. The potential for economic distortion is reduced by TARET's mechanisms that attribute 
some of the market value decretion resulting from the exhausted services to the period when the 
taxpayer purchased the asset. Moreover, the rule denying a deduction for seller-provided serv-
ices may often not result in significant reallocation of resources because the efficiency of seller-
provided services is sufficient to offset the tax disadvantages. 
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market price changes a taxpayer experiences while holding purchased 
nonexhaustible assets: (1) the asset's value at the time the taxpayer 
acquired it; (2) the length of time the taxpayer held the asset;47 and (3) 
the asset's value at the time of the realization event. The best available 
market evidence of the purchased asset's value at the time of acquisi-
tion (referred to hereinafter as W 0) is the market value of the assets 
transferred to purchase another asset less the amount paid for acquisi-
tion services provided by persons other than the seller. As discussed 
above, this amount fails to reflect the asset's value when the taxpayer 
receives.significant acquisition services from the seller and when mar-
ket forces lead to an immediate price decline.48 Using an amount that 
inflates the value of W 0 overtaxes the taxpayer because the market 
value decretions incurred at acquisition are allocated to later periods 
and, therefore, delays when the tax refund is treated as owed.49 
The best available evidence of the asset's value upon sale (referred 
to hereinafter as W 0 ) is the value of the assets received upon disposi-
tion. If the parties' relationship and dealings with each other suggest 
that they may not have exchanged equal values, then the Internal Rev-
enue Service should inquire further into the nature of the transac-
tion. so For instance, a bargain sale to an employee should be taxed as 
an asset sale and a compensation payment. W 0 should not include the 
value of services acquired and exhausted to accomplish the sale if the 
taxpayer purchased them from persons other than the buyer.st If the 
47. The number of periods the taxpayer owned an asset is not something the Code tradition-
ally has measured. 
48. See supra notes 40-41, 46, and accompanying text. 
49. Taxpayer-provided acquisition services do not implicate W0 because ignoring the services 
is the same as taxing the imputed income from the services and then allowing a deduction for 
their exhaustion. See supra text following note 45. 
50. The Code assumes that the parties act at arm's length unless evidence suggests otherwise. 
United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 72 (1962); see also Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. 
United States, 126 F. Supp. 184, 189 (Ct. CI. 1954). When a transfer is made between related 
parties and appears to have no business purpose, the arrangement will be disregarded for tax 
purposes. Davis v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 807, 813 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 
(1979); see also I.R.C. § 482 (Supp. IV 1986) (authorizing the Commissioner to reallocate income 
and deductions among businesses owned by related parties). 
51. The taxpayer should obtain a deduction in the tax period when the setting services are 
exhausted. This rule differs from the Code's treatment of selling expenses. See Ward v. Commis-
sioner, 224 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1955) (attorney fees); Washington Mkt. Co. v. Commissioner, 25 
B.T.A. 576 (1932) (acq .• 1932 C.B. 7) (engineering fees, counsel fees, and expert witness ex-
penses); Treas. Reg. §§ l.263(a)-2(e) (commissions paid on sale of securities); Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.1034-l(b)(4)(i) (commissions, advertising expenses, cost of preparing deed, and other legal 
services in connection with the sale of taxpayer's residence); 2 B. BITIKER, supra note 6, at 43-2 
and 43-3. Although the Code's measurement of taxable income for the period the realization 
event occurs is the same whether the taxpayer treats these expenses as reducing the amount 
received or as deductions, the classification does make a difference when applying other Code 
provisions, such as the deductibility of realized capital losses. See I.R.C. § 1211 (1982 & Supp. 
IV 1986). The reason for this treatment is somewhat unclear and may result only from some 
symmetry-based notion that acquisition and disposition costs should remain tied to the property 
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buyer or taxpayer provides a selling service, W n must include its value 
because the parties' cost allocation lacks economic significance.52 Ig-
noring the value of taxpayer-provided selling services inflates the value 
of Wn, thus overtaxing the taxpayer because it taxes the market in-
creases from the services as if they were earned ih prior taxing peri-
ods. 53 Ignoring the value of buyer-provided services understates the 
value ofWn, resulting in undertaxation of the taxpayer because it taxes 
the costs of the services as if they were exhausted in prior taxing 
periods. 
The ability to determine W0 and Wn with reasonable certainty al-
lows us to determine the average periodic rate of market price change 
while a taxpayer holds an asset as shown in Formula 1. 
R = [Wn/W0 ] 11n - 1 (1) 
n = number of periods since asset was purchased54 
We can then use this average rate to generate the market price changes 
for each period that the taxpayer held the asset. R multiplied by W 0 
represents the market price change estimated to have occurred in 
Period 1. Period 2's market price change will differ from Period 1 's by 
a factor of (1 + R) because the taxpayer will have invested W0 plus 
the market price change that occurred in Period 1. The following 
notation describes the asset's market price change for each period: 
transactions. See Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572, 576 (1970) (discussing both types 
of costs). Under TARET, the selling expenses represent exhausted assets warranting an immedi-
ate deduction. The alternative of understating the value of W n would result in an undertaxation 
of the taxpayer because it would tax the costs of the services as if they were exhausted in prior 
trucing periods. 
52. See supra text accompanying note 46. 
53. The accretion occurring by virtue of the taxpayer performing selling services for the 
buyer is the result of a series of transactions. For example, the taxpayer may have exhausted 
previously acquired assets, such as machines, supplies, or transferred assets, to acquire services 
from workers to perform the selling services. The exhaustion of assets, including the workers' 
services, results in a decretion of the taxpayer's assets that TARET accounts for by reducing the 
taxpayer's tax base when those exhaustions occur. See infra text accompanying note 106. The 
market price of those individually exhausted assets, including workers' services, is likely to be 
less than the market price of the selling services because they do not take into account the syner-
gistic effect produced by bringing together these assets for the purpose of providing selling serv-
ices. The difference between the market price of the exhausted assets and selling services 
provided represents a return on the taxpayer's assets that we might call "the going business." 
If an individual taxpayer performs the selling services, the amount of the accretion under 
TARET is the market price of the selling services without any reduction for exhaustion of 
human capital. See infra section 11.B.3. The overtaxation could be rationalized as a means of 
capturing some of the undertaxation of the accretion of human capital. The problem with this 
argument is that it operates idiosyncratically by only increasing the tax on human capital for 
those who use their human capital in selling assets. 
54. This article does not specify the length of time in a period, and assumes that no partial 
periods occur. These simplifying assumptions make for easier exposition of the approach 
without compromising its validity. 
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Period l's profit = RW0 
Period 2's profit = RW0(l + R) 
Period 3's profit = RW0(l + R)2 
Period 4's profit = RW0(l + R)3 
Period n's profit= RW0(l + R)D-1 
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Each period's estimated market price change can be specified more 
generally as: 
RW0(l + RY- 1 (2) 
i = time period 
One flaw of the averaging technique involves nonexhaustible assets 
that become worthless. With R indeterminate, estimates of the decre-
tions in market value for each period are impossible. When worthless-
ness occurs, hopefully rarely, TARET should resort to historical data 
to allocate loss to the periods the taxpayer held the asset. 
The more serious problem with the averaging technique is that it 
ignores volatility and discontinuity in market price changes. The 
more volatile and discontinuous the market value changes for an asset, 
the more inaccurate the estimates of periodic changes based on an av-
erage rate, and the more weak the claim that TARET replicates Haig-
Simons. Indisputedly, some taxpayers will make some investments 
that experience wide market price changes between acquisition and 
disposition or have a substantial price change preceded or followed by 
a stagnant price level. Ignoring these patterns of price changes will 
lead to significant over- and undertaxation. ss However, comparison 
55. The over- and undertaxation of taxpayers resulting from using average rates of market 
price changes can be demonstrated by comparing TARET results to those under the Haig-
Simons model when the actual price changes are either volatile or discontinuous. 
Example: A buys an asset for $1000 at Time 0 and sells it for $1331 at Time 3. A is subject to 
a 30% tax rate between Time 0 and Time 3 and an interest-rate factor of 10% for any time-value-
of-money adjustments. See infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text for a further explanation of 
how to choose an interest-rate factor. 
I. TARET is $105, computed as follows: 
R = ($1331/1000)113 - 1 
R = .1 . 
Time 1: The profit is $100 ($1000 X .1), and the tax is $30 ($100 X .3). The time-value-of-
money adjustment to account for the delay in payment between Time 1 and the realization event 
at Time 3 results in a Time-1 tax assessed at Time 3 of $34 ($30 X [1 + .1(1 - .3)]2). 
Time 2: The profit is $110 ($1000 X .1 X (1 + .1)) and the tax is $33 ($110 X .3). The 
time-value-of-money adjustment to account for the delay in payment between Time 2 and the 
realization event at Time 3 results in a Time-2 tax assessed at Time 3 of $35 ($33 X [1 + .1(1 -
.3)]). 
Time 3: The profit is $121 ($1000 X .1 X (1 + .1)2) and the tax is $36 ($121 X .3). No 
time-value-of-money adjustment for the Time-3 tax is necessary because its payment is not 
delayed. 
The TARET tax owed by A at Time 3 is the sum of these three time-adjusted tax assess-
ments, or $105 ($34 + $35 + $36). 
2. Haig-Simons tax depends on the appraised market price changes for each period. 
a. Assume that A enjoyed volatile price changes with a relatively large market price increase 
at Time 1 as follows: 
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with the Code's realization-event model makes the over- and un-
CHART 1 
Change in 
Time Market Price Market Price 
0 $1000 0 
1 $2000 $1000 
2 $2200 200 
3 $1331 (869) 
A's Haig-Simons time-adjusted tax at Time 3 would be $146, computed as follows: 
Time 1: The profit is $1000 and the tax is $300 ($1000 X .3). The time-value-of-money 
adjustment to compare the tax assessments of the Haig-Simons ana TARET models results in a 
Time-3 tax liability of $343 ($300 X [1 + .1(1 - .3)]2). 
Time 2: The profit is $200, and the tax is $60 ($200 X .3). The time-value-of-money adjust-
ment to compare the tax assessments of the Haig-Simons and TARET models results in a Time-3 
tax liability of $64 ($60 X [1 +.1(1 - .3)]). 
Time 3: The loss is $869, and the tax refund is $261 ($869 X .3). No time-value-of-money 
adjustment for the Time-3 tax refund is necessary. 
The Haig-Simons tax owed by A at Time 3 is the sum of the three time-adjusted tax assess-
ments, or $146 ($343 + $64 - $261), which is more than TARET, demonstrating that TARET 
can lead to undertaxation. · 
b. Assume that A enjoyed volatile price changes with a relatively large market price decline 
at Time 1 as follows: 
CHART2 
Change in 
Time Market Price Market Price 
0 $1000 0 
1 $ 0 ($1000) 
2 $1210 1210 
3 $1331 121 
A's Haig-Simons time-adjusted tax at Time 3 would be $81, computed as follows: 
Time 1: The loss is $1000, and the tax refund is $300 ($1000 X .3). The time-value-of-
money adjustment to compare the tax assessments of the Haig-Simons and TARET models re-
sults in a Time-3 tax refund of $343 ($300 X [1 + .1(1 - .3)]2). 
Time 2: The profit is $1210, and the tax is $363 ($1210 X .3). The time-value-of-money 
adjustment to compare the tax assessments of the Haig-Simons and TARET models results in a 
Time-3 tax liability of $388 ($363 X [l + .1(1 - .3)]). 
Time 3: The profit is $121, and the tax is $36 ($121 X .3). No time-value-of-money adjust-
ment for the Time-3 tax refund is necessary. 
The Haig-Simons tax owed by A at Time 3 is the sum of the three time-adjusted tax assess-
ments, or $81 (-$343 + $388 + $36), which is less than TARET, demonstrating that TARET 
can lead to overtaxation. 
c. If A enjoyed discontinuous price changes with a market price increase at Time 1 of $331 
and no further price changes, then A's Haig-Simons time-adjusted tax at Time 3 would be $122, 
computed as follows: 
Time 1: The profit is $331, and the tax refund is $99 ($331 X .3). The time-value-of-money 
adjustment to compare the tax assessments of the Haig-Simons and TARET models results in a 
Time-3 tax of $122 ($99 X [l + .1(1 - .3)]2). · 
Time 2 and Time 3 price changes are zero, and no tax is owed. The Haig-Simons tax owed by 
A at Time 3 is $122, which is more than TARET, demonstrating that TARET can lead to un-
dertaxation. 
d. If A enjoyed discontinuous price changes with no market price changes until Time 3 when 
the asset's price increases by $331, then A's Haig-Simons time-adjusted tax owed at Time 3 
would be $99 ($331 X .3), which is less than TARET, demonstrating that TARET can lead to 
overtaxation. 
A review of aggregate historical data suggests that TARET closely approximates Haig-
Simons, indicating that the major concern with TARET may be only one of equity among tax-
payers and not over-or under-inclusion of income in its definition of the aggregate tax base. See 
infra Appendix. 
Arguably, the averaging technique should not apply for those assets sold in highly organized 
markets where price changes are tracked easily. See Dawson, Taxing as Ordinary Income the 
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dertaxation produced by the averaging technique seem trivial. No one 
doubts that the Code's postponement of realized losses and deferral of 
unrealized gains creates significant inequities and tends to distort tax-
payers' investment strategies; even rough estimates are likely to reduce 
the problems created by a realization-event model. Nevertheless, a 
comprehensive critique of TARET requires full consideration of how 
the averaging technique may lead to economic nonneutrality and un-
fairness among taxpayers. 
The most important question is whether taxpayers can manipulate 
the computation of the average rate of market price change through 
their investment strategies to maximize their after-tax returns. Put 
differently, does the averaging technique only reduce, rather than 
eliminate, tax deferral of gains while permitting acceleration of losses? 
The answer to the manipulation issue is a simple "no," but the expla-
nation is moderately complicated. 
After acquiring a nonexhaustible asset, the taxpayer continually 
considers the possibility of liquidating the investment, paying the 
TARET model tax, and reinvesting or consuming the after-tax profits. 
If the taxpayer decides to defer consumption, we can predict that the 
taxpayer will decide whether to liquidate and buy another asset based 
on expected future after-tax profits. If the expected return on the pre-
viously acquired asset is less than the return previously experienced 
from this asset, but nevertheless higher than the expected return for 
any other investment opportunities available, the taxpayer has no eco-
nomic incentive to liquidate. 
If the rate of market price change for the previously acquired asset 
is expected to remain steady or increase, then the averaging technique 
does not discourage the taxpayer from liquidating and investing in a 
more attractive opportunity. The amount of profits allocated to prior 
periods under the averaging technique is expected either to remain un-
changed or to increase and, therefore, avoiding liquidation will either 
leave prior accretions unchanged or increase them. 56 
Appreciation of Publicly Held Stock, 76 YALE L.J. 623 (1967) (proposing annual taxation of 
publicly held stock); Note, Realizing Appreciation Without Sale: Accrual Taxation of Capital 
Gains on Marketable Securities, 34 STAN. L. R.Ev. 857, 871-76 (1982) (proposing annual tax on 
appreciation of publicly held corporate securities). However, I hesitate to endorse a two-pronged 
allocation approach, because it may create unplanned advantages for certain investments depend-
ing on whether they are subject to the averaging technique or period-to-period market tracking. 
But see generally Shakow, supra note 6 (demonstrating how annual taxation of market price 
changes is feasible with regard to a large number of assets and limiting a time-value adjusted tax 
to only a few types of assets; excluded from the analysis, however, is consideration of produced 
assets, see supra note 36 and infra section 11.B). 
56. This is true even if the taxpayer had experienced a negative rate of market price change in 
prior periods. · 
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If the rate of market price change for the previously acquired asset 
is expected to decrease, the taxpayer could use the averaging technique 
to defer gains or accelerate losses. The after-tax profits expected from 
the alternative investment opportunity, however, will always exceed 
any tax deferral advantages produced by the averaging technique. 57 In 
summary, the averaging technique will not discourage a taxpayer from 
liquidating an asset if its expected profits are less than those available 
from other investment opportunities. 
However, when the taxpayer expects the rate of market price 
change on a previously acquired asset to increase, the averaging tech-
nique may create economic inefficiencies. The problem does not arise 
because another investment opportunity is more attractive, but merely 
because the previously acquired investment is expected to do better in 
the future. The averaging technique then acts to allocate some of the 
higher profits in the later years to the earlier years, the equivalent of 
accelerating the recognition of gain. To avoid this result, some tax-
payers may sell the asset, pay the tax or obtain a tax refund, and then 
rebuy the asset. Of course, tax savings should not turn on whether 
57. The proposition that TARET's allocation technique does not make a less profitable in-
vestment more profitable for a taxpayer deciding whether to remain in an investment whose 
profitability is expected to be lower than an alternative investment and lower than its previous 
performance, can be depicted as follows: 
n 
( (1 + R,)" - TR, l': (1 + R,)i-1 [1 + R,(1 - T)]n-i) (1 + R.)' -
i=l . 
n x 
TR,((1 + R,)" - TR, l': (1 + RoY-1[1 + R,(1 - T)]"-i) l': (1 + R.)i-1[1 + 
i=l i=l 
R,(1 _ T)]n+x-i > 
n+x 
(1 + R,)"(1 + R.}' - T{[(l + R,)"(1 + R.)']1/n+x - 1) ~ ([(1 + R,)" ' 
i=l . 
(1 + R.)']lln+xp-1 ( 1 + [[(1 + R,)"(1 + R.)']11n+x _ 1](1 _ T)jn+x-i 
Ro = Rate of market price change between Times 0 and n on existing investment 
R, = Rate of market price change between Times n and x on new investment 
opportunity 
R. = Rate of market price change between Times n and x on existing investment 
R, >Ro 
See infra note 77 for an introduction to the geometric average that is relied upon in the right-
hand side of the inequality to account for the two rates of price change for the existing invest-
ment. The inequality assumes that the average periodic rate of market price change is the appro-
priate interest-rate factor for determining tax liability. See infra notes 62-65 and accompanying 
text. 
The inequality expressed above can be simplified and expressed as: 
[1 + R,(1 - T)]"[l + R,(1 - T)]' > 
( 1 + [[(1 + R,)"(1 + R.)'] 11n+x - 1](1 - T)Jn+x 
If T is assumed to be zero, the inequality holds as shown below: 
(1 + R,)"(l + R.)' > (1 + R,)"(1 + R.)' 
If any positive T is substituted into the simplified inequality and any rates of return are assumed, 
as Jong as R, is greater than R., the inequality continues to hold. 
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taxpayers are willing to incur the transaction costs involved in selling 
and rebuying an asset. 
One response to this problem is to allow taxpayers to elect to pay 
the tax or obtain a refund at any time, but no later than when they 
enter into a realization event. After all, the government has no inter-
est in overtaxing a taxpayer because of increasing rates of market price 
changes. However, the election alternative is costly, both to taxpayers, 
who will have to monitor expected rates of market price changes and 
obtain asset appraisals, and to the government, which will have to 
monitor taxpayers' valuations to assure they are not too low, allowing 
deferral of gains to the later taxing periods. The cumbersomeness of 
an election provision and the inherent problems of valuations outside 
of a marketplace transaction indicate that the only practical response 
to this troubling aspect of the averaging technique is to ignore sales 
and repurchases. 58 
(2) Estimating the applicable tax rate. The second step in 
TARET's operation is to compute a tax liability (or refund) for each 
period based on the estimated accretion or decretion in the asset's 
market price for that period. To determine the taxpayer's tax liability 
accurately would require identifying the taxpayer's tax rate for each 
period. The rate would change under a progressive tax schedule de-
pending on the amount of the taxpayer's income or on congressional 
modifications of the tax schedules. That level of accuracy would add 
greatly to the complexities of TARET. Fair alternatives might be to 
use a tax rate based either on the average of the taxpayer's highest 
marginal rates over the purchased asset's holding period or on a statis-
tical determination of an average marginal tax rate for those taxpayers 
engaging in significant purchased property transactions for the rele-
vant periods. Whatever method is adopted, it should not rely exclu-
sively or substantially on the taxpayer's current marginal tax rate. An 
important goal of the proposal is to eliminate the influence of tax tim-
ing ~n taxpayers' economic conduct, and it is undermined if the tax 
rate depends on when the realization event occurs. 
(3) Estimating the interest-rate factor. The last component neces-
sary to accomplish TARET's time adjustment upon the sale or ex-
change of a purchased nonexhaustible asset is an appropriate interest-
rate factor. From the Haig-Simons perspective - which, at least im-
plicitly, indicates that a taxpayer should pay a tax whenever an asset's 
market price increases and that ·the government should refund tax 
58. Policing these transactions should include the examination of repurchases by related 
parties. 
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whenever a decrease occurs59 - delays in tax payments or refunds 
essentially represent borrowing transactions between the government 
and the taxpayer.60 If an asset's market price increases unaccompa-
nied by a realization event, then the government makes what is essen-
tially a loan to the taxpayer equal to the amount of the computed tax. 
If the asset's market value decreases, unaccompanied by a realization 
event, then the taxpayer effectively makes a loan to the government 
equal to the amount of the computed tax refund. This analogy sug-
gests that the proper approach to determining the interest-rate factor 
depends on whether the value of the taxpayer's investment increases or 
decreases, and, therefore, whether the taxpayer stands as a debtor to 
or a creditor of the goverrtment. 
The tax on the allocative share of appreciation for each period es-
sentially represents the principal amount the government loaned to the 
taxpayer, and the realization event marks the time that the taxpayer 
will be required to repay that principal amount along with accumu-
lated interest to date. 61 The rate of interest that the government-
lender charges should be either R or a yield rate determined by refer-
ence to U.S. Treasury Notes.62 
Looking to the average rate of periodic market price change is con-
ceptually appealing because the absence of a realization event resulting 
in unpaid taxes (the borrowing) suggests that the taxpayer invested the 
borrowed funds in the appreciating asset and earned R. By the gov-
ernment charging an interest rate equal to R, it exactly offsets the 
amount of benefit the taxpayer enjoyed from postponing the tax pay-
ment. 63 Although relying on R means that a decline in the asset's 
appreciation rate not only results in tax deferral on the gain but also 
reduces the taxpayer's borrowing costs, the value of these benefits is 
not sufficient to distort the taxpayer's investment decisions. 64 
59. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. 
60. See supra notes 22, 31, and accompanying text. 
61. The loan for a taxing period increases each year by the amount of interest that is owed 
but not paid. 
62. I.R.C. § 7872 (Supp. IV 1986), concerning below-market loans, is precedent for using 
federal borrowing rates to value imputed interest on lending transactions. For an excellent dis-
cussion of choice of interest rate, see Blum, supra note 11, at 13-27. Arguably, the taxpayer 
should pay interest at commercial rates, which are likely to be in excess of federal borrowing 
rates. That level of interest charge generally has been rejected as too harsh. See id. at 19-23. 
63. In effect, by charging R, the government becomes a partner in the taxpayer's investment 
venture, and the amount received by the government in excess of the principal amount depends 
on the success of the venture. R is an inaccurate rate, however, to the extent the tax deferral 
allows the taxpayer to carry or acquire other assets with a different rate of return. See id. at 15. 
64. The potential economic benefits produced by the averaging technique used to determine 
R will not lead a taxpayer who has an otherwise more profitable opportunity to remain in an 
existing investment. See supra note 57. 
Another advantage of using R rather than the federal borrowing rate is that it avoids the 
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The other way to determine the interest-rate factor is to look to 
U.S. Treasury Note yields. The rationale supporting this rate is that it 
represents the economic loss to the government caused by taxpayer's 
payment delay. If federal yields are used for the interest-rate factor, 
they should be based on short-term yields rather than on yields deter-
mined at the time of acquisition and reflecting the length of time the 
taxpayer held the investment. The theoretical argument for using 
short-term rates is that a realization event can occur at any time and, 
therefore, each period essentially represents a new short-term loan by 
the government to the taxpayer. Even more persuasive, however, is 
that to use historically determined long-term rates may lead to serious 
economic distortions. Taxpayers may forgo liquidating an investment 
to take advantage of a low government yield rate even though the in-
vestment is otherwise less profitable than other alternatives.65 By al-
ways using current interest rates, TARET will minimize its 
interference with a taxpayer's investment decisions. Charging interest 
based on short-term rates will add some complexity to the computa-
tions, since the time adjustment for the tax computed for each period 
will be based on rates that change for each subsequent period, but 
user-friendly tables can be designed to eliminate this problem. 
If the nonexhaustible asset has decreased in market value since the 
time of its purchase, T ARET allocates a portion of the decrease to 
each taxing period based on the average rate of periodic market price 
change, R, and computes a tax refund for each period based on an 
appropriate averaging of tax rates. The tax for each period on the 
allocative share of depreciation essentially represents the principal 
amount the taxpayer loaned the government, and the realization event 
marks ·the time the government is required to repay that principal 
amount along with the accumulated interest. 66 Understood as a loan 
from the taxpayer to the government, the government's borrowing 
potential hardship on the taxpayer of the time-adjusted tax exceeding the amount of the sale 
proceeds. Additionally, it avoids discouraging taxpayers from investing in risky ventures. See 
Blum, supra note 11, at 16-17. 
65. For example, suppose a taxpayer owns an asset with a current market price of $30,000, 
subject to a time-adjusted tax based on a 4% long-term applicable federal rate of $15,000. Sup-
pose further that this asset has an expected return of 10%. The taxpayer is not likely to sell and 
reinvest in another asset even if the alternative investment offers an expected return of 15%, 
because the attractive borrowing rate on the $15,000 provides the taxpayer with a higher after-
tax return. With the assumption of a 30% tax, the taxpayer would have $30,000 invested at an 
after-tax rate of7% (.I X (I - .3)) and $15,000 borrowed at an after-tax interest rate of2.8% 
(.04 X (1 - .3)). The after-tax return at the end of one period would be $16,680 ($30,000 X 
1.07 - ($15,000 X 1.028)). If the asset is sold and the after-tax return is reinvested at an after-
tax rate of 10.5% (.15 X (I - .3)), the taxpayer would have only $16,575 ($15,000 X 1.105) at 
the end of one period. But see id. at 17 (arguing for rates based on the length of deferral). 
66. For a discussion of the treatment of net losses under TARET, see infra notes 173-80 and 
accompanying text. 
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rate reflected in U.S. Treasury Note yields is conceptually attractive 
and workable. R is not useful in this situation because it is negative 
and does not indicate the cost to the taxpayer of suffering a delay in 
receiving the tax refund. 
A time-adjusted tax liability that uses Ras the interest-rate factor 
for gains and the federal yields as the interest-rate factor for losses is 
asymmetrical. Nevertheless, the two-pronged approach is a rational 
response to the different investment situations and should not be re-
jected on grounds of inconsistency. Section Il.A.1.a.(4), which dem-
onstrates how the components of TARET are used to compute a tax, 
uses Ras the interest-rate factor for assets that appreciated while the 
taxpayer held them and the applicable federal yield rates for assets 
that lost value. 
(4) Computing TARET. The tax for each period is computed by 
multiplying each period's market price change (Formula 2) by the ap-
plicable tax rate T as shown below in Formula 3: 
TRW0(l + R)i-1 (3) 
The conversion of the realization-event model into the Haig-Simons 
model results from adjusting each period's tax by the interest-rate 
factor to take the payment delay into account. Formula 4 specifies 
each period's time-adjusted tax when the nonexhaustible asset's value 
increases between the time the taxpayer acquired it and the time she 
sold or exchanged it. 
TRWo(l + R)i-1[1 + R(l - T)]n-i (4) 
In accordance with the Haig-Simons ideal, the interest-rate factor, R, 
is reduced by (1 - T) to lower the tax liability and reflect the reduced 
tax base resulting from the incurred interest costs. 67 
67. The cost of borrowing is recognized generally as a market value decrease warranting a 
deduction. See I.R.C. § 163(a) (1982). The Code limits interest deductions to ameliorate the tax 
deferral advantages of the realization-event principle, see, e.g., l.R.C. §§ 163(d), 469 (Supp. IV 
1986), or to reduce the benefits of income exclusion rules, see, e.g., l.R.C. §§ 163(h), 265(a)(2) 
(Supp. IV 1986). The latter has been interpreted to include interest incurred for federal income 
tax underpayments. See Prop. Treas. Reg.§ 1.163-9T(b)(2)(i). These exceptions to deductibility 
are not precedent for nondeductibility of interest in TARET, which assumes the appropriateness 
of the borrowing and the timing of the deduction for the cost of borrowing. The government is 
not disadvantaged by a "return on the investment" based on an after-tax rate of interest. If the 
taxpayer paid the tax liability when it was incurred and the government invested the revenue by 
lending it to others, those debtors would be able to reduce their tax liability by deducting the 
interest owed the government-creditor. But see Blum, supra note 11, at 23 (arguing that govern-
ment loses revenue because the tax rate is likely to be higher than "the average tax rate of lenders 
to the Treasury who finance the deferred tax receipts"). 
Accuracy requires that the tax rate used be the taxpayer's applicable rate for each period that 
she held the asset. Identifying that tax rate would add substantial complexity to computation of 
the tax liability. One alternative would be to apply the same tax rate used to determine the 
periodic tax. See supra section 11.A.1.a.(2). Another alternative would be to apply the highest 
marginal rate available to the taxpayer for each period. Although this set of tax rates avoids 
disadvantaging all taxpayers, it also risks encouraging deferral because it reduces the borrowing 
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Formula 5 expresses the total time-adjusted tax liability due at the 
time of the sale or exchange, which is the sum of each period's time-
adjusted tax. 
TRW0i] l (1 + RY-1[1 + R(l - T)]n-i (5) 
Example 1 and Table IV below demonstrate Formula S's operation 
and how it replicates Haig-Simons. 
Example 1: A purchases land at Time 0 for $100,000, sells it at Time 3 
for $200,000, and is subject to a 30% tax rate between Time 0 and 
Time 3. 
This information is sufficient to compute R (Formula 1) of .26,68 
which is then used to determine the gain and to adjust the tax liability 
for each period.69 TARET is $34,883, and the after-tax return on the 
investment is $165,117 ($200,000 - $34,883). As Table IV shows, the 
estimate of periodic profits along with the time adjustments for each 
period's tax mimics the Haig-Simons model, assuming that for each 
period A experienced a 26% rate of periodic market price change, re-
invested that return at 26%, and paid tax at a 30% rate. 
TABLE IV: HAIG-SIMONS MODEL 
TimeO Time 1 Time2 Time 3 
--- --- ---
Investment $100,000 $100,000 $118,194 $139,699 
Profit 0 $ 25,9921 $ 30,721 3 $ 36,3115 
Tax 0 $ 7,7982 $ 9,2164 $ 10,8936 
After-tax return $100,000 $118,194 $139,699 $165,117 
cost. This article uses the same tax rate to determine the periodic tax as it uses to determine the 
after-tax interest charges. 
See infra Formula 6 for depiction of the time-adjusted tax that would apply to appreciated 
assets if the yield rates from U.S. Treasury Notes were used as the interest-rate factor. 
68. R = ($200,000/100,000)113 - 1 
R = .259922 
69. The operation of the time-adjustment summation found in Formula S is described below 
for each of the three periods that A owned the land. 
Time 1: TRW0 is equal to $7798 (.3 X .26 X $100,000) and is the amount of tax owed at 
Time 1. The time-value-of-money adjustment to account for the delay in payment between Time 
1 and the realization event at Time 3 results in a Time-I tax assessed at Time 3 of $10,893 ($7798 
x [1 + .26(1 - .3))2). 
Time 2: TRW0 {l + R) is equal to $9824 ($7798 X (1 + .26)) and is the tax owed for Time 
2. The time-value-of-money adjustment to account for the delay in payment between Time 2 and 
the realization event at Time 3 results in a Time-2 tax assessed at Time 3 of $11,612 ($9824 X [l 
+ .26(1 - .3)]). 
Time 3: TRW0 (l + R)2 is equal to $12,378 ($7798 X (1 +.26)2) and is the tax owed for 
Time 3. No time-value-of-money adjustment for the Time-3 tax is necessary because its payment 
is not delayed. 
The tax owed by A at Time 3 is the sum of these three time-adjusted tax assessments, or 
$34,883 ($10,893 + $11,612 + $12,378). 
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1. $100,000 investment in asset at time of its acquisition multiplied by 25.992% rate of periodic 
market price change. This is RW0 • 
2. $25,992 profit for period multiplied by 30% tax rate. TARET makes up for the fact that this 
tax is not paid at Time 1 by assuming that the taxpayer borrowed it from the government. 
The equivalent of having only $118,194 to invest is investing $125,992 and borrowing $7798 
at a rate of 25.992%. 
3. $118,194 investment multiplied by 25.992% rate of periodic market price change. TARET 
treats the taxpayer as investing the entire $125,992 by computing Time 2's profit in accord-
ance with RW0(l + R), or $32,748, but then assesses an interest cost on the $7798 borrowed 
amount, which before tax equals $2027 ($7, 798 X .25992), for a net profit for Time 2 of 
$30,721. 
4. $30,721 profit for period multiplied by 30% tax rate. See note 2 above for an explanation of 
how TARET treats the unpaid tax as an amount borrowed from the government and subject 
to interest, which is the equivalent of only having $139,699 to invest. 
5. $139,699 investment multiplied by 25.992% rate of periodic market price change. See note 3 
above for explanation of how TARET reaches similar results by first ignoring the unpaid tax 
and then separately accounting for the taxpayer's cost of.borrowing from the government. 
6. $36,311 profit for period multiplied by 30% tax rate. 
Formula 6 specifies each period's time-adjusted tax refund when 
the nonexhaustible asset's price decreases between the time the tax-
payer acquired it and sold or exchanged it. Formula 6 is the same as 
Formula 4 except that, rather than R, the U.S. Treasury Note yield is 
used as the interest-rate factor. 
n-1 
TRW0(l + RY-I .II. [1 + F;(l - T)] (6) 
J=l 
n-1 
The term IT [1 + Fj(l - T)], which is a shorthand notation for 
j=i 
[1 + F;(l-T)][l + F;+1(l-T)][l + F;+2(1-T)][l + F;+3(1-T)] ... 
[1+Fn_1(1-T)], means that the tax savings for any period is adjusted 
to reflect the U.S. Treasury short-term yield rates for each period for 
which the taxpayer delays the loss realization. Formula 7 expresses 
the total time-adjusted tax refund due at the time of the realization 
event, which is the same as that suggested by Formula 5 except that 
the U.S. treasury yield rate is substituted for R as the interest-rate 
factor. 
n . n-1 
TRW ~ (1 + R)1- 1 .II. [1 + F;(l - T)] (7) 0
i=l j=l 
Example 2 and Table V below demonstrate Formula 7's operation 
and how it replicates Haig-Simons. 
Example 2: A purchases land at Time 0 for $100,000, sells it at Time 3 
for $50,000, and is subject to a 30% tax rate between Time 0 and Time 3. 
The relevant applicable federal rates for adjustment of each period's tax 
are: 
Time 1: 10% (short-term maturity) 
Time 2: 8% (short-term maturity) 
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The T ARET refund is $16,079 for the market value loss on the 
investment over the three years based on R (Formula 1) of approxi-
mately -20.6%, which, in accordance with Formula 7, is used to com-
pute each period's loss. 70 The tax refund computed for each period is 
then adjusted by the applicable federal interest rate for each period, 
resulting in an after-tax return of $66,079 ($50,000 + $16,079).71 As 
Table V shows, this after-tax return correlates with the Haig-Simons 
result assuming that A experienced a -20.6% rate of periodic market 
price change, reinvested each period's tax refund at the applicable fed-
eral rates of 10% between Times 1 and 2 and 8% between Times 2 and 
3, and obtained tax refunds and paid tax at a 30% rate. 
TABLE V: HAIG-SIMONS MODEL 
TimeO Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 
--- --- ---
Investment: $100,000 $100,000 $85,559 $74,530 
Profit: 0 ($ 20,630)1 ($15,755)3 ($12,073)5 
Tax: 0 ($ 6,189)2 {$ 4,726}4 {$ 3,622}6 
After-tax return $100,000 $ 85,559 $74,530 $66,079 
1. $100,000 investment in asset at the time of its acquisition multiplied by -20.63% rate of 
market price change. This is RW •. 
2. $20,630 loss for the period multiplied by 30% tax rate. TARET makes up for the fact that 
this tax refund is not paid at Time 1 by assuming it was borrowed by the government from the 
taxpayer. After this adjustment the taxpayer has $85,559 invested. 
3. $79,370 of the $85,559 remains invested in the asset suffering a market price decline at a 
20.63% rate, resulting in a $16,374 further loss. The $6189 tax savings from Time l's market 
price decline is invested for a positive return of 10%, resulting in a profit of$619 (10% rate of 
return on $6189 investment). The $16,374 loss plus the $619 profit produces a net loss of 
$15,755. TARET, by its adjustment of the tax refund, treats it as invested at 10% to replicate 
the Haig-Simons results. 
4. $15,755 loss for the period multiplied by 30% tax rate. See note 2 above for an explanation of 
how TARET treats the unpaid refund as an amount borrowed by the government and subject 
to interest. 
70. R = ($50,000/100,000)113 - 1 
R = -.2063 
71. The operation of the time-adjusted summation found in Formula 7 is described below for 
each of the three periods that A owned the land. 
Time 1: TRW0 , is equal to $6189 (.3 X -.2063 X $100,000) and is the tax refund due A at 
Time 1. The time-value-of-money adjustment to account for the delay in payment between Time 
1 and the realization event at Time 3 results in a Time-I tax refund assessed at Time 3 of $6993 
($6189 x [1 + .1(1 - .3)] x [1 + .08(1 - .3)]). 
Time 2: TRW0 (l + R) is equal to $4912 ($6189 X (1 - .2063)) and is the tax refund due A 
at Time 2. The time-value-of-money adjustment to account for the delay in payment between 
Time 2 and the realization event at Time 3 results in a Time-2 tax refund assessed at Time 3 of 
$5187 ($4912 x [1 + .08(1 - .3)]). 
Time 3: TRW0(l + R)2 is equal to $3899 ($6189 X (1 - .2063)2) and is the tax refund due A 
at Time 3. No time-value-of-money adjustment for the Time-3 refund is necessary because its 
payment is not delayed. 
The tax refund owed A at Time 3 is the sum of these three time-adjusted tax assessments, or 
$16,079 ($6993 + $5187 + $3899). 
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5. $62,996 ($79,370 - $16,374) of the $74,530 remains invested in the asset suffering a market 
price decline at 20.63% rate, resulting in a $12,996 further loss. The remaining $11,534, 
made up of $4727 of the tax savings from Time 2 and $6808 (which is the tax savings from 
Time 1 of $6189 and the profit earned at Time 2 from that tax savings) is invested for a 
positive return of 8% resulting in a profit of $923. The $12,996 loss plus the $923 profit 
produces a net loss of $12,073. See note 3 above for an explanation of how T ARET reaches 
similar results by first ignoring the unpaid refund and then separately accounting for the 
government's borrowing. 
6. $12,073 loss multiplied by 30% tax rate. 
Showing that the Haig-Simons model obtains the same results as 
TARET in both the gain and loss examples is somewhat misleading. 
Reaching the same results depends on making the same assumptions 
about when and how the market prices of a particular investment 
changed over time. The Haig-Simons ideal assesses a tax in each pe-
riod for gains and losses without needing to make any assumptions 
about the market price changes or return rates the taxpayer exper-
ienced. However, although the proposed model falls short of the ideal, 
it avoids most of the economic distortions and unfairness of the Code's 
realization-event approach. 
b. Sale or exchange of an exhaustible asset. When a taxpayer ac-
quires and exhausts assets for business and investment purposes within 
the same taxing period, TARET mimics Haig-Simons by reducing the 
tax base by the amount expended in acquiring the assets. 72 When a 
taxpayer acquires assets for business and investment purposes that lose 
market value through use but remain valuable over several taxing peri-
ods, the TARET method for replicating Haig-Simons is more 
complicated. 
Formula l's averaging technique for allocating market value de-
creases among taxing periods is inappropriate for exhaustible assets 
because it assumes a constant rate of market-value decline. That as-
sumption is plausible for an asset whose market price is based on the 
discounted value of expected returns for an infinite number of periods. 
For an exhaustible asset, however, the market price reflects the dis-
counted value of the asset's expected return for a limited number of 
periods. The limited duration means that the market price of the asset 
decreases each period as it has fewer periods to earn profits. Viewing 
the asset's market price at any time as reflecting expected returns over 
a term suggests that the periodic market price decreases should be cor-
related with decreases in the number of periods that the asset will pro-
duce returns. 
72. The earlier discussion of discrepancies between the amounts expended and received, see 
supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text, has little relevance here because the situation contem-
plated is one in which the taxpayer exhausts all the assets received. As for the receipt of pro-
duced assets through purchase, see infra sections 11.B.1-2. 
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Historical data concerning the market value of the taxpayer's re-
turn from the asset for each period is unlikely to be easily accessible 
when the realization event occurs. 73 The primary problem is that an 
asset's returns are difficult to measure. Even for relatively simple 
transactions like buying a building and renting it, the amount of rent 
the landlord earns in each period is difficult to know if, for example, 
services associated with the lease increase or decrease over the taxing 
periods. The problem becomes even more complex when the asset is 
part of a larger operation, such as a machine in a widget factory. The 
taxpayer and the marketplace determine returns from a venture dy-
namically and any attempt to isolate returns on individual assets leads 
to difficult estimations and rules that are arbitrary and manipulable. 
The most that might be determined is the change, and perhaps even 
the rate of change, in the level of returns between one period and an-
other. Even that kind of information is administratively difficult to 
obtain retrospectively and speculative in nature. Because of these 
practical problems, the asset must be assumed to provide returns at a 
constant dollar value during the periods of the taxpayer's use. 
The constant periodic dollar return is a function of the same three 
values used to determine market price changes for nonexhaustible as-
sets: (1) the asset's value at the time the taxpayer acquired it, W0 ; (2) 
the length of time the taxpayer held the asset, n; and (3) the asset's 
value at the time of the realization event, W0 • 74 Formula 8, which uses 
the annuity discount factor, specifies the relationship of W 0, W °' and 
the constant periodic dollar return: 
Wo = C[l - 1/(1 + F)0]/F + W0/(l + F)0 (8) 
C = .Constant periodic dollar return 
To solve for C and compute the amount exhausted each period 
that the taxpayer uses the asset requires the adoption of a discount 
rate, F. The taxpayer's willingness to invest the amount of the market 
price means that the taxpayer expected a return from this asset at least 
as good as that available from her other investment opportunities. In 
a sense, the returns from other opportunities represent the taxpayer's 
cost of borrowing or capital, sometimes referred to as an investor's 
internal rate of return. Although the taxpayer's cost of capital is the 
proper rate, F, to use in determining the taxpayer's periodic return, it 
73. See Gann, supra note 16, at 110-11. Even if historical evidence of returns is available, its 
relevance to a market price based on expected returns is questionable theoretically. 
74. W0 could be a positive amount or zero depending on the circumstances of the asset's 
disposition. If a disposition of an asset requires the taxpayer to expend more money, TARET 
treats W0 as zero and treats the increased costs in accordance with the rules for future costs. See 
infra section II.D.2. and accompanying text. For examples of how the TARET approach oper-
ates in all three of these situations, see infra note 79. 
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requires significant amounts of data to compute. Therefore, any inter-
est-rate factor chosen will, at best, represent only a rough approxima-
tion of a taxpayer's cost of capital. 
The most feasible manner of estimating that rate is to use the yield 
rate on U.S. Treasury Notes and add a premium that varies according 
to the type of investment involved, thus accounting for the added risk 
of investing in a particular venture. The rate should be reevaluated 
each taxing period to reflect changing market conditions. The chang-
ing rates will not only mirror market prices more accurately, but will 
also prevent the allocating technique from interfering with investment 
decisions because the market rates at the time of purchase were rela-
tively high, leading to accelerated losses, or relatively low, leading to 
deferred losses. To mirror the taxpayer's investment decisions at the 
time they were made, each period's yield rates should be based on the 
remaining number of periods that the taxpayer held the· investment.75 
In the following formula, Formula 8 is rewritten in a form that 
solves for C and depicts the use of the risk-adjusted current federal 
rates as the interest-rate factor:76 
n-1 n-1 
[ II (1 + P;)110 - l][Wo - Wn/ II (1 + P;)] 
i=O i=O 
n-1 
1 - 1/ II (1 + P;) 
i=O 
(9) 
Pi = Applicable federal interest rates with added risk premium for 
obligations with terms changing according to number of periods 
between n and i. 77 
75. If, for example, a taxpayer acquired an asset at Time 0 and held it until Time 5, the 
following types of yield rates would be used: 
CHART 3 
Yield rates for risky debt 
instrument with a term 
Time of: 
0 5 periods 
1 4 periods 
2 3 periods 
3 2 periods 
4 1 period 
76. Formula 9 is derived from Formula 8 as follows: 
W0 = C[l - 1/(1 + F)")/F + Wn/(l + F)" (8} 
C[l - 1/(1 + F)"]/F = W0 - Wn/(1 + F)" 
C = (F/[l - 1/(1 + F)"))[W0 - Wn/(l + F)") 
See infra note 77 for a substitution in the formula computing the geometric average for F. 
77. n-1 
II (1 + P;}11" - 1 represents the geometric average of the 
i=O 
risk-adjusted applicable federal rates for each period and replaces the F in Formula 8. The 
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From Formula S's assumption that the market price of an asset 
equals the discounted value of the periodic returns plus the discounted 
value of the amount received upon its sale, it follows that each period's 
market price decrease is the difference between the discounted value of 
the investment return at the beginning and the end of the period. That 
difference can be simplified and expressed as shown in Formula 10:78 
n-1 
Wi-1 - Wi = {C - W0 [ II (1 + Pi)110 - 1]}/[ 
i=O 
n-1 
II (1 + Pi)110r 0- 1> 
i=O 
(10) 
Formula 11 depicts the tax refund for each period by multiplying 
each period's loss by the applicable tax rate T: 
n-1 n-1 
T{ c - Wn[ II (1 + Pi)11" - 1]}/[ II (1 + P;)110]n-(i-l) 
i=O i=O 
(11) 
Formula 12 depicts the time-adjusted tax for each period to 
-account for the government's delay in paying the tax refund: 
n-1 n-1 n-1 
T{ C-Wn[ II (1 + Pi)11"- l]}/[ II (1 + Pi)11•1•-(i-I) II [1 + Fj(l - T)] (12) 
i=O i=O j=i 
Formula 13 expresses the time-adjusted tax refund due at the time 
of the realization event, which is the sum of each period's time-
adjusted tax:79 
geometric average is necessary to eliminate Formula B's assumption of a constant interest·rate 
factor in each period. 
78. The difference between the market price of an asset at the beginning and end of a period 
can be derived from the following formula: 
W;-1 - Wi = (C[l - 11(1 + F)n-fl-11/F + W./(l + F)n-fl-llJ -
( C[l - 11(1 + F)"-;]/F + W ./(1 + F)"-1) 
In this formula, F is used to depict the applicable interest-rate factor until the equation is simpli-
fied further. The right-hand side of the equation can be rewritten and simplified as follows: 
= C([l - 11(1 + F)n-fl-11/F - [l - 1/(1 + F)"-i]/F) + 
w.[1/(1 + F)n-(1-I) - 11(1 + F)"-i] 
= C/F[l - 1/(1 + F)•-Ci-1> - 1 + 1/(1 + F)"-i] + 
Wn[ll(l 4- F)•-Ci-1> - 11(1 + F)"-i] 
= C/F[-11(1 + F)n-ro-o + 1/(1 + F)•-i] + 
w.(11(1 + F)•-H> - 1/(1 + F)•-i] 
= C/F[(l + F)/(l + F)(l + F)"-i - 11(1 + F)"-Ci-11 + 
w.[11(1 + F)•-0- 0 - (1 + F)/(1 + F) (1 + F)"-il 
= C/F[(l + F)/(1 + F)•-0- 1> - 11(1 + F)•-Ci-11 + 
w.[11(1 + F)•-0- 0 - (1 + F)/(1 + F)•-(i-11 
= C/F[F/(1 + F)•-Ci-11 - W0 [F/(l + F)•-fo- 11 
= C[l/(1 + F)n-(1-11 - w.[F/(l + F)•-fo-I) 
= (C - W0 F)/(l + F)•-fl-1> 
This simplified form is found in Formula 10 in the text except for the substitution for F of the 
geometric average of the risk-adjusted applicable federal yield rates. The geometric average is 
used rather than the applicable rates for the periods in question because C is a function of the 
geometric average. 
79. The operation of Formula 13 can be described through three examples. 
Example 1 (worthless asset): A purchases a machine at Time 0 for $100,000, it becomes 
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n n-1 n-1 n-1 
T~{ C-Wn[ II (l+P011n-l]}/ [II (l+P011n1n-(k-1) II [l+Fj(l-T)] (13) 
k=l i=O i=O j=k 
Not all exhaustible assets lose market value while the taxpayer 
worthless at Time 3, and A then disposes of it at no cost. The risk-adjusted federal rates for the 
relevant periods are: 
Time 0: I2% (3-period maturity) 
Time I: I5% (2-period maturity) 
Time 2: IO% (I-period maturity) 
The relevant applicable federal rates for adjustment of each period's tax are: 
Time I: I I% (short-term maturity) 
Time 2: 9% (short-term maturity) 
The tax refund is $3I,209 computed as follows: 
C = {[(l.12)(1.15)(1.l)]'n - I )$I00,000/[I - 1/(1.12)(1.15)(1.1)] 
c = $4I,86I 
Time I: The market price decrease is $29,546 ($4I,86I/( [(1.12)(1.15)(1.l)]'n)3), and the tax 
refund for Time I is $8864 (.3 X $29,546). The time-value-of-money adjustment to account for 
the delay in payment between Time I and the realization event at Time 3 results in a Time-I tax 
refund assessed at Time 3 of $9804 ($8864 X [I + .ll(I - .3)] X [I + .09(I - .3)]). 
Time 2: The market price decrease is $33,I84 ($4I,861/{[(1.12)(1.15)(1.l)]lf3 ) 2), and the tax 
refund for Time 2 is $9955 (.3 X $33,I84). The time-value-of-money adjustment to account for 
the delay in payment between Time 2 and the realization event at Time 3 results in a Time-2 tax 
refund assessed at Time 3 of $I0,224 ($9955 X [I + .09(1 - .3)]). 
Time 3: The market price decrease is $37,271 ($41,861/[(l.12)(1.15)(1.l)]l/3), and the tax 
refund for Time 3 is $I I,I8I (.3 X $37,271). No time-value-of-money adjustment for the Time-3 
tax refund is necessary because its payment is not delayed. 
The tax refund owed A at Time 3 is the sum of these three time-adjusted tax assessments, or 
$3I,209 ($9804 + $10,224 + $11,I8I). 
Example 2 (asset with salvage value): Same as Example I, except A sells the machine for 
$40,000 at Time 3. The tax refund is $I9,027 computed as follows: 
c = {[(1.12)(1.15)(1.1)]'13 - I }[$I00,000 - $40,000/(1.12)(1. I5)(1.l)/[1/(1.12)(1.15)(1.1)] 
c = $30,042 
Time I: The market price decrease is $I7,728 ($30,042 - $40,000([(1.12)(1.15)(1.1)]1!3 -
I)/( [(1.I2)(1.15)(1.l)]'n)3), and the tax refund on the market price decrease is $5318 (.3 X 
$I7,728). The time-value-of-money adjustment to account for the delay in payment between 
Time I and the realization event at Time 3 results in a Time-I tax refund assessed at Time 3 of 
$5883 ($53I8 x [I + .ll(I - .3)] x [I + .09(I - .3)]). 
Time 2: The market price decrease is $I9,911 ($30,042 - $40,000([(1.12)(1.15)(1.1)]1!3 -
1 )/( [(l.12)(1.15)(1.1)]1!3)2), and the tax refund on the market price decrease is $5973 (.3 X 
$I9,9I l). The time-value-of-money adjustment to account for the delay in payment between 
Time 2 and the realization event at Time 3 results in a Time-2 tax refund assessed at Time 3 of 
$6135 ($5973 x [I + .09(1 - .3)]). . 
Time 3: The market price decrease is $23,362 ($30,042 - $40,000[(1.12)(1.15)(1.l)]'n -
1)/( [(1.12)(1.15)(1.1)]'13), and the tax refund on the market price decrease is $7009 (.3 X 
$23,362). No time-value-of-money adjustment for the Time-3 refund is necessary because its 
payment is not delayed. 
The tax refund due A at Time 3 is the sum of these three time-adjusted tax assessments, or 
$19,027 ($5883 + $6135 + $7009). 
Example 3 (asset with negative salvage value): Same as Example 1, except at Time 3 when the 
machine becomes worthless, it costs A $10,000 to dispose of it. The $IO,OOO payment at Time 3 
reflects a cost thatA incurred when she purchased the machine and made it operational. At that 
time, the machine was accompanied by the burden of its eventual removal, the equivalent of a 
market price decrease for A in the period of its purchase. The computation of the tax refund is 
the same as for Example I, except that a market price decrease equal to the discounted amount of 
the $10,000 cost results in a tax refund at Time 0 that is adjusted for the payment delay until 
Time 3. In addition, a tax refund is computed for each period between Times 0 and 3 to account 
for the increasing cost to A, and those tax refunds are also adjusted for the payment delay. See 
infra section 11.D.2 (discussing TARET's treatment of future costs). 
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holds and uses them. Taxpayers invest in exhaustible assets because 
they expect to obtain profits from using those assets that exceed the 
costs incurred through exhaustion. However, in some cases those 
profits may come not only from use of the exhaustible assets but also 
from increases in the market price of those assets. The notion of an 
exhaustible asset appreciating in value may seem oxymoronic, but it 
merely acknowledges the marketplace phenomenon in which increase 
in the value of an asset's expected use outstrips market value decreases 
due to wear and tear. Formula l's averaging technique and Formula 
S's time-value-of-money adjustment provide a satisfactory way of com-
puting the taxpayer's tax liability if an exhaustible asset appreciates. 
Thus, if a purchased asset's market price increases between the time of 
acquisition and disposition, the T ARET model treats the investment 
in the same way, regardless of whether the asset is exhaustible or 
nonexhaustible. 
c. Other types of dispositions. T ARET also changes the tax treat-
ment of dispositions, other than sales or exchanges, involving 
purchased assets. The following discussion of casualty losses and don-
ative transfers indicates how T ARET leads to a reconsideration of fa-
miliar Code rules. 
(1) Casualty losses. Internal Revenue Code section 165(a) allows a 
deduction for any casualty loss sustained during the year that is not 
compensated for by insurance or otherwise. Internal Revenue Code 
section 165(b) provides that "the basis for determining the amount of 
the deduction for any loss shall be the adjusted basis provided in sec-
tion 1011 for determining the loss from the sale or other disposition of 
property." A regulation elaborates on this provision by stating that if 
property used in a business or investment venture is totally destroyed, 
the amount of the loss is the asset's adjusted basis. 80 The Code appro-
priately limits the casualty loss deduction to basis when the asset is 
totally destroyed because the realization-event principle makes market 
price changes in taxing periods before the casualty irrelevant. 
Basis as a measurement of a casualty loss, unexplainedly, breaks 
down under the Code when the taxpayer's asset is only partially de-
stroyed. The regulations indicate that the proper measurement of the 
casualty loss deduction is the difference between the asset's market 
price before and after the casualty, as long as that difference is less 
than the asset's adjusted basis. 81 Rather than using the measurement 
of market price loss to indicate the portion of the asset that was de-
80. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b) (as amended in 1977). 
81. Id. 
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stroyed and allowing a deduction for only that portion of the basis, the 
Code allows unrecognized gains and losses to control the measure-
ment of the casualty loss. The effect of this computation is to allow a 
further deferral of gains or postponement of losses until the taxpayer 
otherwise disposes of the asset. 82 
TARET is not indifferent to when the market price changes and, 
therefore, a casualty event occurs, regardless of whether the asset is 
partially or totally destroyed, or requires an appraisal of the asset's 
market price immediately before the casualty occurred. 83 In effect, the 
casualty is treated as if it were a confluence of three events (1) a cash 
sale before the casualty; (2) a repurchase of the asset for the cash re-
ceived; and (3) a casualty resulting in a loss, or partial loss, of the 
hypothetically repurchased asset. The asset's price immediately before 
the casualty represents W n and is used to compute the taxpayer's tax 
82. The effect of the Code's treatment of partially destroyed assets is illustrated below 
through examples. 
Example I: A's business asset is partially destroyed and has a market price immediately after 
the casualty of $2500. Its basis was $6000, and its market value immediately before the casualty 
was $7500. 
According to Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b) (as amended in 1977), in the year of the casualty A 
may deduct $5000 ($7500 - $2500), and, according to l.R.C. § 1016(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), 
the asset's basis is reduced to $1000 ($6000 - $5000). The adjustment to basis assures that the 
$1500 ($7500 - $6000) market price accretion that occurred before the casualty will be taxed 
eventually, but it delays taxing the accretion until A later disposes of the partially destroyed 
asset. 
An alternative approach would be to use the comparison of market prices immediately before 
and after the casualty to measure the portion of the asset destroyed - in this case, two thirds 
($5000/7500) - and deduct that portion of the basis - in this case, $4000 ($6000 X 2/3) -
leaving a basis of $2000. This approach would treat the casualty event as the equivalent of a sale 
of a portion of the asset followed by the loss of the proceeds, as shown by the following 
computations: 
Sale of 2/3 of asset: 
Amount received 
Basis 
Gain 
Loss of proceeds 
$5,000 
4,000 
1,000 
5,000 
Net Loss 4,000 
The same approach should apply when the asset decreases in value before the casualty, as 
shown in Example 2 below. 
Example 2: A's business asset is partially destroyed and has a market price immediately after 
the casualty of $2500. Its basis was $6000, and its market price immediately before the casualty 
was $4000. 
According to Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(b) (as amended in 1977), in the year of the casualty 4 
may deduct $1500 ($4000 - $2500), and, according to I.R.C. § 1016(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), 
the asset's basis is reduced to $4500 ($6000 - $1500). The adjustment to basis assures that the 
$2000 ($6000 - $4000) market price decretion that occurred before the casualty will be de-
ducted eventually, but it delays the tax refund until A later disposes of the partially destroyed 
asset. The alternative approach would allow a deduction for the casualty loss of $2250 ($6000 X 
($1500/$4000)), and effectively permits a deduction for a portion of the market price decrease 
that occurred before the casualty. 
83. The need to determine a totally destroyed asset's value immediately prior to the casualty 
is an administrative complexity that the Code avoids. 
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liability in accordance with the TARET methods previously de-
scribed. 84 With this tax assessment accomplished, the appropriate 
amount allowed as a casualty loss under T ARET is based on the as-
set's market price immediately before the casualty. If the asset were 
totally destroyed, the amount allowed for the casualty would be W n· 
If the asset were partially destroyed, the deductible amount would be 
the difference between Wn and the asset's price after the casualty. The 
tax refund resulting from the deduction needs no time adjustment be-
cause the casualty occurred in the same period that it is recognized. 
T ARET's treatment of casualty losses highlights both the limita-
tions of its allocation techniques and its continuing dependence on the 
definition of a realization event. The Haig-Simons ideal would assess a 
tax on all market price changes within a taxing period regardless of 
the reason for the accretions or decretions. A casualty loss does not 
represent a special kind of market price loss, but merely an event that 
results in a market price decrease warranting a tax base adjustment at 
the time it occurs. For TARET, a casualty provides not only the op-
portunity to assess a tax based on market price changes occurring be-
tween the time the taxpayer acquired the asset and suffered the 
casualty, but also sufficient objective evidence to avoid allocating some 
of the loss of the current period to prior periods. Recognizing that the 
TARET rules regarding casualty losses are essentially timing rules 
may affect how the definition of casualty develops. Courts applying 
TARET should continue to treat slow-eating termites as a noncasu-
alty event, 85 but seriously consider treating events such as the stock 
market crash of October 19, 1987, as casualties. 
(2) Gifts, bequests, and inheritances. The Code presently permits 
assignment of income by not treating a lifetime gift by the donor as a 
realization event, by not treating a gift as income to the donee, and by 
requiring the donee to take the donor's basis in property.86 TARET 
can accomplish the same results by assessing tax, based on the asset's 
value at the time the donor acquired it, at the time the donee enters 
into a realization event. 87 Nothing about the model suggests that Con-
gress must reconsider its policy of not treating a gift as income to the 
84. See supra notes 47-79 and accompanying text. 
85. See Rev. Ru!. 63-232, 1963-2 C.B. 97. 
86. See 1 B. BITTKER, supra note 6, at ffff 10.1, 41.3; see also H. SIMONS, supra note 1, at 
125-47, 163 (criticizing this rule and recommending taxing the donee upon receipt of gifts, be-
quests, and inheritances). 
87. The Code limits assignment of losses by requiring the donee to compute losses by using 
the lesser of either the asset's value at the time of the gift, or the donor's basis. See I.R.C. 
§ 1015(a) (1982). IfTARET permits assignment, it should eliminate this indefensible limitation. 
See 2 B. BITTKER, supra note 6, at ff 41.3.1. 
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donee. However, eliminating the advantage of tax deferral makes it 
more difficult to justify postponing the realization event. With re-
moval of the fairness question about whether tax deferral should be 
lost through a nonmarketplace transaction, allowing the assignment of 
income becomes harder to defend. The administrative difficulties of 
obtaining an appraisal must be weighed against the inequities of al-
lowing property owners an advantage not available to taxpayers who 
earn income by selling their services. 
TARET demands that Congress change its policy of allowing the 
taxpayer's heirs to take a basis in inherited property equal to its fair 
market value at the time of the taxpayer's death, 88 while not requiring 
the taxpayer's estate to recognize the unrealized gain. 89 The Code's 
treatment of inherited property converts tax deferral into tax exclu-
sion. By eliminating the advantages of tax deferral, T ARET increases 
the relative benefits of the exclusion available to taxpayers who die 
with appreciated assets. More importantly, without repeal of the step-
up-in-basis rule, TARET's promise of increased economic neutrality 
and equity will remain unfulfilled. 
2. Retaining a Purchased Asset 
Section II.A demonstrated how TARET operates when the tax-
payer purchases and disposes of an asset. This section analyzes 
T ARET's operation with regard to transactions occurring while the 
taxpayer holds a purchased asset. 
a. Corporate distributions to shareholders. Corporate distributions 
to shareholders present difficult problems under the Code because sig-
nificant tax differences result from classifying a distribution as a divi-
dend rather than a redemption or liquidation.90 Under the Code, a 
88. See I.R.C. § 1014 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); 2 B. BrITKER, supra note 6, at 'il'il 41.4.1, .7 
(describing exceptions to the general rule that the taxpayer's heirs take a basis equal to the prop-
erty's market price); see also I.R.C. § 469(g)(2) (Supp. IV 1986) (indirectly limiting the advan-
tage of the step-up-in-basis rule by disallowing suspended passive losses to the extent that heirs 
enjoy a step-up). 
89. I.R.C. § 1014 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) also operates to reduce basis when the decedent's 
asset decreased in value between the time of acquisition and death. Nonrecognition of losses is a 
less serious problem, however, because most decedents can plan to dispose of those assets before 
death. 
90. Partial liquidations, which focus on the corporation's chang~ of investment strategy, cre-
ate special difficulties. The case for capital-transaction treatment of partial liquidations has al-
ways been an uneasy one. As long as the distribution is pro rata among shareholders, the 
corporation has accumulated earnings and profits, and if it remains active after the distribution, 
it is hard to see why it is relevant whether the corporation reduced its cash holdings or ceased 
operating a portion of its business. The difference, at best, is one only of degree. See Surrey, 
Income Tax Problems of Corporations and Shareholders: American Law Institute Tax Project -
American Bar Association Committee Study on Legislative Revision, 14 TAX L. REV. 1, 5-9 
(1958). The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 
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dividend is a noncapital transaction, which, in general, results in the 
entire amount being included in income without the benefit of any 
preferential tax treatment.91 In contrast, classifying a distribution as a 
stock redemption, partial liquidation, or complete liquidation gener-
ally means that it is reduced by a portion or all of taxpayer's basis in 
the stock and enjoys preferential treatment.92 
TARET changes the nature of the issues and alleviates many clas-
sification problems because it essentially taxes the shareholder on a 
corporation's increase in earnings and profits as they occur and is in-
different to whether the taxpayer-shareholders' return comes in the 
form of dividends, redemptions, liquidations, or sales or exchanges. If 
the corporation distributes a relatively small percentage of its value 
pro rata to shareholders, TARET taxes the distribution currently, 
without reference to the taxpayer's initial investment. If the taxpayer 
either receives a non-pro rata distribution, if the corporation makes a 
pro rata distribution to its shareholders that represents a relatively 
large percentage of its total"value, or if the taxpayer sells or exchanges 
the stock, then the time-value adjustment detailed earlier in section 
II.A. La applies. The adjustment essentially treats a corporate distri-
bution as if a portion of it had been distributed as a dividend in each of 
the prior years that the taxpayer held the stock and the after-tax distri-
bution had been immediately reinvested in the corporation. Thus, 
T ARET eliminates the preference for corporations retaining earnings 
and having stockholders enjoy investment returns through capital 
transactions. 93 
b. Interest earned by lenders. A taxpayer who lends money to an-
other person enjoys interest income during each period the loan is out-
(1982), repealed the provisions of prior law relating to partial liquidations. The Code now pro-
vides that for corporate shareholders, distributions of property pursuant to a partial liquidation 
are governed by I.R.C. §§ 301 and 302 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), having to do with dividends and 
redemptions. For noncorporate shareholders, the tax treatment of partial liquidations remains 
essentially the same. See I.R.C. § 302{b) & (e) (1982). 
91. See I.R.C. § 301 {1982 & Supp. IV 1986); 3 B. BITIKER, supra note 6, at nn 92.1.1-.2. 
However, the special deduction available to corporate shareholders for dividends received under 
I.R.C. § 243 {1982 & Supp. IV 1986) may make classifying a distribution as a dividend rather 
more advantageous than classifying it as a redemption or liquidation. 
92. See 3 B. BITIKER, supra note 6, at n 93.1.1 {describing the tax treatment of redemptions 
and liquidations as equivalent to the tax treatment accorded an asset sale, which includes treating 
it as the equivalent of a capital transaction). Although the Tax Reform Act of 1986 repealed the 
capital gains deduction, the Code continues to prefer capital gains over other types of income. 
See supra note 34. 
93. Comparing the after-tax results of Examples 1 and 2 below illustrates how TARET elim-
inates any tax preference for the manner that a shareholder incurs tax on corporate earnings. 
The examples rely on the averaging technique's strong assumption that the corporation earns a 
constant rate of return during the period the taxpayer holds its stock. 
Example 1: A acquires stock of Corporation Xl'Z for $1000 at Time 0 and sells it for $1225 
at Time 3. (The analysis would be the same if Corporation Xl'Z had redeemed A's stock or had 
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standing; that interest income reflects market price increases that 
TARET taxes when they occur. Concerns about time value of money 
have led recently to significant Code changes to allow the accurate 
measurement of interest income on taxpayer's loans, in particular, for 
below-market loans and original-issue discount obligations, regardless 
of whether the taxpayer uses the cash- or accrual-method tax account-
ing system.94 The recent reforms are wholly consistent with TARET's 
goals and are an essential component to its operation. 
Related questions arise regarding transactions in which a party 
provides goods or services before receiving payment or makes a pay-
ment before receiving goods or services. The transactions contain a 
loan as well as a sales component, and identifying a loan indicates that 
an accurate measurement of income requires accounting for the im-
plicit interest charge. 
liquidated its assets.) A's applicable tax rate is 30%. A's tax is $71 and after-tax return is $1154 
($1225 - $71), computed as follows: 
R = ($1225/1000)113 - 1 
R= .07 
Time 1: TRW0 is equal to $21 (.3 X .07 X $1000) and is the amount of tax owed at Time 1. 
The time-value-of-money adjustment to account for the delay in payment between Time 1 and 
the realization event at Time 3 results in a Time-I tax assessed at Time 3 of $23 ($21 X [I + 
.07(1 - .3)]2. 
Time 2: TRW0(l + R) is equal to $22 ($21 X (1 + .07)) and is the tax owed for Time 2. 
The time-value-of-money adjustment to account for the delay in payment between Time 2 and 
the realization event at Time 3 results in a Time-2 tax assessed at Time 3 of $24 ($22 X [1 + 
.07(1 - .3)]). 
Time 3: TRW0(l + R)2 is equal to $24 ($21 X (1 + .07)2) and is the tax owed for Time 3. 
No time-value-of-money adjustment for the Time-3 tax is necessary because its payment is not 
delayed. 
The tax owed by A at Time 3 is the sum of the three time-adjusted tax assessments, or $71 
($23 + $24 + $24). 
Example 2: Assume the same facts as Example 1 except that CorporationXl'Z distributes its 
after-tax earnings to its shareholders each period. If the appreciation in the market price of the 
stock enjoyed by A in Example 1 reflects the corporation's after-tax return each period, we can 
assume that the periodic distributions equal 7% of A's investment for each period. At Time 1, 
the corporation's distribution to A is $70 ($1000 X .07), resulting in an after-tax return of $49 
($70 X (1 - .3)), which A reinvests in the corporation. At Time 2, the corporation's distribu-
tion to A is $73 ([$1000 + $49] X .07), resulting in an after-tax return of$51 ($73 X (1 - .3)), 
which again A reinvests in the corporation. At Time 3, the corporation's distribution to A is $77 
([$1000 + $49 + $51] X .07), resulting in an after-tax return of $54 to A. If A were to sell her 
stock, which has a value of $1100 ($1000 + $49 + $51) at Time 3, she would not owe any tax 
upon the sale because the stock did not appreciate from the time of her investments. The cash 
received upon the sale of the stock, $1100, plus her Time-3 after-tax distribution of $54 equals 
$1154. 
The TARET system is also attractive because it eliminates the inequities of current Code 
provisions that tax distributions for corporate profits earned before a stockholder acquired the 
stock as dividends, and corporate profits earned while the stockholder held the stock as a capital 
transaction if the stockholder sells the stock before the corporation declares a dividend. See 3 B. 
BITfKER, supra note 6, at ff 92.1.1. . 
94. See I.R.C. § 1272(a) (Supp. IV 1986) (original-issue discount obligations); I.R.C. § 7872 
(Supp. IV 1986) (below-market loans); see also, e.g., Halperin, supra note l, at 509-15 (discussing 
these types of transactions). 
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If a taxpayer sells a note or bond at a premium or a discount, 
T ARET treats the increase or decrease in the loan's market price as it 
would an increase or decrease in the value of any other purchased 
asset. The loan's price changes reflect interest-rate fluctuations and 
the creditworthiness of the debtor, which are marketplace phenomena 
indistinguishable from the causes of price changes for any purchased 
asset, and, therefore, should be accorded the same tax treatment. If a 
taxpayer retains a note or bond until maturity, TARET, as well as the 
Code, are forced to ignore market value changes that may have oc-
curred during the time the note or bond was outstanding. This result 
is contrary to the Haig-Simons ideal, but is unavoidable because of the 
absence of a realization event to trigger TARET's operation.95 
c. Rents from using property. A taxpayer who purchases an asset 
and leases it to another person enjoys rental income during each pe-
riod. The difficulty of determining market rental rates has made it 
unfeasible for the Code to police below-market leases as it has policed 
below-market loans, and that discrepancy remains under TARET.96 
As market rents vary, a lessor or lessee who has entered into a 
long-term lease may experience market price changes in the value of 
the lease. If market rents are greater than the rents provided for in the 
lease, the value of the lease to the lessor decreases while its value in-
creases to the lessee. If market rents are lower than the rents provided 
for in the lease, the value of the lease to the lessor increases while its 
value decreases to the lessee. If a lessor or lessee retains a lease for its 
full term, both the Code and TARET must ignore the changes in mar-
ket value that may have occurred during the lease's term. Without a 
transaction to value the lease, contrary to Haig-Simons, the market 
changes are beyond the reach of either the Code or TARET. 
Traditional Code analysis treats any lessor transaction relating to 
the leasehold as a noncapital transaction that changes the timing of 
the income stream.97 The capital/noncapital distinction has no place 
under TARET, and, instead, the tax is based on an allocation of the 
lease's market price changes over the tax periods that the lessor or 
lessee had an interest in the lease. 9s 
95. See infra notes 136-42 and accompanying text for a further discussion of market value 
changes for notes and bonds when the debtor sells a debt or obtains a discharge of indebtedness. 
96. See infra notes 130-31 and accompanying text. 
97. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transport, Inc., 364 U.S. 130 (1960); Hort v. 
Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941). 
98. The TARET allocation techniques will dilfer depending on whether the parties enter into 
the lease initially or pay parties owning leasehold interests for the lease. If the lessor or lessee 
enters into the lease agreement, then the allocation technique described in infra section 11.B, 
concerning produced assets, is used to determine the amount of market changes for each period 
either party held the lease. If the taxpayer pays a premium or obtains a discount for an existing 
February 1990] Tax Deferral 767 
The analysis of property rents becomes more complex when tax-
payers elect to use the property themselves in their business or invest-
ment ventures. Haig-Simons essentially ignores a taxpayer's imputed 
income in the form of rental profits acquired from using purchased 
assets for business or investment, since the market value increases at-
tributable to the imputed rental income are accompanied by decreases 
as the imputed income is exhausted immediately. The Code also ig-
nores imputed income from use of a business or investment asset be-
cause of the absence of a marketplace transaction. This treatment is 
appropriate except when the business or investment profits resulting 
from the use of the asset are deferred. 
By not taxing the imputed rental income produced when it is 
earned and delaying its deduction, the Code enhances the benefits of 
tax deferral and creates horizontal inequities between taxpayers who 
lease assets from others and those who obtain imputed rental income 
from assets they acquire. For example, a taxpayer who purchases a 
bulldozer for the purpose of building a factory enjoys bulldozer serv-
ices during the construction period. The Code postpones the deduc-
tion of all marketplace expenditures connected with the building of the 
factory, such as property taxes, machinery rents, machinery amortiza-
tion, or employee salaries, by adding them to the factory's basis and 
amortizing them over the period that the factory is put to use.99 It 
fails, however, to measure and tax the bulldozer services when earned 
and, therefore, effectively allows their immediate deduction. The ef-
fect is to favor taxpayers who acquire and use their own assets over 
those who lease other persons' assets and who cannot immediately de-
duct the costs of the rents. 
T ARET avoids the Code's inequities because it, like Haig-Simons, 
does not need to postpone the deduction for assets exhausted during a 
taxing period. The bulldozer services and any other expenditures that 
are exhausted in the production process are transformed into a fac-
tory. T ARET accounts for the periodic market value increases in the 
factory during the construction process. 100 Eliminating tax deferral 
for market price increases resulting from the building of the fac-
tory means that postponing the deduction for exhaustion of the bull-
dozer services or any other exhausted assets is unnecessary and 
inappropriate. 
lease, then the rules for exhaustible assets found supra in section II.A.Lb apply to allocate mar-
ket price changes to each period the lease is held. 
99. See I.R.C. § 263A (Supp. IV 1986); Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1 
(1974). 
100. See infra section 11.B.2. 
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B. Produced Assets Devoted to Business or Investment Ventures 
A second way the realization-event principle allows taxpayers to 
trigger an interest-free government loan is by not taxing them on the 
increasing values reflected in the assets they produce until they sell or 
exchange them. The term "produced assets" is used to refer to assets 
acquired by the taxpayer through the acquisition or use of other assets. 
This section builds on section II.A's analysis and investigates in more 
detail the relationship of purchased assets to produced assets and the 
phenomenon of using purchased and produced assets to produce other 
assets. It explores the tax issues relating to produced assets by first 
explaining the complexity of market price changes that occur in the 
production process with reference to the Haig-Simons ideal and then 
showing how the Code's realization-event principle, when judged 
against that standard, potentially leads to tax deferral, inequities, and 
economic distortions. The remainder of this section describes how 
TARET mimics the Haig-Simons ideal and substantially reduces the 
Code's tax deferral opportunities. 
In the Haig-Simons ideal, determining the tax consequences of 
producing assets requires identifying market price decreases from as-
sets exhausted in production and market price increases from assets 
produced. Four different types of market price decretions occur dur-
ing the production process. First, the taxpayer may use (exhaust) 
goods or services, such as electricity, scratch paper, truck fuel, or 
workers' labor. These depletions reduce the Haig-Simons tax base in 
the period the taxpayer uses them. 101 Second, the taxpayer may 
devote assets to the production process that remain differentiated from 
the produced asset, but would have no salvage value if removed from 
the production process. Examples include an artist's oil paint placed 
on the canvas, silk cloth cut and sewn to make a dress, or seeds 
planted on farmland. Their use also reduces the Haig-Simons tax base 
by the amount of their market values. Third, a taxpayer may devote 
assets to the production process that remain differentiated from the 
produced asset and have some salvage value if extracted from the pro-
duced asset. Examples include an artist's canvas after the artist has 
applied paint to it or mahogany panelling installed in a building. 
Haig-Simons would account for any market price decrease by compar-
ing the asset's market price before and after the taxpayer devotes it to 
the production process. Fourth, there may be wear, tear, or obsoles-
cence of assets that are used to produce another asset, such as the 
101. This discussion assumes that the tax base has already been reduced for any difference in 
the market price of the assets transferred to purchase and the purchased assets, in accordance 
with the analysis described supra in section II.A. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text. 
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artist's brush, the excavator's bulldozer, or the writer's computer. 
Again, Haig-Simons accounts for market value decreases by compar-
ing the exhaustible asset's market value at the beginning and end of a 
period. 
In the Haig-Simons ideal, market price accretions from acquired 
assets increase the tax base, and that includes produced assets. In this 
context, the greatest difficulties are differentiating produced assets 
from purchased assets and determining when events occurred to pro-
duce those assets. The acquisition of a produced asset is relatively 
easy to identify when the taxpayer acquires services, goods, and ma-
chinery and devotes that capital to manufacturing a completed or par-
tially completed asset, whether it be a painting, a building, or 
knowledge. Less obvious and more difficult to identify, but no differ-
ent, is the situation in which a taxpayer obtains a produced asset 
through what might be called the "portfolio phenomenon." The tax-
payer exhausts no more than is necessary to purchase an asset, yet 
acquires not only the purchased asset but also a produced asset. The 
pizzeria owner's purchase of the delivery truck examined earlier dem-
onstrates this phenomenon, 102 as does a taxpayer's acquisition of a 
control premium by buying voting shares and adding them to those 
she already owned, acquisition of a rarity premium by buying an an-
cient vase that matches one the taxpayer already had to make a unique 
set, or acquisition of a going-concern premium by buying inventory to 
stock a fully equipped retail establishment. In whatever manner a tax-
payer acquires a produced asset, the Haig-Simons ideal requires that 
the accretion increase the tax base in the period it is acquired. 
Under the realization-event principle, market price increases dur-
ing or upon completion of production of an asset are not taxed because 
production is an insufficient realization event. To lessen the tax defer-
ral benefits, the Code generally postpones the deduction of realized 
costs incurred in the production of those assets. 103 The postponement 
of deductions creates administrative complexities as the Code attempts 
to reconnect income-producing transactions, or, if you will, match the 
income-producing costs to the taxing periods when the taxpayer real-
izes the produced income.104 
Deferring tax on a taxpayer's periodic accretions from producing 
assets also creates inequities and economic distortions. The Code 
102. See supra text accompanying note 42. 
103. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 263A (Supp. IV 1986); see also supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
104. For a discussion of the complexities of I.R.C. § 263A (Supp. IV 1986), see Garhwal, 
Cost Capitalization Rules Applicable to Contractors, Manufacturers, Retailers and Wholesalers, 66 
TAXES 403 (1988). 
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taxes market price accretions of those who sell their assets, including 
their services, in the marketplace and use the proceeds to purchase 
other assets, while it defers tax on the income of those who use previ-
ously acquired appreciated assets and personal services outside the 
marketplace to produce assets. For example, a business that uses its 
assets to build its own factory is not taxed on the market value of those 
production efforts until the business sells the goods manufactured in 
its factory or sells the factory itself. The lower deductions for exhaus-
tion of the factory do not offset the tax deferral advantages because the 
market value increase from the factory's production occurs in earlier 
taxing periods than the taxing periods involved when the Code allows 
a taxpayer to deduct for its exhaustion. In contrast, a business that 
hires someone to build a factory enjoys no tax deferral because the 
factory's market price is nearly equal to the amount the taxpayer paid 
for it and reflects relatively little untaxed effort by the taxpayer. The 
difference in treatment not only leads to different taxation of similarly 
situated businesses, but encourages taxpayers to devote their resources 
to producing assets that the market values less than the resources ex-
pended in their production. The favorable tax treatment makes what 
would otherwise be a less profitable venture more profitable. 
T ARET responds to the tax deferral concerns by allocating the 
market price increases attributable to the taxpayer's production efforts 
over the taxing periods when the production took place. The proposed 
allocation technique works reasonably well for produced assets that 
are sold or exchanged immediately after the taxpayer completes pro-
duction.105 By relying on some market appraisals, the allocation tech-
nique also operates reasonably well for produced assets that the 
taxpayer initially retains, but ultimately sells or exchanges. For assets 
that are produced, used, and exhausted entirely outside the market-
place, however, TARET avoids tax deferral only if production and 
exhaustion occur during the same taxing period. Thus, the critical 
question becomes whether the model's inability to tax some produced 
assets with reasonable accuracy or administrative ease means that the 
model fails. The remaining subsections are devoted to this question. 
Sections II.B.1.a and II.B.1.b below describe the allocation tech-
nique for assets that are sold or exchanged immediately after the tax-
payer completes production. Section 11.B.1.a considers produced 
assets for which all materials devoted to the production process be-
come worthless, and section 11.B.l.b considers produced assets for 
which at least one capital item retains some value through the produc-
105. See infra section 11.B.1. 
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tion process. With the easiest of the production situations analyzed, 
section II.B.2 then considers situations in which the allocation tech-
nique becomes administratively more difficult or unworkable. 
1. Disposition of a Produced Asset 
a. Sale or exchange upon completion of an asset for which none of 
the contributed capital that is integrally related to its production has a 
salvage value. If a taxpayer exhausts all of the capital devoted to pro-
duction and if the taxpayer sells the asset shortly after producing it, 
then the sale price, W0 , reflects the total value of production. TARET 
can ignore production costs in determining the market price increases 
resulting from production because the taxpayer exhausted them, and 
they are not reflected in the asset's market price. Replicating Haig-
Simons, T ARET allows the taXpayer to deduct production costs in the 
taxing period when they are exhausted. 
Viewing the asset's market price at any time as reflecting the total 
value of production that has occurred to date suggests that the appro-
priate allocation technique should correlate periodic market price in-
creases with the amount of production that occurred in each period. 
That type of historical data is unlikely to be accessible when a realiza-
tion event occurs, and, therefore, practicality requires the production 
rate to be presumed constant during the time that the taxpayer pro-
duces the as~et. Formula 14, which uses the sum of annuity factor, 
specifies the relationship between the constant periodic value of pro-
duction, E, the number of periods over which the taxpayer produces 
the asset, n, and W0 : 106 · 
W0 = E[(l + F)°-1]/F (14) 
To solve for E and compute the amount of market value accretion 
for each period the taxpayer produces the asset, it is necessary to 
adopt a discount rate, F. The considerations used to identify F for 
exhaustible assets are equally applicable for identifying market price 
increases for produced assets. 107 F should equal the yield rate on U.S. 
Treasury Notes adjusted by a risk premium for each period the tax-
payer produced the asset, and those yield rates probably should be 
based on the remaining number of production periods. The varying 
multi-period rates acknowledge the fact that the taxpayer did not 
106. Determining the time when the taxpayer produces an asset may be difficult. For exam-
ple, the development period for a patent is nearly impossible to determine because of the amor-
phous character of the research and development efforts that may have led to the breakthrough. 
This aspect of the allocation technique may require the Internal Revenue Service to adopt a set of 
assumptions to avoid difficult and administratively costly disputes. 
107. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
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transfer the partially produced asset.108 
Formula 14 can be rewritten in a form that solves for E and depicts 
the use of the risk-adjusted current federal rates as the interest-rate 
factor: 109 
n-1 n-1 
E = Wn[ IT (1 + PJ110 - 1]/[ IT (1 + PJ - 1] (15) 
i=O i=O 
P; = Applicable federal interest rates with added risk premium for obliga-
tions with terms changing according to number of periods between n 
and i. 
Each period's market price increase is the difference between the 
produced asset's value at the beginning and end of the period, and, 
therefore, it follows from Formula 14 that each period's market value 
increase can be simplified and expressed by Formula 16:110 
n~l n-1 n-1 
W;-W;-1=E/[ II ( l+P0110-l]{ [II (l+P0110J - [II (l+P1)110]1- 1) (16) 
i=O i=O i=O 
Formula 17 depicts the tax for each period by multiplying each 
period's market price increase by the applicable tax rate T. 
n-1 n-1 n-1 
TE/[ IT (l+PJ110-l]{[ IT (l+P;)110J - [ IT (l+PJ110]1- 11 (17) 
i=O i=O i=O 
Formula 18 depicts the time-adjusted tax for each period to ac-
count for the taxpayer's delay in paying the amount owed the 
government: 
n-1 n-1 n-1 n-1 
TE/[ II (l+P0110-l]{[ II (l+P0110]i - [II (l+P1)110J-1 J II [l+Fj(l-T)] (18) 
i=O i=O i=O j=i 
Formula 19 expresses the time-adjusted tax liability due at the time 
108. Each period's market price increase consists of both the average value of production of a 
new portion of the asset and a return on the investment of prior produced portions. Failure to 
take the latter into account would lead to different tax treatment of a taxpayer who sells a par-
tially produced asset in the marketplace and reinvests the proceeds, and one who retains a par-
tially produced asset and uses it in the next period or periods to complete the asset. The sum-of. 
annuity formula achieves this result and explains why the definition of F suggested in the text is 
appropriate. 
109. E = W0F/[(l + F)" - 1]. See supra notes 77-78 (discussing substitution of formula 
computing geometric average for F). 
110. The difference between· the market price of a produced asset at the beginning and end of 
a period is suggested by the following formula: 
W; - W;-1 = E[(l + F.); - 1]/F - E[(l + F)i-I - 1]/F 
= E/F[(l + F); - 1] - [(1 + F)i-i - 1] 
= E/F[(l + F); - 1 - (1 + F)i-1 + 1] 
= E/F[(l + F); _ (1 + F)i-1] 
This simplified form is found in Formula 16 except for the substitution for F of the geometric 
average of the risk-adjusted applicable federal yield rates. 
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of the realization event, which is the sum of each period's time-
adjusted tax: 
n-1 n n-1 n-1 n-1 
TE/[Il(l+P;)110-l] l: {[II(l+P;)110]k- [II(l+Pi)110]k-IJII[ l+Fj(l-T)] (19) 
i=O k=l i=O i=O j=k 
Example 3 and Table VI demonstrate Formula 19's operation and 
how it replicates Haig-Simons. 
Example 3: At Time 0, A begins carving a sculpture out of marble that 
cost $1000 and completes the artwork at Time 3, when she sells it for 
$10,000. The marble has no salvage value. A is subject to a 30% tax 
rate between Time 0 and Time 3. The risk-adjusted federal rates for the 
relevant periods are: · 
Time 0: 12% (3-period maturity) 
Time 1: 8% (2-period maturity) 
Time 2: 10% (1-period maturity) 
The relevant federal rates for each period for adjustment of each 
period's tax are: · 
Time 1: 6% (short-term maturity) 
Time 2: 9% (short-term maturity) 
The $1000 cost for materials deducted at Time 0 produces an 
immediate tax savings of $300 and is ignored in the consideration of 
the tax on the accretion resulting from A's work. The tax on the 
accretion is $3159 and her after-tax return is $6841 ($10,000 -
$3,159).111 As Table VI shows, the after-tax return under TARET 
correlates (barring rounding errors) with the Haig-Simons ideal under 
the assumptions that the taxpayer produced the asset at a constant 
rate, reinvested the partially produced asset at the risk-adjusted 
geometric average rate of 9.99%,112 paid tax at a 30% rate, borrowed 
111. The operation of the time-adjusted summation is described below: 
E = $10,000((1.12 X 1.08 X 1.1)113 - l]/((1.12 X 1.08 X 1.1) - l] 
E = $3021 
Time J: The market price increase is $3021 ({ $3021/((1.12 X 1.08 X 1.1)113 - l]) { ((1.12 X 
1.08 x 1.1)113] 1 - ((1.12 X 1.08 X 1.1)1n]1- 1 )), and the tax on the market price increase is $906 
(.3 X $3021). The time-value-of-money adjustment to account for the delay in payment between 
Time 1 and the realization event at Time 3 results in a Time-I tax assessed at Time 3 of $1004 
($906 x (1 + .06(1 - .3)] x (1 + .09(1 - .3)]). 
Time 2: The market price increase is $3323 ({ $3021/[(l.12 X 1.08 X l.1)1n - 11){ ((1.12 X 
1.08 X 1.1)1/3]2 - [(1.12 X 1.08 X 1.1)1n]2•1 )), and the tax on the market price increase is $997 
(.3 X $3323). The time-value-of-money adjustment to account for the delay in payment between 
Time 2 and the realization event at Time 3 results in a Time-2 tax assessed at Time 3 of $1059 
($997 x (1 + .09(1 - .3)]). 
Time 3: The market price increase is $3654 (($30211((1.12 X 1.08 X 1.1)113 - l]) ([(1.12 X 
1.08 X 1.1)11l]3 - ((1.12 X 1.08 X 1.1)1n]:1-1)) and the tax on the market price increase is $1096 
(.3 X $3654). No time-value-of-money adjustment for the Time-3 refund is necessary because its 
payment is not delayed. 
The tax owed by A at Time 3 is the sum of these three time-adjusted tax assessments, or 
$3159 ($1004 + $1059 + $1096). 
112. ((1 + .12) x (1 + .08) x (1 + .1)]113 - 1. 
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cash to pay taxes at the· relevant federal yield rates and sold the 
sculpture immediately after its completion. 
TABLE VI: HAIG-SIMONS MODEL 
Time 0 Time 1 Time2 Time 3 
--- ---
Investment: $1000 $ 0 $2115 $4403 
Production: 0 $3021 $3021 $3021 
Interest Income:· 0 0 $ 3023 $ 6346 
Interest Deduction: 0 0 ($ 54)4 ($ 175)7 
Tax: {$ 300)1 $ 9062 $ 9815 $10448 
After-tax return $ 300 $2115 $4403 $6839 
1. Immediate deduction of $1000 investment in marble results in a $1000 loss that is multiplied 
by the 30% tax rate. This tax refund is ignored for purposes of further comparisons. 
2. $3021 market price of production multiplied by 30% tax rate. 
3. $3021 uncompleted asset reinvested at 9.99%. 
4. Cost of bon:owing $906 at 6% rate to pay tax liability and avoid liquidating uncompleted 
asset. 
5. Taxable income of $3269, which is the sum of $3021, $302 and ($54), multiplied by the 30% 
tax rate. 
6. The uncompleted asset valued at $6344 at Time 2 (Time l's production of$3021 plus interest 
earned on that production of $302 as of Time 2, plus Time 2's production of $3021), rein-
vested at 9.99%. 
7. Cost of borrowing unpaid tax from Time 1 and Time 2, as well as unpaid interest, or $1941 
($906 + $54 + $981), at 9% rate to pay tax liability and avoid liquidating uncompleted asset. 
8. Taxable income of $3480, which is the sum of $3021, $634, and ($175), multiplied by the 30% 
tax rate. 
b. Sale or exchange upon completion of an asset for which some of 
the contributed capital that is integrally related to its production has a 
salvage value. If a produced asset's market price reflects the salvage 
value of the production materials as well as the value of the taxpayer's 
production efforts, TARET requires a method for segregating these 
two components of value. Formula 19, which provides the allocation 
method for determining periodic market price changes from produc-
tion, depends on knowing the total value of production. That value 
can only be determined indirectly by subtracting the salvage value of 
the contributed capital from the produced asset's price when the tax-
payer sells or exchanges it. 
The only feasible manner of attributing a portion of the produced 
asset's market price to the salvage value of its materials is to rely on 
the materials' costs at the time the taxpayer acquired and contributed 
them to the production process. Although the materials might lose 
some value in the production process, that loss, unfortunately, is un-
measurable and, therefore, TARET must ignore it. The materials' 
costs cannot be subtracted from the market value of the produced as-
set to determine the total value of the taxpayer's production efforts 
because that computation fails to consider the investment return dur-
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ing the production process for the taxpayer's salvageable capital con-
tribution. Failure to account for an investment return would lead to 
different tax treatment of a taxpayer who sells the materials in the 
marketplace and reinvests the proceeds and one who retains the 
materials and uses them in the periods that follow to produce an asset. 
The considerations used to identify F for exhaustible assets are equally 
applicable for identifying the market price increases in the salvageable 
contributed capital.113 The time-adjusted value of the contributed 
capital is depicted in Formula 20 as: 
n-1 
I~+~ ~ 
i=O 
I = amount of capital investment that retains a salvage value at the time 
taxpayer sells or exchanges the produced asset 
By assuming that salvage value is a function of the initial cost of the 
materials, Formula 21 shows the relationship between the total value 
of the taxpayer's production 'reflected in the produced asset, or Wm 
and the asset's value at the time the taxpayer sells or exchanges it, or 
WN: 
n-1 
Wn = WN - I II (1 + P;) 
i=O 
n-1 
When W N is less than I II (1 + P;), that suggests that 
i=O 
(21) 
taxpayer's production efforts did not contribute to the produced as-
set's realization-event value and perhaps resulted in a loss in value. 
To assess a tax based on this inference is troubling because it seems to 
take too seriously the estimate of the portion of W N that is attributable 
to capital. It is one thing to use that estimate to apportion accretions 
between the salvage value of materials used in the production and the 
production itself. It is quite another to use that estimate to conclude 
that the taxpayer's capital increased in value and that the taxpayer's 
production process caused a loss of capital without a more objective 
showing that the taxpayer's efforts led to market value decreases dur-
ing the production period. Moreover, recognizing a production loss in 
the unique situation where some capital remains salvageable creates 
potential inequities. For taxpayers who negatively produce without 
using capital or who use capital that loses its entire value in the pro-
duction process, no asset exists keeping the market price decreases 
113. See supra note 75 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 39-46 and accompanying 
text (discussing differences between the market price of the assets transferred to purchase and the 
purchase assets that would have to be considered when determining the materials' costs). 
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from negative production beyond the reach ofTARET. The more at-
tractive solution is to assume that the production had no value, and to 
treat the produced asset in the same way as a purchased asset. 114 
If W 0 is a positive amount, computing the time-adjusted tax liabil-
ity is determined by modifying Formula 19 to take into account the 
I I4. Examples I and 2 below demonstrate how TARET operates when the amount attributa· 
ble to the salvage value in accordance with Formula 20 exceeds the selling price. 
Example 1: At Time 0, A begins building a log cabin out of materials that cost $10,000 and 
completes it at Time 3, when it is sold for $I2,000. The logs retain a salvage value. The risk· 
adjusted federal rates for the relevant periods are: 
Time 0: I2% (3-period maturity) 
Time I: 8% (2-period maturity) 
Time 2: 10% (I-period maturity) 
The relevant applicable federal rates for adjustment of each period's tax are: 
Time I: 6% (short-term maturity) 
Time 2: 9% (short-term maturity) 
The portion of the sales price of $I2,000 allocated to the salvage value would be $I3,306, assum-
ing that the capital investment was invested at the risk-adjusted Federal rates ($10,000 (1.12 X 
1.08 X 1.1)). Rather than assuming that the production efforts had a negative value, TARET 
assumes they had no value and computes the tax on the market price increase in accordance with 
the averaging technique used for purchased assets. The tax on the market price increase is $626, 
computed as follows: 
R = [12,000/10,000]113 - 1 
R = .063 
Time 1: TRW0 is equal to $I88 (.3 X .063 X $10,000) and is the amount of tax owed at 
Time 1. The time-value-of-money adjustment to account for the delay in payment between Time 
1 and the realization event at Time 3 results in a Time-I tax assessed at Time 3 of $205 ($188 [1 
+ .063(I - .3)]2). 
Time 2: TRW0(l + R) is equal to $200 (.3 X $188 X (1 + .063)) and is the tax owed for 
Time 2. The time-value-of-money adjustment to account for the delay in payment between Time 
2 and the realization event at Time 3 results in a Time-2 tax assessed at Time 3 of $209 ($200 [1 
+ .063(1 - .3)]). 
Time 3: TRW0(l + R)2 is equal to $2I2 (.3 X $I88 X (1 +.063)2) and is the tax owed for 
Time 3. No time-value-of-money adjustment for the Time-3 tax is necessary because its payment 
is not delayed. 
The tax owed by A at Time 3 is the sum of these three time-adjusted tax assessments, or $626 
($205 + $209 + $212). 
Example 2: Assume the same facts as found in Example 1 except that at Time 3 the cabin is 
sold for $9000. Rather than assuming the production efforts had a negative value, TARBT as· 
sumes that they had no value and computes the tax refund on the market price decrease in 
accordance with the averaging technique for purchased assets. The tax refund on the market 
price decrease is $318, computed as follows: 
R = [$9000/$10,000]113 - 1 
R = -.035 
Time 1: TRW0 is equal to $104 (.3 X .035 X $10,000) and is the amount of the tax refund 
due A at Time 1. The time-value-of-money adjustment to account for the delay in payment 
between Time 1 and the realization event at Time 3 results in a Time-1 tax refund assessed at 
Time 3 of $115 ($I04 X [I + .06(1 - .3)] X [1 + .09(1 - .3)]). 
Time 2: TRW0 (l + R) is equal to $IOO ($104 X (1 - .035)) and is the amount of the tax 
refund due A at Time 2. The time-value-of-money adjustment to account for the delay in pay-
ment between Time 2 and the realization event at Time 3 results in a Time-2 tax refund assessed 
at Time 3 of $106 ($100 X [1 + .09(1 - .3)]). 
Time 3: TRW0 (l + R)2 is equal to $97 ($104 X (1 - .035)2) and is the amount of the tax 
refund due A at Time 3. No time-value-of-money adjustment is necessary because its payment is 
not delayed. 
The tax refund due A at Time 3 is the sum of these three time-adjusted tax assessments, or 
$3I8 ($115 + $106 + $97). 
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market price changes in salvage value for each period:115 
n n-1 n-1 
Tl:{ I[ II (1 + P011n - 1][ II (1 + P)11n]k-l + 
k=l i=O i=O 
n-1 n-1 
E/[ II (1 + PJ1'n - 1] { [ II (1 + P)11n]k -
i=O i=O 
(22) 
n-1 n-1 [II (l+P)11n]k-1}} II [l+P.(1-T)] 
. . k J 1=0 J= 
Although the allocation technique proposed for this type of pro-
duced asset is imperfect and inelegant, it satisfactorily reflects the eco-
nomics of the circumstances to prevent taxpayers from distorting 
resource allocations in response to the tax law. 116 
115. The difference in salvage value between the beginning and end of the period can be 
described as: 
1(1 + F)i - 1(1 + F)i-1 
This notation can be simplified as follows: 
= I[(l + F); - (1 + F)i-1] 
= I[l + F)1-1 (1 + F) - (1 + F);-1] 
= 1(1 + F)1- 1[(l + F) - 1] 
= 1(1 + F)i-l[F] 
= IF(l + F);-i 
If the geometric average of the risk-adjusted current federal rates are substituted for the interest-
rate factor F, the simplified formula for the periodic change in market value of the salvageable 
capital is: 
n-1 n-1 Il n (1 + PJ11" - 1] [ n (1 + P;)1' 0r- 1 
1=0 i=O 
116. The example that follows demonstrates how TARET operates when the amount attrib-
utable to the salvage value in accordance with Formula 20 is less than the selling price. 
Example: Assume the same facts as Example 1 in supra note 114 except that A sells the log 
cabin for $25,000. The tax liability is $4740, computed as follows: 
The value of the capital investment at Time 3 is $13,306 ($10,000(1 + .12)(1 + .08)(1 + .1)), 
and the value of production at Time 3 is $11,694 ($25,000 - $13,306). 
E = $11,694[(1.12 X 1.08 X 1.1)113 - l]/[(1.12 X 1.08 X 1.1) - l] 
E = $3533 
Time I: The market price increase from production is $3533 ({ $3533/[(1.12 X 1.08 X 
1.1)113 - 1 )( [(1.12 x 1.08 x 1.1)1' 3]1 - [(1.12 x 1.08 x 1.1)1' 3]1-1 and the market price 
increase from the capital investment is $999 ($10,000[(1.12 X 1.08 X 1.1)113 - 1][(1.12 X 1.08 
X 1.1)113)1- 1• The tax on the market price increases is $1360 (.3 X ($3533 + $999)). The time-
value-of-money adjustment to account for the delay in payment between Time 1 and the realiza-
tion event at Time 3 results in a Time-1 tax assessed at Time 3 of $1506 ($1360 X [1 + .06(1 -
.3)] x [1 + .09(1 - .3)]). 
Time 2: The market price increase from production is $3886 ({$3533/[(l.12 X 1.08 X 
1.1)113 - 1 }([(1.12 X 1.08 X 1.1)11312 - [(1.12 X 1.08 X 1.1)11312- 1 )), and the market price 
increase from the capital investment is $1099 ($10,000[(1.12 X 1.08 X 1.1)113 - 1][(1.12 X 1.08 
X 1.1)11312- 1• The tax on the market price increases is $1495 (.3 X ($3886 + $1099)). The time-
value-of-money adjustment to account for the delay in payment between Time 2 and Time 3 
results in a Time-2 tax assessed at Time 3 of $1590 ($1495[1 + .09(1 - .3)]). 
Time 3: The market price increase from production is $4273 ({ $3533/[(l.12 X 1.08 X 
1.1)113 - 1) {[(1.12 X 1.08 X 1.1)11313 - [(1.12 X 1.08 X 1.1)113)3- 1)) and the market price 
increase from the capital investment is $1208 (($10,000[(1.12 X 1.08 X 1.1)113 - 1][(1.12 X 
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2. Retaining a Produced Asset 
TARET encounters serious administrative problems when the tax-
payer produces an asset and uses it in a business or investment ven-
ture. The one exceptional situation when T ARET operates with ease 
is when the taxpayer produces and exhausts an asset within one taxing 
period, because the market price increase from acquisition of the pro-
duced asset is immediately offset by its exhaustion. 
For nondurable assets produced over more than one taxing period 
and exhausted immediately upon conversion to business and invest-
ment use rather than sold, TARET operates inadequately. Without a 
marketplace transaction there is no easily identifiable evidence that the 
taxpayer produced or used an asset in this manner. It is hopeless to 
think that a tax system could monitor these types of transactions and, 
therefore, T ARET, dependent on a realization event for its operation, 
will fail to tax the market price increases that occur in the earlier peri-
ods of production. 
For durable assets that the taxpayer produces over more than one 
taxing period and converts to business and investment use, the opera-
tion of TARET is also problematic. Three kinds of situations arise: 
(1) the durable asset is exhaustible and the taxpayer uses it until it is 
worthless; (2) the durable asset is exhaustible and the taxpayer ulti-
mately disposes of it before it becomes worthless; and (3) the durable 
asset is nonexhaustible and the taxpayer ultimately disposes of it. The 
first situation is similar to the nondurable asset situation because the 
taxpayer produces and uses property outside the marketplace. 
The second situation involves a marketplace transaction, sug-
gesting that TARET's estimation rules allocating market price in-
creases and decreases to prior taxing periods might be workable. The 
primary stumbling block, however, is that allocating the market price 
increases over the taxing periods that the taxpayer produced an asset 
is possible only if we are able to ascertain the value of the produced 
asset at the time the taxpayer completes it. If the taxpayer retains the 
produced asset after completing its production, the only way to esti-
mate and allocate market price increases from production and market 
price changes occurring after production is to estimate the asset's mar-
ket price at the time the taxpayer converts the produced asset into 
business or investment property. 
For purposes of determining the proper basis for computing losses 
1.08 X 1.1)113] 3- 1). The tax on the market price increases is $1644 (.3 X ($4273 + $1208)). No 
time-value-of-money adjustment is necessary because its payment is not delayed. 
The tax owed by A at Time 3 is the sum of these three time-adjusted tax assessments, or 
$4740 ($1506 + $1590 + $1644). 
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and amortization deductions, the Code requires an estimate of the 
market price. when taxpayers convert consumption assets to business 
and investment use.117 This appraisal ru~e is administrativeiy feasible 
because taxpayers do not often convert their assets from consumption 
to business and investment use. Whether it would work for durable 
produced assets converted to business and investm~nt use depends, in 
pait, on how often taxpayers produce assets and retain them and how 
difficult it is to reconstruct the market price at the conversion date. 
With an appraisal, the tax liability due at the time the taxpayer dis-
poses of the asset is based on a combination of: (1) the rules for com-
puting the tax for a produced asset based on the appraised value at the 
time of the conversion and adjusting the tax liability due at the time of 
the conversion to take account of the delay in payment to the time of 
the disposition, and (2) the rules for computing the tax liability or 
refund due for an exhaustible asset based· on the appraised value at the 
time of the conversion.11s 
The third situation is like the second one because it involves a mar-
ketplace transaction. The difference between the two is that the rules 
for computing the tax liability or refund due for a nonexhaustible, 
rather than an exhaustible, asset apply. 
To the extent that the market price increases resulting from the 
production of assets retained and devoted to business and investment 
purposes avoid taxation under T ARET, economic distortions and in-
equities are likely to arise. Excluding the production profit from tax 
means that TARET favors taxpayers who produce the assets they use 
in business or investment over those who must use after-tax dollars to 
purchase or rent them. Taxing the market price increases from pro-
duction upon a marketplace transaction will lead to further economic 
distortions. A taxpayer who produced an exhaustible asset may thus 
be deterred from selling or exchanging the asset because the transac-
tion will lead to a tax that would be avoided if the taxpayer extracts all 
of its value by using it herself. Although market price increases allo-
cated to earlier periods would be offset by market price decreases in 
later periods, the time-value adjustments will inevitably lead to a tax 
117. See Treas. Reg. §§ l.165-9(b), 167(g)-1. 
118. See supra notes 72-79, 106-16, and accompanying text. If a casualty occurs to a pro-
duced asset, three appraisals will be necessary: (1) the value of the produced asset when the 
taxpayer completed it; (2) its value immediately before the casualty occurred; and (3) its value 
immediately after the casualty occurred. These three values allow allocation of the market price 
changes for each period before the casualty and determination of the amount of the casualty for 
the current period. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text. 
A gratuitous transfer of a produced asset should be a realization event. See supra notes 86-87 
and accompanying text. 
780 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:722 
liability unless the taxpayer's rates in the later periods are significantly 
higher. 
The benefits of deferral might be reduced by postponing the deduc-
tion of incurred costs. The postponement, however, injects a matching 
rule that creates different economic distortions and inequities between 
produced and purchased assets and between purchased and rented as-
sets, as well as adding administrative complexities. 119 Thus, postpone-
ment of production costs is not an appealing response to TARET's 
inadequacies. 
Another alternative would be to require taxpayers to pay a tax 
upon completing production of any durable exhaustible asset that ex-
ceeds a certain minimum value, such as $50,000. Completion would 
be treated as a realization event for this group of produced assets, and 
Formulas 19 or 22 would apply to compute the amount of tax liability. 
This approach increases reliance on appraisals and may cause liquidity 
problems for taxpayers. However, the advantage of avoiding these in-
equities and economic distortions may warrant increased administra-
tive complexity, at least when the tax deferral advantages are likely to 
be substantial. 
If the appraisal alternative proves unworkable, the question arises 
whether the inability to tax market price increases resulting from this 
set of produced assets means that TARET is not a viable system. Un-
doubtedly, in comparison to the Code, T ARET increases the incentive 
for taxpayers to produce exhaustible assets and to hold them until they 
become worthless. Whether the costs of the economic distortions and 
inequities created by this tax incentive are worth the advantages of 
more effectively taxing periodic market price increases for other types 
of produced assets and for all types of purchased assets requires empir-
ical investigation. 
3. Human Capital 
Human capital is a produced asset that raises unique issues war-
ranting a separate analysis. It reflects "the present value of the flow of 
future satisfactions that an individual can command in the course of 
his life."120 The value of a taxpayer's human capital depends on three 
phenomena: (1) endowment of talent based on biological and social 
circumstances of birth and upbringing; (2) human and nonhuman cap-
ital investment in education, training, migration, and health care; and 
(3) exogenous factors such as technology or cultural tastes. 
119. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text. 
120. Stephan, supra note 1, at 1358. 
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The Haig-Simons ideal suggests that the tax base for each period 
should be decreased for assets exhausted in the production of human 
capital and increased for the accretions resulting from its produc-
tion.121 TARET cannot mimic this tax ideal because no obvious time 
exists when a taxpayer completes production of human capital, and, 
even if some arbitrary time were chosen, human capital defies valua-
tion because the taxpayer retains and uses it rather than disposes of it. 
T ARET is left taxing the income from human capital, Le., the profits 
the taxpayer derives from using human capital by selling services in 
the marketplace or by performing services outside the marketplace 
that lead to the production of an asset that is sold or exchanged, and 
not human capital itself. The model's failure to tax the market price 
increases from the production of human capital is offset partially by 
the fact that it ignores the exhaustion of human capital. Unless the 
taxpayer's tax rate in later taxing periods rises significantly, ignoring 
the later periods' decreases fails to compensate for ignoring earlier pe-
riods' increases, in view of time-value-of-money considerations. 
Further, TARET cannot reach all income generated from human 
capital. To the extent that the taxpayer uses human capital for con-
sumption, it escapes taxation.122 The combination of tax deferral ben-
efits, along with potential and probable consumptive use, explains why 
the Code severely limits the deductibility of expenditures incurred in 
121. But see Klein, supra note 1, at 466-67 (disagreeing that this treatment would be ideal); 
accord Kelman, supra note 1, at 839-42; Warren, supra note 9, at 1114-17; see also Shakow, 
supra note 6, at 1158-60 (evaluating the various arguments). 
122. Simons recognized the difficulties raised by the production of human capital: 
At the outset there appears the necessity of distinguishing between consumption and ex-
pense . • . . Given items will represent business expense in one instance and merely con-
sumption in another, and often the motives will be quite mixed ..•. Even the professional 
artist may use some of his materials for things he intends or hopes to sell, and some on work 
done purely for his own pleasure. In another instance, moreover, the same items may repre-
sent investment in training for earning activity later on. 
The latter instance suggests that there is something quite arbitrary even about the dis-
tinction between consumption and accumulation. On the face of it, this is not important for 
the definition of income; but it must be remembered that accumulation or investment pro-
vides a basis for expense deductions in the future, while consumption does not. The distinc-
tion in question can be made somewhat definite if one adopts the drastic expedient of 
treating all outlays for augmenting personal earning capacity as consumption. This expedi-
ent has little more than empty, formal, legalistic justification. On the other hand, one does 
well to accept, here as elsewhere, a loss of relevance or adequacy as the necessary cost of an 
essential definiteness. It would require some temerity to propose recognition of depreciation 
or depletion in the measurement of personal-service incomes - if only because the determi-
nation of the base, upon which to apply depreciation rates, presents a simply fantastic prob-
lem. It is better simply to recognize the limitations of measurable personal income for 
purposes of certain comparisons (e.g., by granting special credits to personal-service incomes 
under income taxes). 
H. SIMONS, supra note 1, at 54-55; see also id. at 74 (identifying differences between treatment of 
deductions incurred to earn income from services and those incurred to earn income from prop-
erty, and noting the difficulty of distinguishing consumption from business expenses for the 
former). · 
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the production of human capital. Although generally I have argued 
against adopting the Code's matching principle to compensate for 
TARET's failures, I believe that TARET should deny or delay deduc-
tions for costs of producing human capital. Abandoning the Haig-
Simons rule of allowing a deduction whenever the taxpayer exper-
iences a market price decrease makes sense here because taxpayers put 
human capital to consumptive as well as business and investment use. 
The only means of taxing even a portion of the consumptive income 
from human capital is to deny a deduction for its costs. 123 Denying 
these costs raises the risks of creating economic distortions and inequi-
ties because the rule operates to favor producers over purchasers and 
renters. For example, a taxpayer who builds a home gymnasium 
avoids tax on the value of the gymnasium as well as tax on the in-
creased health produced by exercise. In contrast, the taxpayer who 
buys a gymnasium or pays health club dues must use after-tax dollars 
to get exercise and produce health. The risk of economic distortions is 
minimized, however, because one of the major components of human 
capital is education and training, and formal schooling typically is 
sought and required. 
A further way of neutralizing the tax deferral benefits a taxpayer 
enjoys under TARET for the production of human capital is to impose 
higher tax rates on income earned from services. 124 This proposal is 
particularly attractive because it would counteract the inequities and 
economic distortions created between taxpayers who invest in nonhu-
man capital and those who invest in human capital. The higher the 
taxpayer's realized income from personal effort and talent in any one 
period, the higher the tax rate should be, because a high periodic in-
come suggests a high value of the taxpayer's human capital wealth 
and, therefore, a greater benefit from tax deferral. Provision for in-
come averaging should accompany this aspect of TARET, however, to 
adjust for those cases where the presumption that human capital was 
highly valuable is rebutted by a significant decrease in periodic real-
ized income from personal effort and talent. 125 The higher tax rates 
might justify allowing deductions for capital expenditures incurred in 
123. See infra notes 128-30 and accompanying text. 
124. The higher tax rates would apply to the sale of services in the marketplace as well as the 
sale of assets produced by the taxpayer with her services.. Higher tax rates for income from 
services adds administrative complexity to TARET because a business or investment venture in 
which the taxpayer contributes services, as well as nonhuman capital, will produce profits that 
will have to be attributed in part to services and in part to capital. 
125. Income averaging would correct the presumption when the taxpayer suffers a premature 
death. It would also more accurately tax the high but short-lived profits experienced by persons 
who profit from fads, such as teen idols, pet rock inventors, or persons with a short-lived ability 
to earn high incomes, such as professional athletes. 
February 1990] Tax Deferral 783 
the production of human capital, especially where the expenditures 
have only a tangential consumption component, such as tuition for 
professional or technical education. On the other hand, the higher tax 
rates on realized income from effort and talent may increase the eco-
nomic incentives for taxpayers, especially those at the highest periodic 
income levels, to devote their human capital to consumption uses that 
are beyond the reach of the tax system.126 By denying a deduction for 
the cost of professional or technical education, the tax system indi-
rectly taxes the leisure of those persons who are most likely to choose 
leisure over compensated work. In short, the higher tax rates do not 
necessarily mean that the limitations on the deductibility of capital 
invested in human capital should be relaxed. 
A proposal to tax earnings from services at a higher rate seems to 
contradict the widely accepted tax policy allowing tax deferral of earn-
ings set aside in qualified pension plans or other types of retirement 
accounts. This form of tax relief for earners suggests that tax deferral 
on human capital has not been recognized or viewed as important. 
Once TARET eliminates the investors' tax deferral benefits, the con-
tinuing benefits of tax deferral through the acquisition of human capi-
tal are likely to gain more attention, warranting the proposed 
measures to counteract the potential for economic distortions and 
unfairness. 
C. Assets Devoted to Consumption Purposes 
Sections II.A and II.B above showed how the realization-event 
principle permits taxpayers to enjoy interest-free loans from the gov-
ernment by holding or producing assets and how TARET eliminates 
some of that advantage. In contrast, this section shows how the reali-
zation-event principle leads to the nontaxation of income earned from 
human and nonhuman capital devoted to consumption purposes and 
how T ARET inadequately prevents this tax avoidance. 
The market price of services derived from using human and non-
human capital for consumption purposes, commonly referred to as im-
puted income, should increase the Haig-Simons tax base, but their 
immediate exhaustion should not decrease it. Unless the taxpayer de-
votes imputed income to business or investment purposes, the first 
component of the Haig-Simons definition (including in income "the 
126. A widely held view is that high tax rates are likely to reduce labor output significantly. 
See Bankrnan & Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive 
Taxation, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1905, 1919-21 (1987). Empirical studies estimating compensated 
elasticity, however, suggest that taxation has only a minimal effect on compensated work effort. 
See id. at 1921-25. 
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market value of rights exercised in consumption") requires that its 
value be included in the ideal tax base.121 
Both the Code and TARET adequately tax the imputed income 
from assets that have a short useful life by denying a deduction for 
their costs. An asset with a short useful life, such as food or clothing, 
produces all its profit almost immediately so that the market price of 
the asset and the value of the profit produced are nearly equal, making 
the market price a good proxy for the exhausted imputed income. 128 
The failure of the Code and TARET to tax imputed income produced 
by a taxpayer's investment in durable assets devoted in whole or in 
part to consumption purposes results from three different phenomena. 
First, the market price for a durable asset devoted to, and exhausted 
by, consumption represents the present value of the future imputed 
income stream. The difference between the present value of the future 
income stream and the value of the income stream produced in the 
future is imputed income that neither the Code nor TARET captures 
by denying the taxpayer a deduction for the cost of the durable as-
set.129 The second phenomenon that leads to untaxed imputed income 
occurs when a taxpayer purchases a durable asset that enjoys market 
127. See supra note 2. Neither the Haig-Simons ideal nor TARET avoids having to make 
difficult distinctions between consumption and business or investment purposes. See H. SIMONS, 
supra note 1, at 54 ("At the outset there appears the necessity of distinguishing between con-
sumption and expense; and here one finds inescapable the unwelcome criterion of intention. A 
thoroughly precise and objective distinction is inconceivable."). 
128. See id. at 118-19 ("the error involved in ignoring consumption income from property 
varies directly with the durability or service life of the kind of property in question"). Market 
price effectively measures consumption income only because the Haig-Simons ideal assumes that 
market prices are the appropriate measures and that psychic benefits or costs should always be 
ignored. See id. at 119-20. The principle of ignoring consumer surplus and deficits raises serious 
questions about the appropriateness of allowing casualty losses for property used for consump-
tion purposes. See Goetz, Some Real Property Casualty Losses and Consumption Preferences: 
Double Indemnification?, 60 TAXES 507 (1982); Kelman, supra note 1, at 859 n.87. 
129. The following example illustrates the amount of imputed income escaping taxation. 
Example: At Time 0, A purchases a personal car for $5000 which becomes worthless at Time 
3. A uses the car at a constant rate over the three periods; the market rate of interest during the 
three periods is 10%. The imputed income for each period is $2011 (.1 ($5000)/[1 - 1/(1 + 
.1)3]). The present value of each period's $2011 income return is as follows: 
Time 1: $1828 ($2011/(1 + .1)) 
Time 2: $1662 ($2011/(1 + .1)2) 
Time 3: $1511 ($2011/(1 + .1)3) 
By denying any deduction for the $5000 cost of the car, the Code and TARET indirectly tax the 
present value of the imputed income, but fail to reach the interest income earned each period on 
the market price of the car in that period. That income amounts to: 
Time 1: $500 ($5000 X .1) 
Time 2: $349 (($5000 - $1511) X .1] 
Time 3: $183 (($5000 - ($1511 + $1662)) X .1] 
The Code denies a taxpayer a deduction for the cost of the durable good by disallowing 
depreciation deductions. I.R.C. § 167(a) (1982). If the taxpayer sells the asset before it becomes 
worthless but for less than its basis, the Code denies a deduction because it assumes that the loss 
is mostly the result of consumption rather than a market-price phenomenon. More appropriate 
treatment would be to reduce the car's basis to reflect its exhaustion from use and to allow a loss 
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price increases while it produces imputed income. If the asset does not 
lose value from use, the cost of the asset was not a cost ot the imputed 
income. Indirect taxation of imputed income depends on the taxpayer 
incurring market price decreases and, without a decrease, the imputed 
income remains untaxed. The third phenomenon that leads to un-
taxed imputed income occurs when a taxpayer fails to place assets into 
their highest economic use based on market prices. 
Frequently, the taxpayer acts in a manner sufficient to suggest a 
profit-making motive warranting a deduction for all market price de-
creases incurred, so that the imputed income is not indirectly taxed 
but nevertheless is enjoyed. For example, a taxpayer who lives above a 
storefront and leases that storefront to an art gallery owner rather 
than to a saloon-keeper who is willing to pay higher rent, has untaxed 
imputed income from enjoying a quiet neighborhood. A taxpayer who 
accepts a lower rate of return by investing in socially conscious corpo-
rations also has untaxed imputed income. Only when the taxpayer 
enters into a transaction that lacks sufficient indicia of profit-making, 
such as when the parties are related or the taxpayer continually fails to 
earn a profit from the business, does the Code start reaching imputed 
income. It usually responds by limiting the deduction of the tax-
payer's costs of producing income, thus reaching the imputed income 
indirectly.130 In the case of below-market rate loans, however, the 
Code includes rules for estimating the amount of forgone income. 131 
T ARET neither prevents the exclusion of this type of imputed income 
from the tax base nor interferes with Code provisions that operate to 
include at least a portion of it in the tax base. 
As indicated in the discussion of human capital, neither the Code 
nor TARET effectively taxes imputed income derived from the tax-
payer's devoting human capital to consumption purposes.132 Whether 
to the extent the taxpayer receives less than the adjusted basis in the sale or exchange. See 
Epstein, supra note I, at 457-62. 
Like the Code, TARET denies any tax refund if the amount received upon sale is less than 
the cost of the durable consumer asset. One difference between the Code and TARET, however, 
is the treatment of expenditures related to acquiring a durable consumption asset. Under the 
Code, a taxpayer may add expenditures related to the acquisition of an asset to basis, even 
though those expenditures do not contribute to the value of the asset. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.1034-l(c)(4). In contrast, TARET treats those expenditures as decretions when incurred, 
and, if evidence shows that the taxpayer intends to use the purchased asset exclusively for con-
sumption, disallows a deduction for those expenditures when incurred. See supra note 46 and 
accompanying text. Depending on the asset's value at the time of disposition, the Code's de-
ferred deduction may increase the exclusion for imputed income. 
130. See I.R.C. §§ 183, 280A (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
131. See I.R.C. § 7872 (Supp. IV 1986). 
132. For practical reasons, Simons would not include many produced assets used for con-
sumption purposes within the ideal tax base. He emphasized that "[t]o conceive of income in 
terms of things is to invite all the confusion of the elementary student in accounting who insists 
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a taxpayer bakes a cake, grows vegetables, or builds a personal resi-
dence, so long as those produced assets are not sold in the marketplace 
the services are beyond the reach of the tax system, except to the ex-
tent the taxpayer incurs training costs in learning how to cook, garden, 
or build.133 
upon identifying 'surplus' and 'cash.'" H. SIMONS, supra note 1, at 51 (footnote omitted). For 
Simons, the critical, and unanswerable, question was "where or how a line may be drawn be· 
tween what is and what is not economic activity.'' Id. The examples he used to illustrate the 
problem are instructive: 
If a man raises vegetables in his garden, it seems clearly appropriate to include the value of 
the product in measuring his income. If he raises flowers and shrubs, the case is less clear. 
If he shaves himself, it is difficult to argue that the value of the shaves must also be ac-
counted for. Most economists recognize housewives' services as an important item of in-
come. So they are, perhaps; but what becomes of this view as one proceeds to extreme 
cases? Do families have larger incomes because parents give competent instruction to chil-
dren instead of paying for institutional training? ..• 
A little reflection along these lines suggests that leisure is itself a major item of consump· 
tion; that income per hour of leisure, beyond a certain minimum, might well be imputed to 
persons according to what they might earn per hour if otherwise engaged. Of course, it is 
one thing to note that such procedure is appropriate in principle and quite another to pro-
pose that it be applied. 
Id. at 51-52. 
Ultimately, Simons concluded that, for purposes of measuring relative incomes, ignoring im-
puted income from services would not lead to significant distortions. See id. at 52-53. The dis-
cussion in the text indicates that ignoring imputed income from services can result in inequitable 
tax treatment. The effect of nontaxation encourages taxpayers to produce their own consump-
tion assets rather than purchasing them from others. See id. at 110-12, 113 (recognizing inequi-
table treatment and the practical constraints of eliminating it except in the most "flagrant" 
cases). 
133. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. If an asset is the subject of a marketplace 
transaction after it is put into consumption use, however, TARET's favorable tax treatment of 
taxpayers who produce their own consumption assets is no longer necessary. If the taxpayer sells 
a produced durable asset before it is exhausted, an appraisal of its value at the time the taxpayer 
began consuming it allows for a valuation of the taxpayer's effort and a time-adjusted tax liability 
assessment. Ifthe production is taxed, then exhausted costs that were denied a deduction when 
incurred should be allowed, and the taxpayer's tax liability should be reduced by the time-ad· 
justed tax refund. If the sale price is less than the asset's appraised value at the time it is put into 
consumption use, TARET should ignore the loss and attribute it to the cost of the imputed 
income from the taxpayer's use of the durable asset, as an indirect way of taxing the asset's 
services. If the sale price is more than the asset's appraised value at the time it is put into 
consumption use, a time-adjusted tax should be assessed on the market price increase between 
the time the taxpayer completed its production and the time taxpayer sold it. In this situation, 
the imputed income derived from use of the asset remains untaxed. 
The advantage of this approach is that it treats purchased and produced consumption assets 
in the same manner. Its disadvantage is that the sale of an asset at a low price relative to its value 
immediately after it is produced may result in a tax assessment that exceeds the sale price. A 
special rule that TARET must never exceed a designated percentage of the sale price, say 50%, 
might be a fair compromise between treating purchasers and producers equally and assuring that 
the tax system does not interfere with resource allocations through transfers of consumer durable 
goods. The following example demonstrates how TARET treats sales of produced consumer 
durables: 
Example: At Time 0, A purchases $3000 of materials, begins building a vacation cabin that 
he completes at Time 3, and uses it for personal purposes until Time 5, when he sells it. The 
market value of the cabin at Time 3 is appraised at $10,000, and the materials have no salvage 
value. Materials costing $2000 are exhausted in Time 1, and the remaining $1000 of materials 
are exhausted at Time 2. The risk-adjusted federal rate for all of the relevant periods is 10%, A 
is subject to a 30% tax rate between Time 0 and Time 5, and the relevant applicable federal rate 
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D. Debt 
A third way the realization-event principle permits taxpayers to 
trigger interest-free loans from the government is by not taxing them 
on changes in the market value of their outstanding liabilities until 
they are sold to third persons or creditors discharge them. TARET's 
approach of considering transactions at the time of the realization 
event and identifying when the Haig-Simons ideal would have in-
cluded the accretions or decretions in the tax base works as well for 
debt transactions as it did for asset transactions. The realization-event 
principle, however, is implicated in the area of debt b·eyond the ques-
tion of sale or discharge. Throughout the article, the overriding con-
cern has been tax deferral. However, debt also raises an issue of tax 
acceleration when the realization-event principle operates to delay a 
deduction for a liability. TARET's approach provides insight into the 
analysis and solution of this overtaxation problem. Although applying 
TARET's approach to debt sales and discharge-of-indebtedness trans-
actions is unfamiliar to the literature, it is unlikely to be controversial. 
However, analyzing future costs as realized debt that occurred earlier 
is a more contestable proposition. 
for adjustment of each period's tax is 8%. The tax on A's building a cabin assessed at Time 5 is 
computed as follows: 
E = ($10,000 X .1)/((1 + .1)3 - 1] 
E = $3021 
Time 1: The market price increase is $3021 (($3021/.1) X ((1 +.1) - (1 + .1)1- 1]). The 
market price decrease from exhaustion of the materials is $2000, and the tax on the net market 
price increase is $306 (($3021 - $2000) X .3). The time-value-of-money adjustment to account 
for the delay in payment between Time 1 and the realization event at Time 5 results in a Time-1 
tax assessed at Time 5 of $381 ($306 X (1 + .08(1 - .3)]4). 
Time 2: The market price increase is $3323 (($3021/.1) X ((1 +.1)2 -(1 + .1)2- 1]), the 
market price decrease from exhaustion of the materials is $1000, and the tax on the net market 
price increase is $697 (($3323 - $1000) X .3). The time-value-of-money adjustment to account 
for the delay in payment between Time 2 and the realization event at Time 5 results in a Time-2 
tax assessed at Time 5 of $821 ($697 X (1 + .08(1 - .3)]3). 
Time 3: The market price increase is $3655 (($3021/.1) X ((1 +.1)3 -(1 + .1)3- 1]) and the 
tax on the market price increase is $1097 ($3655 X .3). The time-value-of-money adjustment to 
account for the delay in payment between Time 3 and the realization event at Time 5 results in a 
Time-3 tax assessed at Time 5 of $1223 ($1097 X (1 + .08(1 - .3)]2). 
The tax owed by A for the building of the cabin at Time 5 is the sum of the three time-
adjusted tax assessments, or $2425 ($381 + $821 + $1223). 
If A sells the house for Jess than $10,000, TARET denies A a tax refund for the Joss because 
she put the cabin to consumption use. If the amount received is less than $4850, the TARET 
exception would limit the tax assessed on the production profits to 50% of the amount received. 
If the amount received exceeds $10,000, then TARET uses the averaging technique for 
nonexhaustible appreciating assets to determine the time-adjusted tax on the market price accre-
tions occurring between Times 3 and 5. 
If a taxpayer suffers a casualty regarding a produced consumer asset, TARET should assess a 
tax on the market value increases resulting from the production and for the market value in-
creases that occur while the asset is put to consumption use, as well as allow a loss for the 
difference between the asset's value immediately before and after the casualty. If the amount of 
the tax refund for the casualty is Jess than the amount of tax liability for prior accretions, perhaps 
an exception should provide that no tax is due. 
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1. Borrowing, Sale, and Discharge of Indebtedness 
Haig-Simons and the Code treat borrowing as a nontaxable event 
because the receipt of borrowed funds is offset by the taxpayer's obli-
gation to repay the loan, leaving the taxpayer's net worth un-
changed.134 TARET treats borrowing in the same manner. All three 
systems converge because a taxpayer realizes the accretions and decre-
134. See H. SIMONS, supra note 1, at 168. Professor Andrews seems to suggest that the 
Code's treatment of debt, recourse or nonrecourse, increases the opportunity for tax avoidance. 
See w. ANDREWS, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 618-20 (3d ed. 1985). But see Andrews, 
supra note l, at 1138 (acknowledging that problem is created because "taxpayers can set off the 
near perfect accretion-type treatment of the debt side of a transaction against the much less true 
accretion treatment of the investment side."). Any mistaken notion that tax avoidance is attribu-
table to borrowing is based· on an analysis that conflates the effects of borrowing and the tax rules 
that allow for deductions in excess of the market price decreases the taxpayer experiences in a 
taxing period. If borrowing and accelerated deductions are segregated, however, the time lag 
between the incurring of a cost and paying it is shown to be irrelevant. 
In a no-tax world, an investor who uses $150 of savings at Time 0 to acquire an asset that 
increases in value by 10% each period would have an asset with a market price of $165 at Time 
1. If, instead of paying for the asset at Time 0 from savings, assume the investor borrows $50 of 
the $150 at a 10% periodic rate. To eliminate any confusion arising from profits or losses result-
ing from the cost of borrowing itself, the borrowing rate is assumed to be the same as the invest-
ment rate. Although tax arbitrage opportunities exist, these opportunities are a product of the 
tax treatment of investment return and not the cost of borrowing. See Gann, supra note 16, at 
116-19. As shown in Table C, the borrowing does not affect the investor's rate of return. 
TABLE C: NO-TAX WORLD: $100 INVESTMENT; $50 BORROWING AT 10% 
Time 1 
Asset 
Interest Cost 
Repayment of Loan 
$165 
$ 5 
$ 50 
Return $110 
Profit (Return - investment) $ 10 
Rate of Return (Profit/Investment) 10% 
If the same investor lived in a tax world that assesses tax of30% on income, the after-tax rate 
of return would be only 7% because of the additional cost of taxes, regardless of whether the 
investor borrowed. If the investor could take a deduction at Time 0 equal to the value of the 
asset acquired, even though the asset was not exhausted at Time 0, then the after-tax rate of 
return would change depending on the amount borrowed. However, the change in the rate of 
return is attributable exclusively to the accelerated deduction and the unearned tax savings. 
Consider an investor, subject to a 30% tax rate, who incurs no debt when acquiring an asset at 
Time 0 with a value of $150. The after-tax rate of return is 10% as shown in Table D. 
TABLED: TAX WORLD: $150 INVESTMENT; No BORROWING 
Asset 
Tax 
Return 
Profit (Return - Investment) 
Rate of Return (Profit/Investment) 
TimeO 
$150 
($45) 
0 
0 
0 
*Investment = $150 from savings less $45 tax refund, or $105. 
Time 1 
$165 
$ 49.50 
$115.50 
$ 10.50* 
10% 
The increase in the rate of return from 7% to 10% is due to the premature deduction of$150 
at Time O. The deduction is the equivalent of an interest-free loan from the government of $45 
that, based on a market rate of 10% and a tax rate of30%, saves the investor (after taxes) $3.15 
between Time 0 and Time 1. Had the investor been charged $3.15 in interest, her profit of $10.50 
would have been only $7.35, which results in an after-tax rate of return of 7% ($7.35/$105). 
The same results occur when the investor borrows a portion of the acquisition price of the 
asset. If the investor borrows $50 of the $150 price and is allowed a deduction at Time 0 for the 
entire $150, then the after-tax rate of return is 12.7%, as shown in Table E. 
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tions associated with debt creation when they occur.135 
After acquiring a debt, changing market rates, as well as changes 
in the taxpayer's creditworthiness, can lead to increases and decreases 
in the debt's value. If the taxpayer retains the debt to maturity and 
repays the entire loan, the Code treats the repayment as nontaxable. 
The decrease in the taxpayer's obligation, based on its value at the 
time of acquisition, is offset by the transfer of funds to repay the loan. 
Without a transaction to value the obligation, the Code ignores any 
changes in the debt's value. TARET, contrary to Haig-Simons, would 
also fail to reach any valuation changes in the debt if the taxpayer 
retains it through maturity, because no marketplace transaction oc-
curs that leads to a market valuation. In a sense, a taxpayer retaining 
a debt to maturity is analogous to a taxpayer producing and exhaust-
ing an asset outside of the marketplace. 
TARET, however, can mimic Haig-Simons if the taxpayer enters 
into a sale of the debt because the realization-event results in a mar-
ketplace valuation. Upon sale, TARET would allocate the market 
price changes to each period the taxpayer held the debt and accord-
ingly assess a time-adjusted tax liability. TARET can also mimic 
Haig-Simons if a creditor discharges the taxpayer's debt. 
When a creditor discharges a recourse debt for less than the funds 
borrowed, the Code treats the discharge as a realization event and 
taxes as income the difference between the amount borrowed and the 
TABLE E: TAX WORLD: $100 INVESTMENT; $50 BORROWING AT 10% 
Asset 
Interest Cost 
Repayment of Loan 
Tax 
Return 
Profit (Return - Investment) 
Rate of Return (Profit/Investment) 
TimeO 
$150 
0 
0 
($ 45) 
0 
0 
0 
*Investment = $100 from savings less $45 tax refund, or $55. 
Time 1 
$165 
$ 5 
$ 50 
$ 48 
$ 62 
$ 7* 
12.7% 
Borrowing appears to be the source of the increased rate of return from 10% to 12.7%. A 
more accurate explanation, however, is that borrowing reduced the amount invested, which 
made the savings from the government's interest-free loan on the premature deduction more 
valuable, as a larger percentage of the amount invested. If the $3.15 advantage of the premature 
deduction were accounted for by reducing the profit from $7 to $3.85, the rate of return falls 
from 12.7% to 7%, the appropriate rate with a market rate of return of 10% and a tax rate of 
30%. . 
135. Arguably, a taxpayer who adopts the cash method of accounting realizes the receipt of 
the borrowed cash or other property but not the obligation. The cash method is based on the 
general rule that receiving or making a promise to pay is ignored, and only the receipt or pay-
ment of cash or other property represents a taxable event warranting inclusion or exclusion of an 
amount in the tax base for the taxable year. See 4 B. BITTKER, supra note 6, at 1111105.2.2.-.2.4. 
Although loan obligations are substantively indistinguishable from any other promise to pay, the 
cash method of accounting always has allowed the taxpayer to deduct the obligation to repay 
when it arises out of a formalized borrowing transaction. 
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amount paid.136 Haig-Simons would also treat a decrease in the tax-
payer's obligation by an amount greater than the amount transferred 
in repayment as a net accretion to the tax base. However, given its 
focus on market price changes between two points in time, Haig-
Simons would treat the accretion as occurring before the creditor's 
discharge. From the borrower's viewpoint, the market reasons for 
price changes in the debt replicate those affecting assets and affect the 
value of the outstanding obligation each period.137 Analogizing a 
debtor's discharge to the sale of an asset for a gain makes it easy to see 
why T ARET uses its averaging techniques to allocate the increases to 
each period over which the taxpayer-debtor incurred the obligation 
and adjusts the tax for each period accordingly. 138 
136. See United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931); 1 B. BIITKER, supra note 6, 
at ~~ 6.4.1 -.3. 
137. The reference to assets is not merely an analogy, because, for the lender, the claim for 
payment against the borrower is an asset. See supra text accompanying note 95. 
138. Example: At Time 0, A borrows $10,000 from Bat a 10% periodic interest rate, prom-
ising to pay interest on the outstanding principal each period and to pay the principal at Time 10. 
At Time 3, A pays B $9000, and B cancels the debt. A's tax rate between Times 1 and 3 was 
30%. The tax liability owed by A at Time 3 is $308, computed as follows: 
R = [$9,000/$10,000]113 - 1 
R = -.0345 
The reduction of debt requires that the negative R be treated as positive and used as the 
interest-rate factor for adjusting the tax liability. 
Time 1: TRW0 is equal to $104 (.3 X .0345 X $10,000), and is the amount of tax owed at 
Time 1. The time-value-of-money adjustment to account for the delay in payment between Time 
1 and the realization event at Time 3 results in a Time-1 tax assessed at Time 3 of $109 ($104 [l 
+ .0345(1 - .3)]2). 
Time 2: TRW0(l + R) is equal to $100 ($104 X (1 - .0345)), and is the amount of tax 
owed at Time 2. The time-value-of-money adjustment to account for the delay in payment be· 
tween Time 2 and the realization event at Time 3 results in a Time-2 tax assessed at Time 3 of 
$102 ($100 x [1 + .0345(1 - .3)]). 
Time 3: TRW0(l + R)2 is equal to $97 ($104 X (1 - .0345)2), and is the amount of tax 
owed at Time 3. No time-value-of-money adjustment for the Time-3 tax is necessary because its 
payment is not delayed. 
The tax owed by A at Time 3 is the sum of these three time-adjusted tax assessments, or $308 
($109 + $102 + $97). 
Treating an obligation as the equivalent of an asset and tracking its changing value avoids the 
net-worth analysis that the courts have adopted, which led to the rule that an insolvent debtor 
realizes income only to the extent that the value of the debtor's assets exceeds the amount of 
outstanding indebtedness immediately after a debt is discharged. See Lakeland Grocery Co. v. 
Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 289 (1937); see also I.R.C. § 108 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (providing 
for deferral rather than permanent exclusion of gain resulting from discharge of indebtedness of 
insolvent or bankrupt taxpayers). The question whether the approach under I.R.C. § 108 (1982 
& Supp. IV 1986) should become part of TARET, so that a bankrupt or insolvent taxpayer 
avoids a tax assessment upon discharge, needs serious consideration. See infra notes 181-86 and 
accompanying text (discussing generally the role of nonrecognition provisions under TARET); 
see also Shakow, supra note 6, at 1164 (favoring tax relief for financially troubled debtors). 
TARET's treatment of discharge cases implicates the claim-of-right and tax-benefit doc-
trines. Under the claim-of-right doctrine, if a taxpayer receives money or property from another 
person and either does not know or disputes any obligations to return it, the taxpayer should 
report the money or property received as income in the taxing period when received. North 
American Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417 (1932). If the taxpayer has to repay any portion of 
the amount received later, she is allowed a deduction at that time. See United States v. Lewis, 
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The realization event and market price changes also do not coin-
cide for transactions involving discharge of nonrecourse secured debt. 
Under the parties' contractual agreement, a debtor can be expected to 
repay the obligation whenever the security's value is equal to or 
greater than the amount of the outstanding obligation and relinquish 
the security to the creditor rather than repay whenever its value is less 
than the obligation. This suggests that, under Haig-Simons, when the 
security's value is less than the debt, the taxpayer's market price loss 
in the security for any period is offset by an equivalent amount of gain 
attributable to the decrease in the outstanding obligation.139 TARET 
mimics Haig-Simons by allocating the gain from the discharge to those 
periods when the security's market price decreases. When the tax-
payer relinquishes the security, that realization event triggers TARET 
for purposes of allocating market price changes for both the security 
and the outstanding nonrecourse obligation.140 
The Haig-Simons and TARET approaches to discharges of nonre-
340 U.S. 590 (1951); see also I.R.C. § 46l(f) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (extending doctrine to 
disputed payments); I.R.C. § 1341 (1982) (relief provision from claim-of-right doctrine); l B. 
BfITKER, supra note 6, at 11 6.3.l - .4; 4 id. at 11105.3.5. 
The tax-benefit principle requires recoveries of previously deducted amounts to be taxed. See 
Hillsboro Natl. Bank v. Commissioner, 457 U.S. 1103 (1982); see also I.R.C. § 111 (Supp. IV 
1986) (relief provision for taxpayers to the extent their tax liabilities were not reduced by the 
previously deducted amount); l B. BrITKER, supra note 6, at 11 5.7. 
TARET would continue current Jaw while the receipts and payments are contested, but, 
upon settlement, would allow time adjustments to the tax liability to correct any over- or un-
derpayment of tax. This approach does not replicate Haig-Simons because the ideal would be to 
determine the market price of the disputed claim for each taxing period. Nevertheless, by relying 
on the settlement and adjusting the tax liability accordingly, TARET eliminates the Code's reli-
ance on the realization events of receipt, repayment, payment, and recovery to measure income 
for a taxing period. 
139. The analysis also would apply for a taxpayer who acquires property subject to a nonre-
course debt when the property's value is Jess than the face amount of the debt. See, e.g., Estate of 
Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976). The nonrecourse nature of the debt 
means that the taxpayer's obligation is equal to the value of the property when it is acquired. 
Under Haig-Simons, if the property decreases in value, that market price loss is offset by a gain 
attributable to the decrease in the outstanding obligation. If the property increases in value, that 
market price gain is offset by a Joss attributable to the increase in the outstanding obligation up to 
the face amount of the debt. 
TARET can mimic Haig-Simons by allocating the gain or loss attributable to the debt in the 
same manner that it allocates the gain or loss attributable to the property. The realization event 
occurs when the taxpayer relinquishes the property. If the property's value ultimately exceeds 
the face amount of the debt, however, the taxpayer will not relinquish the property, but instead 
will repay the entire Joan. Payment of the nonrecourse debt should be treated as a realization 
event that triggers TARET's operation. In other words, nonrecourse provides a unique opportu-
nity to treat payment at maturity as a realization event. See supra text following note 135. 
140. Example 1: At Time 0, A purchases Blackacre, which has been appraised as having a 
fair market value of $1 million, subject to a nonrecourse debt of $1 million. (Note that appraisals 
are unavoidable when property subject to nonrecourse debt is involved. See, e.g., Estate of 
Franklin, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976).) At Time 3, A transfers the land to B subject to the 
debt. Appraisals show that Blackacre's value at Time 3 is $800,000. The $200,000 loss in the 
land's value over the three periods is offset by the $200,000 gain reflected in the reduced obliga-
tion. Although the increase and decrease over the three periods is the same, a difference in the 
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course debt differ from the Code's, because the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice resisted analyzing the transaction as a sale of the security and a 
discharge of the debt. Instead, it insisted on treating the relinquish-
ment of the secured property with a market value less than the out-
standing debt as purely a sale, and the Supreme Court deferred to, the 
Service's view.141 The difference in classification of the transaction has 
significant consequences under the Code and accounts for the Court's 
and the Service's reluctance to acknowledge the discharge-of-indebted-
ness component.142 That artifact of the Code's approach obscures our 
understanding of the transaction, and its survival serves no purpose or 
policy. 
2. Future Costs 
The second type of debt transaction in which market price changes 
and realization events do not coincide concerns a controversial set of 
liabilities that have been called future costs, future obligations, prema-
ture accruals, and reverse investments, and which I will refer to as 
future costs.143 A deferred payment agreement in which a taxpayer 
receives goods or services before having to pay for them is a future 
cost. When the seller provides the goods and services without requir-
ing immediate payment, the buyer is also a borrower. The payment 
that the buyer ultimately makes will represent not only the value of 
interest-rate factor for adjusting the tax liability and the tax refund means that a TARET compu-
tation for each market value change is necessary. 
Example 2: Same facts as in Example 1, except that at Time 5 B transfers Blackacre subject 
to the nonrecourse debt to C for $200,000. Appraisals indicate that Blackacre's value at Time 5 
is $1.2 million. B suffers a loss between Times 3 and 5 of $200,000 as the obligation increases 
from $800,000 to $1 million. B enjoys a gain during that same time of $400,000 as Blackacre 
increases in value from $800,000 to $1.2 million. TARET determines both the time-adjusted tax 
refund due on the increased debt and the time-adjusted tax liability due on Blackacre's 
appreciation. 
141. Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 310 n.11 (1983); see also I.R.C. § 770l(g) (Supp. 
IV 1986) (codifying Tufts by providing that "in determining the amount of gain or loss ••• with 
respect to any property, the fair market value of such property shall be treated as being not less 
than the amount of any nonrecourse indebtedness to which such property is subject"). 
142. The primary difference is that the Code treats the gain as ordinary income if it is viewed 
as a discharge of indebtedness and as capital gain if viewed as a part of the disposition of the 
underlying security. See Tufts, 461 U.S at 319 (O'Connor, J., concurring). TARET abandons 
the distinction between ordinary and capital transactions and thereby liberates the analysis. 
143. See, e.g., Cunningham, A Theoretical Analysis of the Tax Treatment of Future Costs, 40 
TAX L. REv. 577 (1985); Jensen, The Deduction of Future Liabilities by Accrual-Basis Taxpayers: 
Premature Accruals, The All Events Test, and Economic Performance, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 443 
(1985); Kiefer, supra note 11; Sunley, supra note 11; Klein, Tax Accounting for Future Obliga-
tions: Basic Principles, 36 TAX NOTES 623 (1987); see also Land, Contingent Payments and the 
Time Value of Money, 40 TAX LAWYER 237 (1987) (By examining proposed regulations for 
contingent-payment debt obligations, the author uses basic tax principles defining when income 
is earned to develop a yield-based approach with many of the attributes of the TARET 
proposal.). 
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the goods and services, but also interest on the loan. The Code and 
TARET may have difficulty monitoring these transactions, but, upon 
segregation of the sale and loan components, their proper tax treat-
ment is obvious.144 
Controversy over future costs has focused on obligations to per-
form in the future for which no lenders are identifiable. Examples of 
this kind of future cost include a statutory obligation on a strip miner 
to reclaim land scarred by its mining operations and a contractual ob-
ligation on a lessee to return property to its original condition when 
the lease terminates. 
The accrual method of tax accounting generally permits a taxpayer · 
to deduct a cost equal to the amount that is owed when the fact of a 
liability that is reasonably estimatable arises.145 This realization rule, 
frequently referred to as the "all events" rule, 146 ignores the time gap 
between when the taxpayer incurs the cost and pays for it. Ignoring 
the payment delay leads to an overstatement of the expense that pro-
vides accrual-method taxpayers tax deferral advantages. Congress 
curtailed the tax savings opportunities for some kinds of future 
costs by enacting section 461(h) in the Tax Reform Act of 1984,147 
which allows a taxpayer to deduct a cost only upon "economic per-
formance." 148 Although section 461(h) does not make payment a con-
dition for a deduction except for a tort liability or a worker's 
compensation claim, the economic performance requirement means 
that a taxpayer must defer a deduction for a future cost until the tax-
payer or another person provides goods or services for the purpose of 
meeting the obligation.149 Congress apparently assumed that any gaps 
between the receipt of the goods or services and payment would be 
minimal, eliminating any need for discounting to account for a sale 
contract's borrowing component.150 
144. See Fellows, Future Costs Reconsidered: A Reevaluation of /RC Section 461 (h), 44 TAX 
NOTES 1531, 1532-37 (1989); Halperin, supra note 1. TARET's approach to future costs not 
involving an identifiable lender may be useful for taxing typical deferred-payment transactions, 
such as delayed payments for professional services, or employee bonuses. See infra note 163 and 
accompanying text. Cf Blum, supra note 11, at 57-60 (discussing benefit of hindsight determina-
tion with these types of transactions). TARET's approach also would be useful for taxing long-
term contracts. See id. at 63-64. 
145. See United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422 (1926); Treas. Reg. § l.461.l(a)(2). 
146. See, e.g., M. GRAETZ, supra note 11, at 903-04. 
147. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 9l(a}, 98 Stat. 494, 598-601 (codified at 
26 u.s.c. § 461 (1986)). 
148. I.R.C. § 46l(h)(l) (Supp. IV 1986). 
149. I.R.C. § 46l(h) (Supp. IV 1986) is not the only provision that addresses issues regarding 
future costs. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 404(a)(5) (1982) (denying an employer's deduction until the em-
ployee includes the compensation in income). 
150. For discussion of the statute's intricacies, exceptions, and deficiencies, see Cunningham, 
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Although no one defends the "all events" rule, a number of ana-
lysts believe that the 1984 Act's "economic performance" requirement 
leads to overtaxation of the obligor of a future cost.151 Others, most 
notably Professor Halperin, believe that concern about the fairness of 
section 461(h) may be misplaced.152 The first step in his analysis is to 
introduce the concept of surrogate taxing. Surrogate taxing operates 
when the Code ignores the time gap between when one party provides 
goods and services and the other party pays for them. The time gap 
arises either by the buyer prepaying the seller for the goods and serv-
ices or by the buyer deferring payment. An accelerated payment effec-
tively is a loan by the buyer to the seller that the seller discharges by 
delivering goods and services. A delivery of goods and services before 
payment effectively is a loan by the seller to the buyer that the buyer 
discharges upon payment. Halperin shows that when one party pays 
for goods or services at a different time than when the other party 
provides them, ignoring the loan between them overtaxes the borrower 
and undertaxes the lender. 153 The second step in his analysis uses sur-
rogate taxing to explain how section 461(h) taxes interest income that 
would otherwise escape taxation altogether.154 
Analysts have criticized Halperin for viewing the two kinds of fu-
ture costs in the same way. 155 They agree that his argument is persua-
sive regarding deferred payment agreements. Imputing a borrowing 
relationship between the identifiable taxpayers fairly reflects the eco-
nomics of the transaction. Where a lender cannot be identified, how-
supra note 143, at 585-87; Jensen, The Supreme Court and the Timing of Deductions/or Accrua/-
Basis Taxpayers, 22 GA. L. REV. 229, 252-69 (1988); Jensen, supra note 3, at 477-89. 
151. See, e.g., Aidinotr & Lopata, Section 461 and Accrual-Method Taxpayers: The Treat-
ment of Liabilities Arising from Obligations to Be Performed in the Future, 33 TAX LAW. 789 
(1980); Kiefer, supra note 11; Sunley, supra note 11. 
152. Halperin, supra note 1. 
153. Halperin also shows that if they face the same tax rates, contracting parties obtain the 
same after-tax returns from the sale had the Code separately taxed it without regard to the loan 
because they "can be expected to take care of themselves by altering the purchase/sale price." 
Halperin & Klein, Tax Accounting for Future Obligations: Basic Principles Revised, 38 TAX 
NOTES 831, 836 (1988); accord Halperin, supra note l, at 520-24. In response to a critique of the 
Halperin & Klein article by Professor Thuronyi, see Letters to the Editor, 39 TAX NOTES 265-66 
(1988), Professors Halperin and Klein acknowledge that the parties cannot be expected to adjust 
to section 461(h)'s scheme when a prepaying buyer acquires the goods or services for use in a 
business or investment venture. See id. at 266; see also Fellows, supra note 144, at 1532-37 
(identifying other types of deferred and accelerated payment transactions where surrogate taxing 
fails). 
154. Accord Cunningham, supra note 143, at 600-09, 610-15; see Halperin, supra note 1, at 
529-30; Halperin, supra note 11, at 759; S. Fiekowsky, Income Measurement and Time Value of 
Money (Apr. 9, 1984) (unpublished manuscript). 
155. See, e.g., Aidinotr & Lopata, supra note 151; Kiefer, supra note 11; Sunley, supra note 
11. 
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ever, they argue that the future cost represents a negative salvage value 
that should be treated as a capital cost. 
I reach the same conclusion as Halperin's critics, but adopt a dif-
ferent, albeit related, rationale. The distinction between incurring 
costs and meeting the cost's obligation through economic performance 
requires that the two kinds of future costs be treated differently. Nev-
ertheless, section 461(h) may achieve the right' tax result under the 
Code because it avoids having to estimate when and how much the 
taxpayer will pay to meet the obligation. It also ameliorates the bene-
fits of tax deferral that the taxpayer enjoys on income earned from 
incurring the future cost. Neither of these reasons justifies extending 
the economic performance rule to TARET. 
A deferred payment agreement, such as a deferred tort settlement, 
is econonii.cally equivalent to the parties entering into two agreelllents: 
(1) the payment of damages to compensate the victim for losses and 
(2) the victim loaning the tortfeasor the amount of damages to be re-
paid at some specified date. The thrust of Halperin's argument re-
garding the proper treatment of a deferred tort settlement pertains to 
the borrowing component. He reasoq.s that Code rules excluding the 
interest income from the loan from the victim's tax base explains why 
section 461(h) denies the tortfeasor a deduction for the interest cost by 
postponing the deduction for damages until payment.156 
That Halperin extends this reasoning to a future cost like mining 
reclamation is not too surprising because the amount of the cost in-
creases over time based on market interest rates. The periodic in-
creases are consistent with viewing the transaction as if it contained a 
borrowing component and raise the concern that some interest income 
is being left untaxed merely because no identifiable lender exists. An-
other explanation for why these costs increase at market interest rates 
unrelated to borrowing, however, has to do with the fact taxpayers, 
such as the strip miner, are less wealthy by having incurred the future 
costs, but the value of the assets they own remain undiminished while 
the obligation remains outstanding. 
At the time the parties agree to a deferred tort settlement, the 
tortfeasor has already become less wealthy by having earlier incurred a 
tort liability. The settlement represents economic performance of the 
tort obligation because it results in the victim obtaining rights and 
156. See Halperin, supra note l, at 526-27. Arguably, this justification is unpersuasive be-
cause surrogate taxation is too inexact a solution. See Fellows, supra note 144, at 1532-37. Also 
arguably, this justification is applied inappropriately for deferred tort settlements because, by 
denying tortfeasors interest deductions, we can expect that they will negotiate with victims for 
lower settlement amounts to offset the lost tax savings, see infra note 157, and thereby undemiine 
congressional intent to enhance the after-tax compensation to tort victims. 
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ownership over the tortfeasor's money or property. Any investment 
income earned on the money or property after the agreement is owned 
by the victim and justifies Halperin's concern over untaxed income. 157 
In contrast, for future costs, such as mining reclamation, the strip 
miner does not transfer ownership of any money or property to an-
other person at the time the obligation arises. The strip miner's loss of 
wealth is represented only by an obligation without a reduction of the 
amount of property the strip miner owns or has invested. The fact 
that the mine operator has not met the obligation by economic per-
formance after incurring it and the fact that the operator could eco-
nomically perform indicate how the Code should measure the 
obligation over time. 
At the time a taxpayer incurs a future cost, some form of economic 
performance is always possible, including selling the business or pay-
ing someone else to assume the obligation.158 If a strip miner sells its 
mining operation or pays someone else to assume the obligation, it 
loses money or property and, therefore, earns less investment income 
in the future than if it had continued to carry the obligation. To pro-
vide similar tax treatment for taxpayers who incur future costs and 
those who incur and economically perform future costs, the Code 
must allow a deduction based on market interest rates for each period 
between when taxpayers incur future costs and when they meet those 
obligations through economic performance.159 
Explaining why measurement of a taxpayer's income for an unper-
157. The effect of section 461(h) regarding tort liabilities is to allow the tortfeasor a deduc· 
tion at the time of payment equivalent to the amount of damages that would have been paid to 
meet the obligation at the time of the agreement. If the parties face similar tax rates and the 
tortfeasor would have had the right to deduct the interest costs each period and the damage 
payment when the parties settled, the parties can be expected to agree to a settlement amount 
that gives each the after-tax equivalent of what they respectively would have received and paid at 
the time of the agreement. For example, if the amount of damages, as of Time 0, is $1000, and 
payment is delayed until Time 2, the parties would agree to $1145 as the amount of the deferred 
payment assuming a pretax interest rate of 10% and a tax rate of 30%. The victim would agree 
to this amount because it is equivalent to receiving $1000 at Time 0 and investing it at a 7% 
after-tax rate for two periods. The tortfeasor would agree to this amount because it will result in, 
according to Section 461 (h), an after-tax cost at Time 2 of $801 ($1145 X (1 - .3)), which is 
equivalent to the after-tax cost of$700 ($1000 X (1 - .3)) at Time 0 ($801/[1 + .1(1 - .3))2). 
158. A taxpayer may economically perform by receiving goods and services for the purpose 
of meeting an obligation and either paying for the goods and services immediately or agreeing to 
a deferred payment. Neither of these two forms of economic performance may be feasible when 
the taxpayer incurs the cost, however, because the goods and services may be of no use until the 
taxpayer completes other aspects of its operation. If a taxpayer were to prepay for goods or 
services, the issue of untaxed investment income arises. Prepayments, however, merely represent 
changes in the form taxpayers hold their wealth. Instead of owning money, prepaying taxpayers 
own claims of right against other persons, but they suffer no reductions in the amount of prop-
erty they have invested. Thus, a prepayment of an obligation should not be considered economic 
performance. 
159. See Halperin, supra note 11, at 529-30. 
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formed future cost includes accounting for periodic interest deduc-
tions does not mean necessarily that the Code should allow interest 
deductions or that section 461(h) is wrong for deferring a deduction 
for an unperformed future cost until it is economically performed. To 
allow a deduction for a future cost when it is incurred and periodic 
interest deductions while it remains unperformed requires reliance on 
estimates of when and how much a taxpayer will pay to discharge an 
obligation. 
Moreover, the operation of the realization-event principle, even for 
taxpayers using accrual-method accounting rules, disconnects the 
costs of producing income from the income produced. That discon-
nection necessitates rules to reduce the benefits of tax deferral on mar-
ket value increases by postponing the deductions of as~ociated market 
value decreases until the taxpayer realizes the increases.160 
Many situations in which future costs arise involve deferred gains, 
and, therefore, deferring the deductions to tax periods when the tax-
payer realizes those gains is warranted. For example, for the strip 
miner to begin its operations, it uses capital to acquire land, equip-
ment, and labor. The market value of an established mining facility is 
probably greater than the value of the capital invested, because the 
strip miner has brought elements of production together to create the 
"capacity to mine." The value of that mining capacity is not taxed 
when it is created because it is unrealized. It is taxed at a later time 
when the strip miner sells either the operation or the mine's extracted 
minerals. Section 461(h) may be criticized fairly for deferring the de-
duction of future costs beyond the taxing periods when the taxpayer 
has realized related gains and for ignoring the Code's general ap-
proach of accelerating deductions for capital investments.16 1 Never-
theless, section 461(h)'s approach, which defers the deduction, is a 
reasonable response to this complex area because it avoids estimating 
future costs that will produce income that the taxpayer will not realize 
until later taxing periods. 
Without the need under TARET to defer deductions to offset the 
advantages of deferred gains, section 461(h) should be abandoned. In-
stead, TARET's treatment of asset market price changes should be 
extended to future costs. By viewing the taxpayer's payment of the 
cost as the realization event triggering a tax assessment, the time and 
amount of the payment are determined. TARET discounts the 
amount paid using a well considered interest-rate factor to the tax pe-
160. See supra text immediately following note 38. 
161. See Kiefer, supra note 7, at 931. 
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riod when the taxpayer incurred the cost, 162 allocates that discounted 
cost to the period when it occurred, and allocates the increases in the 
cost due to the payment delay based on the applicable interest-rate 
factor to each taxing period between when the taxpayer incurred and 
paid the cost. TARET then adjusts the tax refunds computed for each 
of the taxing periods based on the market value decreases to adjust for 
the delay between when the tax refund obligations arose and when the 
government pays them. 163 TARET's approach is attractive because it 
162. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
163. TARET's computation of the time-adjusted tax refund is depicted by the following 
formula: 
n-1 n-1 
T(-W.,/ II (1 + P;)]{ II (1 + Fi(l - 1)) 
i=O • i=O 
n-1 n n-1 n-1 
+ (II (1 + P;)11" - 1)) ~ ( II (1 + P;)11"]k-I . II (1 + Fj(l - 1)) 
1=0 k=l 1=0 J=k 
This formula is derived in the following manner: 
The discounted cost, -W0 , is equal to: 
n-1 
- Wn/II(l + P;) 
i=O 
Wn = the amount paid at Time n for cost incurred at Time 0. 
The increase in the cost for each period after the taxpayer incurs the cost is depicted by the 
following notation: 
n-1 n-1 n-1 
(-W.,/II(l + P;)J(II(l + P;)11" - 1)( II (1 + P1) 11"]i-t 
i=O 1=0 i=O 
The sum of the costs for Time 0 and each period that follows is depicted by the following 
notation: 
n-1 n-1 n n-1 
(- W.,/ II (1 + P;)J[l + II (1 + P;)11" - 1) ~ (II (1 + P;)1'•Jk-t 
i=O i=O k=li=O 
The tax rate, T, and the time-adjustment to the tax refund components are added to the previous 
formula to complete the computation of the time-adjusted tax refund. 
n-1 
.II. (1 + Fi(l - 1)) 
J=l 
The operation of this formula is illustrated through the following example. 
Example: At Time 3, A pays $5000 to dispose of toxic wastes from a manufacturing process 
started at Time 0. The risk-adjusted federal rates for the relevant periods are: 
Time 0: 12% (3-period maturity) 
Time 1: 15% (2-period maturity) 
Time 2: 10% (1-period maturity) 
The relevant applicable federal rates for adjustment of each period's tax refund are: 
Time 0: 8% (I-period maturity) 
Time 1: 11% (1-period maturity) 
Time 2: 9% (1-period maturity) 
The tax refund due A is $1764, computed as follows according to Formula 10: 
Time 0: The market price decrease is equal to $3529 ($5000/(1.12 X 1.15 X 1.1)), and the 
tax refund on the market price decrease is $1059 (.3 x $3529). The time-value-of-money adjust-
ment to account for the delay in payment between Time 0 and the realization event at Time 3 
results in a Time-0 tax refund assessed at Time 3 of $1280 ($1059 (1 + .08(1 - .3)) X (I + 
.11(1 - .3)) x (1 + .09(1 - .3))). 
Time 1: The market price decrease is equal to $447 ($3529((1.12 X 1.15 X 1.11)113 - 1)), 
and the tax refund on the market price decrease is $134 (.3 X $447). The time-value-of-money 
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eliminates any concern about basing a current deduction on an esti-
mate of when and how much a taxpayer will pay for a cost and be-
cause it incorporates time-value-of-money principles. The one 
disadvantage of the approach, however, is that it requires a determina-
tion of when the taxpayer incurs a cost.164 
The Haig-Simons standard directs that the appropriate time for 
deducting a cost is when the marketplace acknowledges that the tax-
payer incurred a market price decrease. The focus on the marketplace 
suggests that so long as the taxpayer could take some action to avoid 
payment no decrease occurs, but the possibility of that action cannot 
be so remote that the marketplace would ignore it. 
The two latest Supreme Court pronouncements concerning the 
"all events" rule demonstrate the slipperiness of a standard that re-
quires a distinction between remote and nonremote contingencies. In 
United States v. Hughes Properties, Inc., 165 the Court allowed a deduc-
tion to a Nevada gambling casino for the amount of guaranteed jack-
pots indicated on its slot machines at the end of the casino's tax year. 
The casino could have avoided payment by surrendering its license or 
filing for bankruptcy, but those possibilities were viewed as too remote 
to consider. 
What qualifies as a remote contingency became more unclear the 
next Term, however, when the Court decided United States v. General 
adjustment to account for the delay in payment between Time 1 and the realization event at Time 
3 results in a Time-1 tax refund assessed at Time 3 of $153 ($134 X [1 + .11(1 - .3)] X [1 + 
.09(1 - .3)]). 
Time 2: The market price decrease is $504 ($3529[(1.12 X 1.15 X 1.11)113 - 1][(1.12 X 
1.15 X 1.11)113]2-1), and the tax refund on the market price decrease is $151 (.3 X $504). The 
time-value-of-money adjustment to account for the delay in payment between Time 2 and the 
realization event at Time 3 results in a Time-2 tax refund assessed at Time 3 of $161 ($151 X [I 
+ .09(1 - .3)]). 
Time 3: The market price decrease is equal to $567 ($3529[(1.12 X 1.15 X 1.11)113 -
1][(1.12 X 1.15 X 1.11)113]3-1), and the tax refund on the market price decrease is $170 (.3 X 
$567). No time-value-of-money adjustment of the tax refund is necessary because its payment is 
not delayed. 
The tax refund due A at Time 3 is the sum of these four time-adjusted tax assessments, or 
$1764 ($1280 + $153 + $161 + $170). 
164. See supra note 106 and accompanying text (raising a similar difficulty with regard to 
when a taxpayer produces an asset). The problem will be exacerbated because of misunder-
standings about future costs. If a taxpayer unconditionally commits herself at Time 0 to rent 
office space between Times 10 and 11, no deduction for the discounted value of the rental pay-
ment should be allowed at Time 0 because that obligation is offset by the increase in wealth 
represented by the claim to office space between Times 10 and 11. But see Hearings on Timing 
and Measurement of Taxpayer Deductions for Obligations to be Paid in the Future Before the 
Subcomm. on Oversight of House Comm. on Ways and Means, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1984) 
(statement of Emil M. Sunley) (also concluding that the rent in this example should not be 
deductible at Time 0, but reaching that conclusion by relying on matching principles and arguing 
that the rental payment is not a cost attributable to Time O's income). 
165. 476 U.S. 593 (1986). 
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Dynamics Corp. 166 General Dynamics was obligated to reimburse em-
ployees for medical expenses under its collective bargaining agree-
ment. At the end of its taxable year, it estimated, based on insurance 
industry actuarial principles, its liability for claims for medical serv-
ices that had been performed, but not yet filed, or, if filed, not yet 
approved. The Court held that the liability did not occur until an 
employee filed a claim because failure to file was not an "extremely 
remote and speculative possibility."167 The Court failed to explain 
why an employee's failure to file was sufficiently likely to support the 
conclusion that the taxpayer had not incurred a cost, while a gambler 
neglecting to claim jackpot winnings was not. 168 Haig-Simons and the 
"all events" rule require something less than legal certainty, but how 
much less continues to defy clear statement.169 
Even when remoteness is not at issue, when a taxpayer incurs a 
future cost may remain administratively difficult to determine. Future 
costs arise in a number of different contexts that require factual inquir-
ies to determine when and how much should be deducted for any tax-
ing period. Some future costs arise as a result of a single economic 
event, such as removal costs for a newly installed machine. Other fu-
ture costs are incurred incrementally over a number of taxing periods, 
such as toxic waste disposal expenses that increase depending on the 
taxpayer's production level. Still others may defy accurate allocation 
among taxing periods because the amount of a future cost depends on 
variables that are difficult to identify for any taxing period. For exam-
ple, if a lumber company acquires the right to harvest trees from 
rented land with the obligation to reforest, the amount of future costs 
incurred each taxing period may depend on whether the company 
needs to build access roads to reach and remove lumber in a particular 
area and on weather conditions, as well as the amount of lumber 
harvested. 
166. 481 U.S. 239 (1987). 
167. 481 U.S. at 244 (quoting U.S. v. Hughes Properties, 476 U.S. 593, 601 (1986)). 
168. See Jensen, supra note 6, at 238-46. 
169. The problem of deciding when a taxpayer incurs a cost will increase with technological 
advances that allow more accurate prediction of events. If the marketplace takes this informa-
tion into account when valuing a business and its ventures, any tax system committed to emulat-
ing the Haig-Simons ideal must reflect market responses. For example, before a firm starts 
manufacturing widgets, it will estimate employee injuries in the workplace and consumer injuries 
from defective products. Those costs of operations are part of the investment decision to start 
the business and would be considered by a prospective buyer of the operation. The Tax Reform 
Act of 1984 avoias these issues by providing that taxpayers can deduct tort claims only upon 
payment. See I.R.C. § 46l(h)(2) (C) (Supp. IV 1986). However, the TARET approach requires 
the Internal Revenue Service and the courts to consider whether claims for employee or con-
sumer injuries are costs incurred when manufacturing operations begin, when the particular in-
jury occurs, when the injured person files a claim, or when the taxpayer concedes liability. 
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The more accurate the determination of when a taxpayer incurs a 
cost, the closer TARET will mimic Haig-Simons. If the Internal Rev-
enue Service adopts rules that unduly delay deductibility, it will poten-
tially deter taxpayers from engaging in economic activities that involve 
future costs. Similarly, premature deductibility will potentially en-
courage taxpayers to overinvest in these economic activities. The bur-
den will be on the Service to adopt a set of assumptions that reflect the 
economic environment and periodically to reassess those assumptions 
in view of economic changes. 
E. Summary of TARET's Implications 
One of the two most significant achievements of T ARET is that it 
eliminates any difference in taxation among types of profit from prop-
erty. It makes investors indifferent, from a tax point of view, to 
whether they receive interest, dividends, rents, or capital appreciation, 
because capital appreciation no longer enjoys the opportunity for tax 
deferral.17° Concerns may arise that the proposal will discourage in-
vestment because it increases the tax on investment profits. But tax 
incentives that reintroduce a distinction between capital appreciation 
and other income from nonhuman capital will be difficult to defend 
once tax deferral on gain is no longer seen as an inevitable cost of the 
tax regime. 
The second significant achievement ofTARET is that it eliminates 
differences in tax treatment of taxpayers who acquire assets and those 
who produce assets used in business or investment if the producer 
eventually disposes of the asset in a marketplace transaction. 
Although practical limitations may prevent taxing produced assets ex-
hausted through use in business or investment activities, T ARET nev-
ertheless substantially reduces tax incentives for taxpayers to use their 
economic resources to produce rather than acquire assets. Moreover, 
TARET's scheme eliminates the need for the Code's complex rules 
deferring deductions for realized costs until income related to those 
costs is realized. 
Eliminating the tax deferral impact of the realization-event princi-
ple for purchased and many produced assets requires rethinking many 
aspects of the Code. The Code's most controversial provisions - like 
170. The question of the disparate treatment of a corporation's dividend distribution to its 
shareholders and interest payments to its lenders is not addressed. The tax rules allowing a 
corporation to deduct interest but not dividends generate both economic distortions and legal 
problems, but proposals for reform are beyond the scope of this article. For a discussion of these 
problems and possible solutions, see American Law Institute, Federal Income Tax Project, Sub-
chapter C, Proposals on Corporate Acquisitions and Dispositions and Reporter's Study on Cor-
porate Distributions, Appendix (1982). 
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accelerated depreciation, percentage depletion, capital gains deduc-
tions, and deferred compensation plans - are predictable byproducts 
of the realization-event model. Each can be excused as congressional 
attempts to reduce the tax differences between taxpayers retaining in-
vestments and those changing their investment strategies, and between 
taxpayers who earn profits by selling their services and those who earn 
profits by providing capital. With tax deferral no longer viewed as a 
necessary component of an income tax system, these Code provisions 
make less sense. 
Code rules that defer deductions also need reconsideration. For 
example, the limit on the amount of capital losses that a taxpayer may 
deduct in one year171 should be abandoned. This limitation is 
designed to prevent taxpayers from enjoying tax deferral on their gains 
without delaying their losses. TARET eliminates the need for a spe-
cial capital loss rule because it eliminates the benefit of the tax deferral 
on gains. Taxpayers' after-tax returns no longer depend on avoiding a 
realization event and, therefore, there will be no incentive for undue 
delay of gains. Moreover, it makes little sense to delay deduction of an 
incurred loss beyond the time that it is easily measurable. Time-value-
of-money analysis makes it easy to assume, mistakenly, that both the 
government and the taxpayer should be indifferent to when tax assess-
ment occurs. From that logic, one might conclude that TARET al-
lows the government to delay recognition of any loss for any amount 
of time. To account for such delays in assessing the tax refund, 
TARET assumes that the taxpayer would make a loan to the govern-
ment at U.S. Treasury Note yield rates. That assumption is imperfect 
and should not be relied upon unless administratively necessary. By 
delaying the deduction of a realized loss, the government is unjustifi-
ably requiring taxpayers to lend it money even though they may have 
more attractive investment opportunities elsewhere.172 
Related to the question of allowing time-adjusted tax refunds once 
a market value decrease becomes easily measurable is whether the gov-
ernment should provide a refund when the amount of time-adjusted 
tax refunds exceeds the time-adjusted tax liabilities for the tax ac-
counting period. Simons never addressed what response the govern-
ment should make when a taxpayer suffers a net decrease in wealth for 
the period. 173 That no tax is due is an insufficient response because we 
171. I.R.C. §§ 1211, 1212 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
172. Unless some constraint is placed upon the government's ability to postpone tax refunds, 
the government yields would no longer reflect the market. 
173. See H. SIMONS, supra note 1, at 50 (emphasis in original): 
The measurement of income implies allocation of consumption and accumulation to speci· 
fled periods. In a sense, it implies the possibility of measuring the results of individual 
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are left wondering how to measure and tax accretions in subsequent 
taxing periods. Even if a prior period's net decretions are considered 
in determining net accretions in a subsequent period, that adjustment 
would fail to account for the difference in the time value of a tax re-
fund in the period of the decretion and the period it was available to 
reduce the taxpayer's tax liability on an accretion. The right answer 
under Haig-Simons is that net decretions should result in a refund 
from the government to the taxpayer at the time they occur. That 
result preserves the periodic accounting principle implicit in the Haig-
Simons ideal and eliminates idiosyncratic results obtained by a conflu-
ence or lack of confluence of unrelated economic events during the 
period. 
The Code's treatment of net losses is a controversial area for which 
no complete or satisfactory solution has yet emerged.174 If a taxpayer 
realizes a loss, it is available to offset related, and in many cases, unre-
lated gains realized during the same period.175 If the taxpayer's real-
ized losses exceed realized gains during the period, she owes no tax, 
but obtains no tax refund. The Code provides some relief for this "an-
nual accounting" problem, 176 but these rules are flawed. They add 
administrative complexity by requiring prior year's returns to remain 
open for long periods of time and violate the principle of tax neutrality 
by disfavoring risky investments.177 The net operating loss rules are 
especially pernicious because they favor conglomerate corporations 
over nondiversified ones and old firms with prior profit years over new 
ones.178 Moreover, even if the losses ultimately reduce a taxpayer's 
future tax liability, no adjustment for the time value of money is made 
to take account of the postponement. 
The Code's harsh treatment of net losses is attributable primarily 
to the realization-event principle. Underlying the restrictions on re-
ducing taxes from net losses is the view that the taxpayer is probably 
enjoying tax deferral on unrealized gains while recording artificial tax 
participation in economic relations for an assigned interval and without regard for anything 
which happened before the beginning of that (before the end of the previous) interval or for 
what may happen in subsequent periods. 
Perhaps this omission is explainable by Simons' view that "[t]he essential connotation of income 
•.. is gain - gain to someone during a specified period and measured according to objective 
market standards." Id. at 51 (emphasis in original). 
174. See generally Campisano & Romano, Recouping Losses: The Case for Full Loss Offsets, 
76 Nw. U. L. REV. 709 (1981) (demonstrating the inequities, inefficiencies, and administrative 
costs of the existing system). 
175. The Code contains some provisions that allow costs only to the extent that the taxpayer 
realizes income related to those costs. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 163(d), 469 (Supp. IV 1986). 
176. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 111, 172, 186, 1016(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
177. Campisano & Romano, supra note 174, at 729. 
178. See id. at 730-36. 
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losses through advantageous amortization rules and the like. 179 This 
skepticism about the authenticity of the net losses makes a refund rule 
politically unacceptable. 
The basic premises underlying T ARET that eliminate tax deferral 
demand a refund rule for all taxpayers. The amount of the refund 
should be based on the taxpayer's average tax rate or some other des-
ignated tax rate. 18° Failure to accompany T ARET with a refund rule 
will reinfect taxpayers' economic decisions with tax considerations 
about timing. Some concern might be raised that net losses might in-
crease, straining government revenues, because of increased instances 
of deductions for costs in periods before the income produced by those 
costs is recognized. Countering this tendency, however, is the fact 
that taxpayers will not avoid recognizing gains because the tax law 
eliminates the advantage of doing so. 
The last major Code area that would require reassessment if 
T ARET were adopted is the set of rules allowing or requiring post-
ponement of realized gains or losses.181 Nonrecognition rules are 
sometimes justified as alleviating the differences in tax treatment of 
people who remain in the same investment and enjoy tax deferral and 
those who change investment strategies or experience an "involun-
tary" marketplace transaction, such as a fire or divorce, leading to a 
realization event.182 If the advantages of tax deferral are eliminated, 
the purpose of these provisions is less clear. The time-value-of-money 
adjustment makes the taxpayer indifferent as to when the tax is as-
sessed, and the nonrecognition rules seem to provide the taxpayer no 
economic benefit except a certain borrowing source. A taxpayer might 
value the opportunity to borrow the tax liability - for example, if she 
had a low credit rating and could otherwise not borrow or could bor-
row only on unattractive terms. This very case, however, should make 
the government reluctant to delay tax collection, since it suggests a 
risk of default upon a later tax assessment. 
A second justification for these nonrecognition provisions is that 
delaying the tax assessment relieves the taxpayer of the hardship of 
liquidating investments or borrowing to pay a tax bill.1s3 To some, 
TARET might make the hardship argument more persuasive because 
the government is at least requiring the taxpayer to borrow at a mar-
179. See id. at 737-40. 
180. See id. at 713, 713 n.18. 
181. See, e.g., l.R.C. §§ 453, 1031, 1033, 1034, 1041 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
182. See Kornhauser, Section 1031: We Don't Need Another Hero, 60 S. CAL. L. REV, 397, 
407-10 (1987). 
183. See id. at 407, 410-11. 
February 1990] Tax Deferral 805 
ket interest rate. On the other hand, this argument is less persuasive 
because the government's role as lender is more obvious and raises the 
question why the government, rather than private parties, is providing 
this service. Moreover, if the nonassessment is not required by admin- -
istrative constraints, a more rational rule would allow all taxpayers to 
demand loans upon a showing of liquidity hardship rather than 
presuming liquidity hardship through a blunt discriminatory rule. 
The third standard justification for the nonrecognition rules is that 
they avoid valuation diffi.culties. 184 In many instances, however, the 
nonrecognition rules do not avoid difficult valuations. For example, a 
like-kind exchange in which the taxpayer receives cash or other non-
like-kind property requires an appraisal of the like-kind property re-
ceived to determine how much gain, if any, should be taxed at the time 
of the exchange.185 Once the taxpayer and the government are forced 
to appraise the value of an asset, no reason for delaying a tax assess-
ment remains. Thus, the nonrecognition rules should be retained, if at 
all, only for transactions where neither the valuation of the asset re-
ceived nor the valuation of the asset transferred is necessary. 186 
Because of its comprehensiveness, TARETwill make taxpayers at-
tach more value to the government's decision to exclude or postpone 
taxing market price changes. Therefore, Congress and the President 
can expect increased political pressure for special tax relief provisions. 
Whether certain industries, expenditures, or groups should obtain tax 
relief is a matter for national debate. What the near conversion of the 
realization-event model to the Haig-Simons ideal provides is the op-
portunity to rethink these issues free of a taxing system in which tax 
deferral is the norm. 
III. COMPARISON WITH A CONSUMPTION TAX 
In 1974, Professor Andrews published an article exploring the con-
sumption tax, which marked the beginning of a cottage industry for 
legal scholars, economists, and policymakers investigating the advan-
tages and disadvantages of this alternative system. 187 The following 
184. See id. at 407, 409. 
185. See id. at 409. 
186. This standard could become the core ofTARET's definition ofa realization event. 
187. Andrews, supra note 1. The consumption tax had been discussed and advocated earlier 
by a number of economists. See I. FISHER, THE INCOME CONCEPT IN THE LIGHT OF EXPERI-
ENCE (n.d.) (pamphlet); I. FISHER, THE NATURE OF CAPITAL AND INCOME (1906); I. FISHER & 
H. FISHER, CONSTRUCTIVE INCOME TAXATION (1942); T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. 30 (1651); 
N. KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX (1955); J.S. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF PoLmCAL EcONOMY 
bk. v. ch. II,§ 4 (Laughlin ed. 1884); A. PIGOU, A STUDY IN PUBLIC FINANCE 118-26 (3d ed. 
1951); W. VICKREY, AGENDA FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 329-66 (1947); A. MARSHALL, The 
806 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:722 
discussion will not detail the operation of the consumption tax or at-
tempt to resolve the continuing debate about either its fairness or 
workability. 188 Instead, this discussion will simply compare the con-
sumption tax to TARET and show what the consumption tax can do 
that TARET cannot, and vice versa. 
The consumption tax provides a more elegant and complete re-
sponse to tax deferral than TARET. It takes the opposite tack from 
T ARET by extending tax deferral to all transactions and imposing a 
tax only when a taxpayer exhausts economic resources for consump-
tion purposes. This approach makes the consumption tax indifferent 
to the questions that have occupied this article, such as when an asset's 
market price changes or when (or whether) a taxpayer produces an 
asset for business or investment purposes. Instead, its only concern is 
whether resources are devoted to business or investment purposes, on 
the one hand, or to consumption, on the other. If to the former, no 
tax is assessed until the taxpayer uses those resources (or the profits 
from those resources) for consumption purposes. 
The consumption tax eliminates the economic distortions and un-
fairness that T ARET tries to correct, but it does so by not taxing, 
rather than taxing, periodic accretions and decretions. For example, it 
taxes neither corporate dividends, rents, nor capital appreciation so 
long as the taxpayer continues to devote wealth accumulation in any 
Equitable Distribution of Taxation, in MEMORIALS OF ALFRED MARSHALL 347-52 (A. Pigou ed. 
1956). 
188. See, e.g., 1 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPT. OF TREAS., TAX REFORM FOR FAIR-
NESS, SIMPLICITY, AND EcONOMIC GROWTH: THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT (1984), reprinted in [1984] Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 29-33 (Nov. 29, 1984) (extra 
ed.) [hereinafter U.S. TREASURY DEPT.]; DEPT. OF TREAS., BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX RE-
FORM (1977) [hereinafter TREASURY BLUEPRINTS]; THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, EcoNOMIC 
CHOICES 1984 (A. Rivlin ed. 1984); MEADE REPORT, supra note 16, at 33; P. MIESZKOWSKI, 
THE CASH FLOW VERSION OF AN EXPENDITURE TAX (Office of Tax Analysis, Dept. of Treas.) 
(1977); D. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX (1986); Andrews, Fairness and the Per-
sona/ Income Tax: A Reply to Professor Warren, 88 HARV. L. REV. 947 (1975); Boskin, Taxa-
tion, Saving, and the Rate of Interest, 86 J. PoL. EcoN. 53 (1978); Bradford, The Case for a 
Persona/ Consumption Tax, in WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED: INCOME OR EXPENDITURE? 75 (J, 
Pechman ed. 1980) [hereinafter WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED?]; Bradford, The Economics of Tax 
Policy Toward Savings, in THE GOVERNMENT AND CAPITAL FORMATION 11 (G. Von Fur-
stenberg ed. 1980); Bradford & Toder, Consumption vs. Income Base Taxes: The Argument on 
Grounds of Equity and Simplicity, 69 NATL. TAX AssN. PROCEEDINGS 25 (1976); Committee on 
Simplification Section of Taxation, American Bar Association, Complexity and the Personal Con-
sumption Tax, 35 TAX LAW. 415 (1982); Davies, Income-Plus-Wealth: In Search of a Better Tax 
Base, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 849 (1984); Feldstein, The Welfare Cost of Capital Income Taxation, 86 
J. POL. EcoN. S29, S37-S39 (1978); Goode, The Superiority of the Income Tax, in WHAT 
SHOULD BE TAXED?, supra, at 49; Graetz, supra note 29; Gunn, The Case for an Income Tax, 46 
U. CHI. L. REv. 370 (1979); Jones, Treatment of Gratuitous Transfers: Unraveling the Case for a 
Consumption Tax, 29 ST. Loms U. L.J. 1155 (1985); Minarik, The Future of the Individual 
Income Tax, 35 NATL. TAX J. 231 (1982); Posin, Toward a Theory of Federal Taxation: A 
Comment, 50 J. AIR L. & COMM. 907 (1985); Warren, Fairness and a Consumption-Type or Cash 
Flow Personal Income Tax, 88 HARV. L. REV. 931 (1975); Warren, supra note 9. 
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of these forms to business and investment purposes. Likewise, it taxes 
neither funds used to acquire or rent assets nor the assets the taxpayer 
produces so long as they are devoted to business and investment pur-
poses. The consumption tax even successfully avoids the economic 
distortions created by the nontaxation of imputed income from prop-
erty acquired for consumption purposes because it taxes neither the 
income from consumption assets nor the income from business or in~ 
vestment assets. The reason for the equivalent tax treatment is ex-
plained by recalling that one way to describe the beriefit of tax deferral 
is by characterizing it as a tax exemption on investment income.189 
Taxing income used to acquire consumption assets and not the im-
puted income earned on these assets leads to the same tax burden as 
not taxing income used to acquire business and investment assets and 
only taxing that income and· accumulated profits when the taxpayer 
dissaves and devotes the funds to consumption. Thus, the consump-
tion tax eliminates the incentive present under the Code (and that 
would continue under TARET) to acquire consumer goods rather 
than save.190 
The consumption tax potentially distorts resource allocation in 
only two ways. One distortion results from the continuing tax advan-
tage accorded imputed income from services. A taxpayer who sells 
her services in the marketplace and acquires consumption assets pays 
a consumption tax, but a taxpayer who forgoes working in the market-
place and produces her own consumption assets successfully avoids 
the tax. 191 The second distortion results from the proposals to make 
the consumption tax progressive on an annual basis. For individuals 
who have large variations in consumption rates over time, a progres-
sive tax causes intertemporal distortions if expenditures in different 
taxing periods fall into different tax brackets.192 
The advantages of relative economic neutrality suggest that the 
consumption tax is clearly a more attractive alternative than TARET. 
189. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. 
190. The effect of a consumption tax on the level of savings is uncertain. See, e.g., Howrey & 
Hymans, The Measurement and Determination of Loanable-Fund Savings, in WHAT SHOULD BE 
TAXED?, supra note 188; Minarik, supra note 188, at 234-35; Minarik, Income Versus Expendi-
ture Taxation to Reduce the Deficit, 22 TAX NOTES 1257, 1258 (1984). 
191. The consumption tax's inability to reach imputed income from services suggests that 
many expenditures for the production of human capital should be classified as consumption to 
ameliorate the tax advantage. For further discussion of investments in human capital and how 
these should be treated under the consumption tax, see D. BRADFORD, supra note 188, at 204-06; 
Andrews, supra note l, at 1145-46. 
192. MEADE REPORT, supra note 16, at 37-39; Bradford, in WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED?, 
supra note 188, at 96 n.39; Veal!, A Note on the Expenditure Tax and Progressivity, 40 NATL. 
TAX J. 259 (1987). 
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The focus on economic neutrality, however, ignores the impact of the 
tax system on wealth distribution. Taxpayers who save rather than 
consume will be able to get wealthier faster under the consumption tax 
than under TARET because they will enjoy the benefits of tax defer-
ral. The concern about wealth accumulation is heightened if Professor 
Andrews' recommendation is followed and donative transfers during 
life and at death are not treated as consumptive acts. 193 By excluding 
donative transfers from the consumption tax, tax deferral becomes tax 
exclusion. The taxpayer and the taxpayer's donees are no longer 
choosing between immediate and postponed consumption, but are also 
given the opportunity to avoid consumption permanently. Not only is 
the consumption tax likely to increase wealth disparity, it also fails to 
account for the benefit that people can obtain from wealth without 
ever having to consume it. 
Professor Andrews' response is that Congress should supplement 
the consumption tax with an effective wealth tax. 194 The politics sur-
rounding federal wealth taxes, however, have historically prevented 
them from being used constructively either to eliminate large concen-
trations of wealth or to make the taxing system significantly more pro-
gressive. Further, with current interest in the consumption tax 
sparked by its promise of encouraging Americans to increase their 
level of savings, 195 any increase in wealth taxes would likely be resisted 
on grounds that it would undo the consumption tax's benefits by dis-
couraging accumulations of wealth. 196 Moreover, even if the political 
will existed to enact a significant wealth tax, a considerable challenge 
would remain to design a workable system to prevent tax avoidance. 197 
193. See Andrews, supra note 1, at 1162-64; see also TREASURY BLUEPRINTS, supra note 
188, at 30, 35, 123-25 (discussing inclusion and exclusion of gifts and bequests from the donor's 
and donee's tax bases and adopting for its model a rule including them in the donee's and exclud-
ing them from the donor's tax base under the assumption that large gifts and bequests would be 
subject to some sort of transfer tax). But see Aaron & Galper, A Tax on Consumption, Gifts, and 
Bequests and Other Strategies for Reform, in THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, OPTIONS FOR TAX 
REFORM 106, 121, 131 (J. Pechman ed. 1984) (proposing including gifts and bequests in both the 
donor's and donee's tax base). For further discussion of this issise, see Jones, supra note 188; 
Gunn, supra note 188, at 390-91. 
194. See Andrews, supra note 1, at 1169-73. 
195. See, e.g., Sheppard, Consumption Taxes and Capital Investment, 32 TAX NOTES 934 
(1986). 
196. Gunn, supra note 188, at 380-81 (attributes reluctance to impose a wealth tax on the 
illogical but real and pervasive perception that taking property from citizens is more oppressive 
than preventing them from acquiring it); see also H. SIMONS, supra note 1, at 229 (predicting 
political resistance will arise if donatively transferred property is taxed heavily under a gift and 
estate or inheritance tax and then taxed again when the beneficiaries consume the donntively 
transferred capital). 
197. See G. COOPER, A VOLUNTARY TAX! NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SOPHISTICATED Es-
TATE TAX AVOIDANCE (1979). The most recent attempt has focused on an accessions tax. See 
Halbach, An Accessions Tax, 23 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 211 (1988). 
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TARET's claim to serious consideration is that it eliminates many 
unplanned economic distortions from the tax structure without 
shrinking the tax base through tax deferral and without risking greater 
wealth disparities within society. It addresses the major criticisms of 
the Code by eliminating tax deferral on realized gains and the related 
complexities of provisions concerning nonrecognition, capital gains 
and losses, cost recovery, and debt. 198 If either tax system is imple-
mented, serious consideration should be given to repeal of the corpo-
rate income tax. The reason to eliminate the corporate tax under a 
consumption tax regime is that whatever the corporation distributes to 
shareholders will be taxed unless reinvested and whatever the corpora-
tion retains represents savings and, therefore, should not be taxed. 199 
Under TARET, the reason to repeal the corporate tax is that it pres-
ently serves to offset the deferral available to shareholders associated 
with accumulated earnings.200 By eliminating deferral, TARET 
makes the corporate income tax less justifiable. The only capital in-
come measurement problem T ARET fails to solve is the effect of infla-
tion. Full indexing of the TARET tax base, however, should be 
administratively feasible and, therefore, inflation-related problems are 
not a clear reason to favor the consumption tax over TARET.201 
TARET's strength comes from the fact that it does not rely on the 
hope of designing an effective wealth tax to redistribute wealth accu-
mulations. By eliminating most tax deferral opportunities, TARET 
eliminates the need for any wealth tax or consideration of rules includ-
ing gifts and bequests in the income tax base of the donor or donee. 
As a number of scholars have indicated, the principal reason for a 
wealth tax under the current federal system is to reach some of the 
wealth that escapes income taxation through rules providing for accel-
erated depreciation, tax-free retirement accounts, and step-up-in-basis 
at death.202 Without these incursions on the tax base, the administra-
tion of a wealth tax may prove undesirable and_unnecessary.203 
198. See Andrews, supra note 1, at 1129-39. 
199. But see MEADE REPORT, supra note 16, at 227-68 (arguing that a corporate tax should 
continue under a consumption tax to preserve a revenue source and avoid the windfalls to corpo-
rate owners that will occur as a result of the tax's repeal). 
200. See Anlerican Law Institute, supra note 170, at 358-66. 
201. For discussion of inflation adjustments, see U.S. TREASURY DEPT., supra note 188, at 
177-200; MEADE REPORT, supra note 16, at 99-123; Durst, supra note 32, at 1222-26, 1238-45, 
1251-60, 1272-90; Gann, supra note 16, at 123-35, 140-42. 
202. See Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259, 273 (1983); 
Gutman, Reforming Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes After ERTA, 69 VA. L. REV. 1183, 1189-92 
(1983). Death will remain a taxable event under TARET because market value changes that 
occurred from the time assets were acquired or produced until death will be taxed. See supra 
notes 88-89 and accompanying text. 
203. See Galvin, supra note 16, at 33, 43. 
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The consumption tax offers tax deferral accompanied by a promise 
of an effective wealth tax while TARET offers no tax deferral accom-
panied by a promise of no wealth tax. The consumption tax and 
TARET are two very different approaches designed to accomplish the 
same tax goals of economic neutrality, fairness, a healthy and growing 
economy, and administrability. Both offer tax structures that are far 
superior to the present Code. A good deal more study is necessary 
before we can make an informed judgment about which approach we 
should implement. The development in some detail of TARET at 
least permits a comparison of the consumption tax with an income tax 
system other than one in which the realization-event principle and tax 
deferral are viewed as necessary constraints. 
CONCLUSION 
One major purpose of this article has been to demonstrate the fea-
sibility of creating an income tax system that prevents taxpayers from 
arranging their economic affairs to enjoy the benefits of tax deferral. 
At the outset, the article acknowledges the administrative importance 
of a marketplace transaction and, therefore, provides solutions to tax 
deferral based on information known at the time a taxpayer enters into 
a realization event. The first step was to identify various kinds of eco-
nomic transactions and the challenges each presents to crafting an al-
location technique for assigning market price increases over the taxing 
periods a taxpayer holds or produces an asset. After feasible, reason-
ably accurate, and nonmanipulable allocation techniques were 
designed, the solution to tax deferral took the obvious form of charg-
ing interest for the delay in tax payment between the time the market 
price increases were deemed to have occurred and the realization event 
that triggered the tax assessment. Fairness, of course, demands that 
the same approach apply to market price decreases, and the article 
proposes similar rules for computing tax refunds. 
The allocation techniques and time-value adjustments are ex-
pressed in seemingly complex summation formulas. Those formulas, 
however, provide a linear description of the tax system and demon-
strate how Haig-Simons' one-period model can be made to work in a 
multi-period context. All that further needs to be considered to make 
T ARET fully operational are inflation adjustments and transitional 
rules. Much work has already been done regarding indexing of the 
Code, and TARET can easily adapt it.204 The transitional rules may 
204. See supra note 201. Indexing requires record-keeping of when a taxpayer acquired and 
sold an asset and if or when she increased her investment in the asset by making improvements or 
the like. TARET requires the same information, reducing the marginal cost of introducing an 
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also be relatively easy to accomplish. The time-value-of-money ad-
justments essentially change the tax rate, and tax rate changes are one 
of the easiest reforms to accomplish quickly and smoothly.205 
A second and equally important purpose of the article was to high-
light the realization-event principle's role under the Code and demon-
strate that it is the source of the most serious abuses, inequities, and 
complications found in the law. Consideration ofTARET as an oper-
ating system provides a different perspective for understanding the 
Code and its operation. To reiterate Simons, exploring TARET al-
lowed us "to consider fruitfully the problem of bettering the system of 
presumptions. "206 
inflation adjustment. Moreover, linking TARET with indexing should significantly reduce the 
impact TARET might have on the relative prices of assets. Indexing will reduce the amount of 
gains while TARET will increase the tax rate on those inflation-adjusted gains. 
205. The breadth of the proposal has the advantage of limiting the change that might occur 
in the relative values of assets. Cf. Shakow, supra note 6, at 1180-81 (discussing transitional 
issues regarding an accrual taxing proposal). 
206. See supra note 18. 
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APPENDIX: $1000 INVESTMENT IN COMMON STOCKS 
FROM 1965-1984 
TABLE I: HAIG-SIMONS MODEL 
Tax Time-
Year-by-Year Total Liability Adjusted 
Returns on for Each Tax 
Standard & Poor Year. Liability 
500 Common Stocks* Re tum {30%} {1.0545%} 
Investment: $1000.00 
1965 .1245 124.50 $37.35 $102.39 
1966 -.1006 (113.12) (33.94) (88.35) 
1967 .2398 242.53 72.76 179.38 
1968 .1106 138.68 41.60 97.26 
1969 -.0850 (118.37) (35.51) (78.73) 
1970 .0401 51.10 15.33 32.23 
1971 .1431 189.65 56.90 113.44 
1972 .1898 287.54 86.26 163.09 
1973 -.1466 (264.25) (79.28) (142.15) 
1974 -.2647 (407.18) (122.15) (207.69) 
1975 .3720 420.76 126.23 203.53 
1976 .2384 369.96 110.99 169.71 
1977 -.0718 (134.99) (41.40) (60.03) 
1978 .0656 117.02 35.11 48.28 
1979 .1844 350.51 105.15 137.11 
1980 .3242 729.89 218.97 270.76 
1981 -.0491 (146.38) (43.91) (51.49) 
1982 .2141 606.94 182.08 202.47 
1983 .2251 774.75 232.43 245.10 
1984 .0627 264.38 79.31 79.31 
Total: $4480.92 $1415.62 
• Interest-rate factor assumed to be the average after-tax rate of return earned over 20-year 
period to permit comparison with TARET model 
Source of data: IBBOTSON AssOCIATES, STOCKS, BONDS, BILLS, AND INFLATION 1986 YEAR-
BOOK 29 (1986). 
February 1990] Tax Deferral 813 
TABLE II: TARET MODEL 
R = [$4480.92/$1000]1120 - 1 = .077875 
After-tax interest-rate factor: [1 + .077875(1 - .3)] = 1.0545 
Year 
Investment: 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
Total: 
Return 
[R($1000)(l+RYJ 
$1000.00 
77.87 
83.94 
90.48 
97.52 
105.12 
113.30 
122.13 
131.64 
141.89 
152.94 
164.85 
177.68 
191.52 
206.44 
222.51 
239.84 
258.52 
278.65 
300.35 
323.74 
$4480.92 
Haig-Simons model: $1415.62 
TARET model: $1589.85 
TARET model amount of overtax: $174.23 
Percentage of overtaxation: 12.30% 
Tax Liability 
for Each 
Year 
(30%) 
$23.36 
25.18 
27.14 
29.25 
31.53 
33.99 
36.63 
39.49 
42.56 
45.88 
49.45 
53.30 
57.45 
61.92 
66.75 
71.94 
77.55 
83.59 
90.10 
97.11 
Time-Adjusted 
Tax Liability 
(1.0545) 
$64.04 
65.46 
66.91 
68.39 
69.91 
71.46 
73.04 
74.66 
76.31 
78.00 
79.73 
81.50 
83.30 
85.15 
87.03 
88.96 
90.93 
92.95 
95.01 
97.11 
$1589.85 
